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ABSTRACT 
Much recent discussion has highlighted the challenges posed by what have variously 
been called “disruptive”, “discontinuous”, “breakthrough” and “radical” innovations.  
Although the labelling may vary, the underlying themes appear to be consistent.  In 
particular it is clear that under conditions in which the dominant “rules of the game” 
change as a result of emergent or shifting markets, major movements at the 
technological frontier, dislocations in the regulatory environment etc, even 
organizations with well-developed innovation capabilities get into difficulties.  This is 
less a matter of particular technological, market or political stimuli than of the 
limitations of the repertoire of organizational responses available to the firm.  This 
resurfaces a long-running concern with managing innovation in two different modes, 
namely “exploitation” and “exploration”. 
     This thesis reports the results of exploratory research into specific aspects of the 
organizational culture within the Research and Development (R&D) setting of a small 
mature UK based company, Cerulean.  In doing so it also identifies and discusses key 
management interventions for developing an innovation culture that facilitates radical 
product innovation.  Cerulean designs and manufactures quality control instrumentation 
and has in the past been very successful with radically new products.  In recent years 
this propensity for “radicalness” has declined and the company now wishes to regain 
this capability.  A grounded research methodology and a participative action research 
approach was utilised to surface issues that clearly illustrated both the presence and 
intensity of aspects of organisation culture that enabled and inhibited radical product 
innovation.  Participative analysis of the data identified nine emerging themes and key 
constructs of an innovation culture that was found to influence “radicalness” in new 
product development ventures.  The interrelationships between the themes were 
discussed in the context of current theoretical perspectives in the field of innovation 
management.  This led to the development of a conceptual model that incorporates two 
“ideal” archetypal forms of innovation culture.  A composite instrument was developed 
based on existing evaluation tools and used to assess the innovation culture.  First use of 
the instrument indicated areas of opportunity in developing a radical innovation culture.   
    Further participative analysis of the emergent themes and the assessment and 
evaluations of the extant innovation culture, resulted in a series of management 
interventions to stimulate the development of a culture to facilitate radical product 
innovation.  The design of the interventions was also informed by the literature and 
other organizations, part of a national Discontinuous Innovation Forum (DIF) 
undergoing similar ambitions.  The proposed interventions comprise a series of linked 
management actions in the form of a plan to shift the innovation culture of the company 
closer to a desired radical innovation culture. 
 
Keywords: organizational culture, radical innovation, interventions, change 
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PUBLICATION 
During the course of the research, presentation of the work and academic peer review 
took place through several channels.  In the earlier stages of the research, during 2004, 
the researcher presented his work to a Research Colloquium in the Cranfield School of 
Management and to the Cranfield Innovation Leadership Centre. 
 
     The research and emergent findings were presented through the doctoral tracks at the 
EurOMA 2004 conference in Fontainebleau (McLaughlin, 2004), and at the EurOMA 
2005 conference in Budapest (McLaughlin, Bessant and Smart, 2005a).  Also at the 
EurOMA 2005 conference, the researcher presented a paper in the Co-design and New 
Product Development track (McLaughlin, Bessant and Smart, 2005b).  At the 2005 
CINET conference in Brighton, the paper presented (McLaughlin, Bessant and Smart, 
2005c) won “Best Paper” award. 
 
     Papers were accepted for the Cranfield School of Management Working Paper series 
(McLaughlin, Bessant and Smart, 2005d), and for publication in the International 
Journal of Technology Management (McLaughlin, Bessant and Smart, Forthcoming). 
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NOTATION 
The following abbreviations and acronyms are used in this research and relate to 
Cerulean and its employees. 
Term Definition of term 
ASM The ASM 500- a semi-automated machine that collects vapour 
phase and particulate matter from cigarettes to allow further 
laboratory analysis of the collected material. 
 
QTM A Quality Test Module.  One of a number of individual instrument 
modules that are used to measure individual product characteristics 
on cigarettes or filters. 
 
MC2 A new product that encapsulates twenty-seven measurements into 
one single instrument.  Originally designed as an “at line” 
measurement instrument that would operate alongside a filter or 
cigarette maker and sample from the finished product to allow these 
measurements to be obtained.  MC2 comprises the basic instrument 
“C2” – software for visualization and analysis of measured data – 
“M”, and a sampling probe that allows the instrument to sample 
from the mass flow outlet of a filter or cigarette maker. 
 
C2 The hardware part of the MC2 instrument that forms the basis of 
development as a basic low cost instrument. 
 
SM400/SM450 A manual machine that collects vapour phase and particulate matter 
from cigarettes to allow further laboratory analysis of the analytes 
contained in the collected material. 
 
top team The group of directors who are responsible for the running of the 
business within Cerulean.  Also known as the “exec team”. 
 
exec team See “top team”. 
 
Cerulean An operating division of Molins plc. 
 
Molins A UK engineering plc with business operations in tobacco 
machinery, packaging and scientific services. 
 
Conformance The term used in Cerulean for improvement activities on existing 
products. 
 
Design/Development The term used in Cerulean for new product design development 
activities.  It does not include improvements or enhancements to 
existing products. 
 
DIF Discontinuous Innovation Forum.  A collaborative study of 
discontinuous innovation capability and enabling factors undertaken 
between Cranfield and Bath Universities, The Oxis Partnership, 
Thames Valley Technology and the United Kingdom Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
 
 xi 
Term Definition of term 
Decision Explorer Decision Explorer is a package that allows the drawing of 
cognitive maps.  It was developed to help members of a team 
map their view of a problem and more effectively negotiate a 
consensus for action.  It displays constructs and linkages 
between constructs that represent the meaning of the construct 
in terms of the explanations and consequences.  These links 
are not taken to be causal in a precise way.  The link is in the 
form of an arrow to show the nature of the linkage.  An arrow 
out of a construct shows a consequence and an arrow into a 
construct an explanation.  Each arrow gives explanatory 
meaning to one construct and consequential meaning to 
another (Eden, 1988). 
 
NVivo NVivo is a package that facilitates analysis of qualitative data.  
This software permits the coding and subsequent analysis of 
attributes within a series of documents. 
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1 Introduction 
The research described in this thesis responds to a growing concern that the flow of new 
products at the researcher’s company, Cerulean, was not forthcoming and so putting its 
future survival at risk.  The researcher’s industrial experience revealed that most 
companies are effective in pursuing incremental innovations in their new product and 
service developments.  Whilst in general, radically new products espoused to provide a 
significant competitive advantage are a rare occurrence, in some larger organizations 
such as Hewlett Packard (Stringer, 2000) radical innovation is more common.  This 
mostly large company phenomenon prompted an interest in whether established and 
mature small-to-medium sized (SME) companies, in this case Cerulean, could also 
facilitate a culture for radical innovation.  At the time of this research commencing 
Cerulean’s senior management team were actively communicating the urgency for 
radically innovative products to ensure the organization’s future survival.  This 
practitioner need subsequently drove the research process. 
     The objective of undertaking the research was to understand what aspects of 
organizational culture enable and inhibit radical innovation n, to better facilitate radical 
innovation in new product development.  Bringing the research resource and faculty 
experience from Cranfield School of Management to bear on this problem was 
perceived as a benefit in managing such a change.  An effective and complementary 
way of doing this was to propose a practitioner issue for doctoral enquiry through the 
Executive Doctorate programme.  The desired outcome from the research is an outline 
of a plan of interventions designed to create the conditions of an organizational culture 
that will facilitate radical innovation. 
1.1 Background and rationale for the research 
1.1.1 The company 
Cerulean is an international company that designs, manufactures, markets and supports 
a range of quality measurement equipment and specialized packing machines 
worldwide.  It has a head office in Milton Keynes in the United Kingdom.  Design, 
development and manufacturing are all carried out exclusively at the Milton Keynes 
head office.  This facility also contains the administration functions, Sales and 
Customer Service for the Europe, Middle East and Africa regions.  There are service, or 
sales and service centres in the USA, in Richmond and Winston Salem, Mexico, Brazil, 
Venezuela, South Africa, Germany, Russia, Italy, India, Malaysia, and China in 
Shanghai and Kunming.  As at September 2005, there were 110 people employed by the 
company with around 70 of these being based at the Milton Keynes head office.  
Cerulean is an operating division of Molins plc.  An organization chart for the company 
as at June 2005 is shown in Appendix A. 
     The company was established in 1961.  It grew out of a requirement to produce 
cigarette filter packing machines and measurement equipment for the mainstream 
business of filter making.  As this requirement grew, the opportunity to market this 
capability was recognized and a separate company established.  Until October 2000 the 
company was part of a division of Bunzl plc.  The division, Filtrona, designed and 
marketed filters for the tobacco industry on a worldwide basis.  The instrument and 
packing business was known as Filtrona Instruments and Automation.  However, Bunzl 
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was developing itself as a business-to-business consumables operation and Filtrona 
Instruments and Automation was the only capital goods manufacturing part of the 
group.  The business was sold to Molins plc in October 2000.  Molins is a UK 
engineering plc that produces making and handling machinery for the tobacco industry, 
specialized packing machines for food and consumer goods industries, and scientific 
analytical services for the tobacco industry.  As the name “Filtrona” was no longer 
appropriate for the company it was rebranded as “Cerulean” during the summer of 2001.  
The instruments produced by the company are a deep blue colour and tend to stand out 
against the beige and green of making machines on the factory floor.  Building on this 
attribute, the name of “Cerulean”, a word also meaning a deep blue colour, was chosen 
for the business. 
     The company launched a modular range of instrumentation (the QTM range) in the 
early 1990s, and this led to a long run of successful sales.  The modularity of the QTM 
instruments and the ability to stack modules to provide multiple readings of product 
characteristics were features that were new to the industry.  The QTM range had been a 
significantly new product when it was launched – a radical innovation.  This product 
had been enhanced over many years, developing incremental improvements and 
variants of the original core product.  This QTM range of products was still generating 
significant sales in 2005.  In 1999, the company launched another new product, the 
ASM smoking machine, with several new technologies used in the instrument.  This 
product was less successful in the market, meeting significant resistance, due to 
inadequate development of some of the new technologies.  Since the launch of this 
product, incremental enhancements have been made to the instrument and there is now 
greater acceptance of this product in the market.  There has only been one radical 
product innovation since the ASM product, and this was developed initially through 
external consultants, prior to bringing the project in-house. 
1.1.2 The researcher 
The researcher is the current Managing Director of Cerulean.  At the outset of the 
research he held the position of Operations Director, being promoted to Managing 
Director midway through the research.  He is a Chartered Engineer with management 
experience in manufacturing and product development with a number of firms.  Over 
several years prior to joining Cerulean, he had experience of implementing change in 
these firms to improve production or product development performance.  He was 
recruited to Cerulean specifically to implement a lean manufacturing system as part of 
the overall change programme the company was undertaking during 1999.  After 
completing this part of the change programme he took responsibility for the product 
development area in Cerulean in 2000.  He became interested in the reasons why the 
company could no longer develop new radical products, despite having a history of 
developing such products in the past.  The company’s recent development history, at the 
outset of this research, had been predominantly incremental improvements to the 
existing product range.  The issue of radical innovation was a focus because the 
researcher’s experience in a number of mature small design and manufacturing 
companies has been that radically innovative products are the exception.  Many 
companies are effective in developing incremental innovation in their new product 
development, albeit in many cases in an intermittent manner.  However, radically new 
products, which are considered to be essential to the survival and growth of companies, 
appear to be relatively rare, in contrast to some larger organizations, such as Hewlett 
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Packard, where they are a more common occurrence.  This prompted an interest in why 
some smaller established companies appear to be less successful in radical or 
discontinuous innovation in new product development.  For Cerulean innovative new 
products are perceived to be essential for the future survival of the organization, so the 
research issue is relevant to the future operation of the business.  With the requirement 
to regain the ability to develop radically new products becoming more important to the 
business, the researcher began examining the reasons why the company had lost this 
capability and what would be required to regain it.  From this interest, the research 
described in this thesis evolved. 
1.1.3 Problem statement 
Over many years the company had grown to be a dominant player in its international 
market sectors but found itself unable to provide the “stream of innovative new 
products” that the company believes is necessary to survival and growth.  It had a strong 
new product introduction process that had been used to generate “me too” products that 
were responding to a competitor offering or an evolution of an existing product.  Some 
incremental innovation was taking place as seen from the new product introductions 
over these years, but the new products represented an evolutionary progression.  The 
last example of a product that included a radical innovation was conceived about three 
years prior to the start of this research investigation.  This radical innovation came from 
the use of an external consultancy to create the concept that was later developed and 
productionized within Cerulean.  PA Consulting was retained to provide a solution to a 
particular set of measurement requirements.  This consultancy created a sensor 
application, instrument layout and packaging that represented a radical innovation.  The 
remaining sensor applications in the instrument were examples of incremental 
innovation, doing what was done before, but doing it better.  At the time the decision 
was taken to retain the consultants, the belief of the Managing Director was that the 
Cerulean Development Team would produce only an incremental improvement of the 
existing product range as a solution to the measurement requirements.  The radical step 
forward was not believed to be capable of being created internally.  Once the outline 
proposal and feasibility had been completed satisfactorily by the consultants, the 
development and productionization of the design took place within Cerulean.  
Terziovski (2002) argues that a continuous incremental improvement strategy is the 
major driving force behind any improvement effort, and that radical innovations should 
be used to jump-start critical products, services and processes intermittently.  Both 
incremental and radical innovation are necessary for long-term business success. 
     The reasons associated with the lack of radical innovation in product development at 
Cerulean were discussed with key personnel at varying levels within the organization.  
The new product created through the external consultancy generated interest in why the 
company was unable to generate radical innovation internally.  These informal 
discussions took place with senior managers and development personnel, during the 
eighteen months prior to the start of this research.  The issues that emerged were 
representative of risk-aversion, a tendency to blame for mistakes and missed due dates; 
and a Development Team desire to build on existing products rather than develop new 
ones.  These were suggested as fundamental problems within Cerulean’s culture.  The 
underlying problem appeared to be one of organizational culture inhibiting innovation 
(Kanter, 1988). 
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1.2 The need for radical innovation 
Innovation matters and it is important for success in design and manufacturing firms 
(DTI, 2003).  Utterback (1994) states that innovation is a central determinant of longer-
run success and failure for manufacturing firms.  Successful companies are generally 
effective at responding to evolutionary changes in their markets.  Where they run into 
trouble is in handling or initiating revolutionary changes in their markets or in dealing 
with disruptive technologies (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000).  If a company is looking 
for growth levels that are significantly larger than the growth of the industry then it 
must take discontinuous or radical innovation seriously (Bessant, Birkinshaw and 
Delbridge, 2004).  This perspective is supported by McDermott and Handfield (2000) 
who argue that in order to achieve long-term growth firms need either novel 
replacements, new to the market products, or breakthrough products.  Firms that focus 
only on incremental innovation are avoiding risk, but at the same time are missing 
opportunities.  Utterback (1994) and Christensen (1997) note how firms that dominate 
one generation of technology often fail to maintain leadership in the next.  Radical 
innovation has one main benefit over incremental innovation which is that it creates 
products that do not replace or supplant other products, but adds something new; ‘it 
takes you out of the “zero-sum” game that characterises many industry battlegrounds’ 
(Bessant et al., 2004:  29).  Radical innovation is associated with breakthrough ideas 
(Gundling, 2000; O’Connor and Rice, 2001) and with the development of new business 
or product lines based on new ideas or technologies or substantial cost reductions that 
transform the economics of a business (Leifer, McDermott, O’Connor, Peters, Rice, and 
Veyzer, 2000).  Companies are increasingly required to combine operational 
effectiveness and strategic flexibility.  Operational effectiveness requires excellent 
exploitation – incremental innovation – capabilities.  Strategic flexibility requires 
excellent exploration – radical innovation – capabilities (Boer and Gertsen, 2003).  An 
alternative perspective is posited by Getz and Robinson (2003).  They suggest that 
innovation is not essential and that companies can prosper without innovation.  
However they also posit that continuous improvement is essential for the success of the 
company and cite GE as an example of an organization that has prospered without a 
clear innovation strategy.  In recent times however, the new CEO at GE has adopted a 
more conciliatory approach to risk taking.  This is described as unlocking the curiosity 
yet retaining the rigour (Brady, 2005). 
1.3 Research question 
The research agenda is developed from literature on innovation, creativity aspects of 
innovation, organizational culture’s effect on innovation and changing the 
organizational culture to promote innovation.  The research gap identified is in 
determining aspects of innovation culture that facilitate radical innovation and in 
developing interventions that can create conditions conducive to supporting radical 
innovation.  The gap poses a research question that is sub-divided into constituent parts 
that address the research gap.  Although the research question focuses on Cerulean, the 
investigation can be considered as an experiment that explores a more widespread 
phenomenon rather than a company specific issue. 
     The research question is formulated as, “What aspects of organizational culture 
facilitate radical product innovation and how can change be planned to leverage 
potential improvement?”  The research question is broken down into the following sub-
questions: 
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1. What are the cultural enablers and inhibitors to radical innovation in mature 
small to medium sized design and manufacturing firms? 
2. What are the perceptions of Cerulean employees and their extant position of the 
company’s culture for encouraging radical innovation? 
3. What is the gap between the Cerulean current organizational culture and the 
desired future state for radical innovation? 
4. What change can be effectively planned to encourage a culture that will develop 
a radical innovation capability at Cerulean? 
1.4 Thesis format 
The Cranfield Executive Doctorate research format comprises three projects that are 
inter-related and a linking document that draws all three projects together.  The research 
is driven by issues in management practice that can be translated into an academic 
question for the purpose of doctoral research.  The outcome of the research should 
provide valuable insight for the organization involved in the research and for the wider 
community of practice.  The research is focused on a practitioner issue and is intended 
to provide a solution of benefit to the practitioner as well as adding to domains of 
knowledge for an academic contribution.  The researcher is a senior manager in the 
organization and this is recognized in the research methodology. 
     This thesis follows the Cranfield Executive Doctorate research format outlined 
above.  The literature is reviewed in Chapter 2 and informs all three project stages of the 
research and the discussion.  Chapter 3 evaluates the researcher’s philosophy and the 
resultant methodology adopted for this research.  Project One, described in Chapter 4, 
describes how aspects of the innovation culture that influence radical innovation are 
surfaced by working in a participatory manner with the Cerulean Development Team 
members.  Chapter 4 describes Project Two which develops a composite instrument and 
gauges the presence and intensity of the aspects of innovation culture influencing 
radical innovation.  This chapter also includes the results from the assessment.  Chapter 
6 describes Project Three which evaluates empirical examples of interventions designed 
to develop a radical innovation capability and develops a series of inter-linked 
interventions planned to create an innovation culture that is supportive to radical 
innovation in the Cerulean Development Team.  The findings from the research are 
discussed in context of the literature in Chapter 7.  Conclusions are drawn and further 
research opportunities discussed in Chapter 8.  An overview of the thesis format is 
shown in Figure 1-1. 
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2 Literature review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1  Research overview – Literature Review 
2.1 The innovation landscape 
To consider innovation, it is necessary to define what is meant by the term.  Within this 
research, innovation refers to the context of product development.  In this context it can 
be defined as the development and implementation of new ideas by people who over 
time engage in transactions with others within an institutional order (Van de Ven, 
1988).  Schumpeter’s (1961) emphasis on the importance of innovation is echoed by 
Ouchi (1981), Peters and Waterman (1982) and Kanter (1985).  Innovation is generally 
accepted as a necessary activity for an organization to ensure its prosperity (DTI, 2003). 
     Quinn (1985) suggests that innovation is non-linear, slightly chaotic, usually sloppy, 
sometimes random, and often up and down in nature.  Ruth (2003:  230) suggests that 
the ‘assumption that product innovation can be planned is an increasingly doubtful 
assumption lacking in foundation’.  Hickman and Raia (2002) argue that innovation 
thrives on disorder, imagination and ambiguity.  Tang (1998:  301) suggests that 
‘innovation thrives on challenge.’  One suggested definition of innovation is ‘the 
generation, acceptance, and implementation of new ideas, processes, products and 
services’ (Kanter, 1985:  20). 
     Innovation is generally agreed to be composed of invention and application of the 
invention (Delbecq and Mills, 1985; Van de Ven, 1988; Ettlie, 2000).  The concept of 
creativity is therefore a part of the literature on innovation and this concept is contained 
in some definitions of innovation.  Amabile (1988b:  126) defines creativity as ‘the 
production of novel and useful ideas by an individual or small group of individuals 
working together’ and organizational innovation as ‘the successful implementation of 
creative ideas within an organization’.  Bruce and Bessant (2002) define innovation as 
the successful application of new ideas in practice in the form of new or improved 
products, services or processes.  Delbecq (1985) argues that significant change must be 
successfully introduced to be considered as innovation. 
     Van de Ven and Poole (1989:  32) suggest that ‘while innovation is defined as the 
introduction of a new idea, the process of innovation refers to the temporal sequence of 
events that occur as people interact with others to develop and implement their 
innovation ideas within an institutional context’.  Innovation is about change (Tidd, 
Bessant, and Pavitt, 2001).  This is a recurring theme in most definitions of innovation.  
The innovation process, from the creative front end to the development and 
implementation, is characterized by change.  Innovation cannot happen without 
interaction and input from people.  It is influenced by organization and attitude rather 
than nurturing solitary genius (Hargadon and Sutton, 2000). 
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2.1.1 Radical v incremental innovation 
Dahlin and Behrens define a radical invention as (1) novel, (2) unique and (3) having an 
impact on future technology (2005).  ‘The distinction between radical and incremental 
innovations is easier to intuit than to define or measure’ (Dewar and Dutton, 1986:  
1423).  Innovation can be considered to exist along a continuum, from incremental 
innovation, that which the company tries to do better or do more of, to radical 
innovation, that which is new to the company or new to the industry (Nord and Tucker, 
1987; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  Radical 
innovation is associated with break-though ideas (Gundling, 2000; O’Connor and Rice, 
2001) and with the development of new business or product lines  based on new ideas 
or technologies or substantial cost reductions that transform the economics of a business 
(Leifer et al., 2000).  Hill and Rothaermel (2003:  258) differentiate between the two 
types of innovation in that ‘an incremental technological innovation builds squarely 
upon the established knowledge base used by incumbent firms, and it steadily improves 
the methods or materials used to achieve the firm’s objective of profitably satisfying 
customer needs.  In contrast, a radical technological innovation involves methods and 
materials that are novel to the incumbents’.  The negative consequences of too much 
attention to incremental innovation have been recognized in research (Rice, Leifer and 
O’Connor, 2002).  Utterback (1994) and Christensen (1997), note how firms that 
dominate one generation of technology often fail to maintain leadership in the next.  A 
radical innovation may use disruptive technology and in so doing require a different set 
of rules with which to manage the innovation process.  For radical innovation the 
emphasis is on products that involve dramatic departures from existing products or their 
logical extensions (Veryzer, 1998).  Delbecq and Mills (1985) differentiate radical from 
incremental innovation in that incremental innovation involves minimal disruption.  
Radical innovations involve the development of a new technological paradigm that 
creates new knowledge and understanding, and potentially new industrial sectors.  
Radical innovation requires organizations to move into unknown territory and 
experiment with new processes that largely elude systemization (O’Connor and 
McDermott, 2004).  This perspective of venturing into the unknown is supported by 
Rose-Anderssen, Allen, Tsinopoulos and McCarthy (2005) who suggest complexity 
theory as a lens to examine innovation.  They argue that incremental improvements are 
rational extensions of the present whilst radical improvements require a creative step 
into the unknown. 
     Uncertainty plagues radical projects – technical, market, organizational and resource 
uncertainties.  The radical project is also marked by discontinuities, gaps, critical 
transitions and leverage points.  In this arena traditional management methods may not 
be appropriate for radical innovation projects (Leifer et al., 2000).  This indicates why 
the business practices in some larger established firms mitigate against radical 
innovation, as the systems and processes that ensure continuity and success (the 
incremental improvements) become the inhibitors to innovation (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). 
2.1.2 Creativity 
Rickards suggests that ‘creativity in a changing environment is a corporate necessity, 
not an add-on luxury’ (1990:  40).  Recurring themes in the definitions of innovation are 
creativity (Amabile, 1988a; Andriopoulos, 2001), invention (Marquis, 1988; Ettlie, 
2000) and people (Van de Ven, 1988; Huizenga, 2000).  People are the source of the 
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creativity and individual creativity leads to group creativity which can manifest itself in 
innovations in the appropriate environment (Kanter, 1988; Angle, 1989; Woodman, 
Sawyer and Griffin, 1993).  An appropriate organizational culture will facilitate this 
creativity (Tesluk, Farr and Klein, 1997) and the organization members should be able 
to operate in a relatively unstructured, open and fluid environment (Kaplan, 1960; 
Ahmed, 1998; Amabile, Hadley and Kramer, 2002; Buhler, 2002).  The requirement to 
have creativity at both individual and group levels is a fundamental cornerstone for 
innovation (Amabile, 1988a; Tesluk et al., 1997; Bharadwaj and Menon, 2000; Sethi, 
Smith and Park, 2002).  Tang (1998:  298) argues that ‘creativity is the personal ability 
to recognize unusual patterns, relations, and produce novel ideas or things.  It is a 
prerequisite for innovation’.  Bundy suggests that the ‘ideal environment for an 
innovative company is Plato’s world, in which creativity and discovery are honoured’ 
(2002:  247).  De Salvo (1999) argues that creativity is the result of inspiration and that 
innovative ideas are born from supportive, open and trusting environments.  Two of the 
biggest barriers to blocking creativity are fear and lack of passion (DeSalvo, 1999).  
Trust overcomes fear and allows a willingness to accept vulnerability based upon 
having positive expectations about other people’s intentions and behaviours in 
situations which are interdependent and/or risky (Clegg, Unsworth, Epitropaki and 
Parker, 2002).  Creativity is considered to be widespread rather than the skill-set of a 
few creative individuals.  Having the appropriate climate is suggested to be a key factor 
in what is needed to release this creativity (Humble and Jones, 1989).  This is supported 
by Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1989) who argue that individual creativity within an 
organization depends, in addition to the individual’s own skills and motivations, on 
three basic components of the organization, (1) skills in innovation management 
occurring primarily at the level of the local supervisor, (2) motivation to innovate, 
evident as a commitment to innovation at the organization level and (3) resources, 
including materials, personnel and time.  Developing “do different” ideas depends on 
unusual ideas, and organizations successful in radical innovation make themselves more 
hospitable to the person with different ideas” (Leavy, 2005). 
2.1.3 Learning and knowledge 
The innovation process is knowledge intensive (Kanter, 1988).  Innovation needs 
knowledge to develop the ideas and it creates knowledge in the process (Tidd et al., 
2001).  Much of the knowledge required for incremental innovation is local knowledge 
(Jelinek and Schoonhoven, 1991).  For a radical innovation, the knowledge is new to the 
firm, and may diminish the value of the accumulated R&D knowledge of the firm (Hill 
and Rothaermel, 2003).  Management of this knowledge, much of which is tacit 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995), is also part of the innovation process.  Intertwined with 
the development of knowledge is individual and organizational learning (Garvin, 2000).  
The learning process is instrumental in making use of the knowledge available and 
results in generation of new knowledge (Senge, 1990; Bessant and Francis, 1997; 
Norling and Statz, 1998; Mikaelsson, 2002).  Indeed, Tushman and Moore (1988:  xii) 
argue that ‘Organization learning is at the heart of managing innovation.  This learning 
can be shaped only by an executive team that is itself flexible and adaptive over time’.  
The process of using existing knowledge and developing new knowledge is similar to 
Revans’ Action Learning (1980) in that it fulfils some of his criteria for success; (a) a 
powerful motivation to do something about the situation, (b) being obliged to think for 
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themselves, (c) all suggestions are considered, no matter how ridiculous they may seem, 
and (d) promising suggestions are tried out many times with slight local variations. 
     The learning that takes place to facilitate innovation has to be both additive and 
subtractive (Akgün, Lynn and Byrne, 2006).  Organizations must learn to forget in order 
to allow new knowledge to be absorbed (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Prahalad, 1998; Vera 
and Crossan, 2005).  The learning activity is both at individual and organizational level 
and, in this area also, the effect of an appropriate culture is relevant to allowing the 
appropriate learning to take place.  The effect of organizational culture on learning is 
argued by Argyris and Schön who state (1996:  16) that ‘Organizational learning occurs 
when individuals within an organization experience a problematic situation and inquire 
into it on the organization’s behalf.  They experience a surprising mismatch between 
expected and actual results of action and respond to that mismatch through a process of 
thought and further action that leads them to modify their images of organization or 
their understandings of organizational phenomena and to restructure their activities so 
as to bring outcomes and expectations into line.  In order to become organizational, the 
learning that results from organizational enquiry must become embedded on the images 
of organization held in its members’ minds and/or in the epistemological artifacts (the 
maps, memories, and programs) embedded in the organizational environment.’  These 
“artifacts” are the same manifestations of underlying values and beliefs that Schein 
proposes in his model of culture (1984). 
2.1.4 Innovation culture 
Although the extant literature poses many questions; for example, does culture exist as 
an entity or is culture a characteristic of a group (Smircich, 1983; Fiol, 1991); does 
culture exist independently or is it a social construction (Weisinger and Salipante, 
2000), organizational culture is agreed to have an influence on the propensity of an 
organization to be innovative (Kanter, 1988; McGourty, Tarshis and Dominick, 1996; 
Ahmed, 1998; Tidd et al., 2001).  This is supported through empirical research 
(Chandler, Keller and Lyon, 2000; Andriopoulos, 2001).  Despite there being a 
munificence of definitions and perspectives on organizational culture, little consensus 
exists for the understanding of organizational culture (Smircich, 1983).  Some of the 
aspects of culture enjoy broad agreement, but there is little unanimity.  Most authors 
agree that organizational culture is something holistic, historically determined, related to 
rituals and symbols, created and preserved by the group, soft and difficult to change.  
Literature emphasises the need for the right organizational culture for innovation.  
Ahmed (1998:  31) argues that ‘culture is a primary determinant of innovation’.  Bart 
(1996) shows that mission statements of organizations, which specify practices in 
innovativeness, exert a strong influence on innovative practices and behaviour in 
organizations.  McGourty et al. (1996) show that an organization’s culture can be 
modified to encourage innovative behaviour through specific management practices that 
deal with strategic direction, employee selection, rewards and recognition, employee 
deployment, support for idea generation, and multi functional teaming. 
     Aspects such as leadership (Drennan, 1992; Schein, 1992; Galpin and Herndon, 
2000), group history (Handy, 1985; Drennan, 1992; Johnson, 1992) and shared values 
(Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990; Schein, 1992; Hofstede, 1997; Stackman, 
Pinder, and Connor, 2000) are considered to be attributes of culture, but their influence 
and relevance are considered to be different from writer to writer.  However the concept 
of values being fundamental to determining culture enjoys widespread support (Wiener, 
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1988).  Most organizations have some core values that are shared across a particular 
group (Chatman and Jehn, 1994).  This is supported by Selznick (1984) who argues that 
shared values are essential for organizational survival because they maintain the 
organization as a bounded unit and provide it with a distinct identity.  Culture is not a 
single belief, value or assumption, but a combination of many of these (Schein, 1991).  
It must be viewed from multiple perspectives in order to be fully understood (Hall, 
1976).  It is not innate but is learnt and it is inextricably linked with the group 
(Hofstede, 1991; Johnson, 1992).  Without a group there can be no culture (Smircich, 
1983). 
     Research indicates that certain factors or conditions are more likely to create an 
environment where innovation can flourish.  Kanter (1988:  170) suggests that 
‘innovations, like flowers, start from tiny seeds and have to be nurtured carefully until 
they blossom; then their essence has to carried elsewhere for the flowers to spread.  And 
some conditions – soil, climate, fertilizer, the layout of the garden – can produce larger 
and more abundant flowers.’  ‘Innovations can grow wild, springing up weed-like 
despite unfavorable circumstances, but they can also be cultivated, blossoming in 
greater abundance under favorable conditions’.  The favourable conditions combine to 
create an environment where creativity and thus innovation can flourish.  The culture 
that facilitates radical innovation may be different to that which will facilitate 
incremental development and product introduction.  A number of sub-cultures for each 
stage of the product innovation and development may be appropriate (Zien and Buckler, 
1997).  A firm that wishes to facilitate radical innovation and simultaneously pursue 
continuous improvement through incremental innovation may require two sub-cultures 
that do not comfortably co-exist – a cultural ambidexterity (Delbecq and Mills, 1985; 
Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Leifer et al., 2000).  For radical innovation, “order and 
clarity” (generally accepted to support incremental innovation) may be detrimental.  
Management must learn to loosen control and become less risk avoiding in order to 
develop an environment that favours the appearance of radical innovation (Ekvall, 
1996).  Ekvall (1996:  121) argues that ‘it is a well-known phenomenon that ambiguity 
is not threatening to highly creative people.  On the contrary they become stimulated by 
it; they see the possibilities in an unclear situation.  But it is also known that people with 
above-average creative potentials, and with less self-confidence than highly creative 
people, often need frames and goal direction in order to realize their latent creativity.’  
Rewarding entrepreneurship and innovativeness, facilitating risk taking and tolerance of 
failure encourages idea submission and NPD participation.  It creates an environment of 
formal and informal interdependence and communication which leads to successful 
innovation (de Brentani and Kleinschmidt, 2004). 
     On the other side of the same coin, certain aspects of organizational culture act to 
suppress creativity and thus innovation (Amabile, 1998; Morrison and Milliken, 2000; 
Perel, 2002).  Bureaucracy, restricted resources, restricted freedom and confused goals 
all act to inhibit creative behaviour (Puhlmann and Gouy, 1999; Freel, 2000; Ogbonna 
and Harris, 2000; Perel, 2002).  An environment that allows freedom, provides slack in 
resource provision, clear goals, and a participative management style encourages 
innovation through the fostering of creativity (Oliver, 2002).  The organization that is 
supportive, open and trusting as opposed to bureaucratic and controlling is more likely 
to produce innovative products (Ahmed, 1998; DeSalvo, 1999; Jassawalla and Sashittal, 
2002).  This is the argument posited by Burns and Stalker (1966) who suggest an 
organic rather than a mechanistic organization to foster innovation. 
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     A favourable organizational culture on its own will not guarantee an organization 
being innovative.  Other conditions must also be in place for innovation to flourish.  For 
example, adequate resource allocation must be available (Thomas, 1993; Cooper, 1999), 
good external sources of communication to provide information must be available 
(Oakey, Rothwell, and Cooper, 1988; Stringer, 2000), robust mechanisms to review and 
continue or kill innovation projects at the appropriate stage must be in place 
(Dornblaster, Lin, and Van de Ven, 1989; Leifer et al., 2000), and sufficient skills must 
be available to the organization (Johne and Snelson, 1988a; Johne and Snelson, 1988b; 
Syrett and Lammiman, 2002).  However, it is clear that an appropriate organizational 
culture will facilitate innovation.  The creation of a culture of innovation is not about 
facilitating occasional radical innovation breakthroughs but about creating a culture in 
which innovation is a way of life (Bessant, 2003). 
2.1.5 Radical and incremental innovation culture 
The differentiation between the culture that supports incremental and radical is noted by 
several authors (Nord and Tucker, 1987; Humble and Jones, 1989; Rice, O’Connor, 
Peters and Morone, 1998; Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999; Leifer et al., 2000).  This is 
supported by the argument that some of the mechanisms that support incremental 
innovation can be counter-productive to radical innovation.  Von Stamm (2003a:  260) 
argues that ‘radical ideas tend to need room to grow and develop, they tend to change 
shape and scope’ and therefore suggestion schemes, which are the foundation for 
incremental innovation, are not good for radical innovation.  Organizational cultures 
that facilitate radical innovation tend to be tolerant of risk taking and the uncertainty 
that facilitates this type of innovation (Claver, Llopis and Molina, 1998).  It is the 
internal mindset or organizational culture rather than technological forces that act as 
drivers of success or failure in an organization responding to disruptive technology 
challenges.  A visionary leadership and a willingness to embrace change characterize 
such organisations (Tellis, 2006).   
     Radical innovation is “inherently messy”, fraught with uncertainty and unfamiliarity.  
The process is non-linear, stochastic, highly explorative and experimental, involving 
probing and learning rather than targeting and developing (Rice et al., 1998).  Attempts 
have been made to map the process (Veryzer, 1998; Tidd et al., 2001), but the nature of 
radical innovation means that structure and predictability are unlikely to facilitate its 
management.  The organizational culture and adherence to process following found in 
large firms tends to push efforts towards low risk incremental innovation (Dougherty 
and Heller, 1994).  Less is known about effective management of the development 
process for radical than for incremental innovation.  ‘It is unclear what the landscape for 
radical NPD looks like’ (McDermott, 1999:  632), and rather than being a predictable 
process ‘developing radical innovations involves considerable risk and requires insight 
and foresight’ (O’Connor and Veryzer, 2001:  231). 
     Von Stamm (2003a:  271) argues that ‘incremental and radical innovation require 
very different business conditions, skills, structures and processes’.  This is supported 
by McDermott and Handfield (1996:  371) who suggest that ‘it is not unreasonable to 
expect that successful practices associated with new product development may be 
significantly different for discontinuous and incremental projects.’  The organizational 
culture that supports incremental innovation may not therefore act in the same way to 
facilitate radical innovation. 
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2.1.6 Managing innovation 
In organizations where technological innovation is a key component, a state of creative 
tension exists between those responsible for technological development of new products 
and the organization’s need to satisfy customer demands.  The need to maintain a 
balance between the two is clear.  Too far towards R&D, and technological wizardry 
runs amok.  When it swings too far in the direction of satisfying customer demands, 
innovativeness can be stifled and technological stagnation can result.  Maintaining this 
state of creative tension is important for producing viable and technologically 
innovative products.  A key task for managers is to foster innovation whilst at the same 
time controlling and channelling the business needs of the organization (McDonough III 
and Leifer, 1996).  Managing innovation is subject to several perspectives in the 
literature.  Managing technological innovation through normal process management 
methods is advocated by several authors (Tushman and Nadler, 1986; Roberts, 1988; 
Rothwell, 1992).  Rickards (1996) suggests that the management of innovation be recast 
as the individuals concerned enacting new social processes.  Much is known about 
innovation killers and how organizations deal with innovation, but less is known about 
how to make organizations more innovative (Pohlmann, 2005).  As Gebhardt states 
‘there is no recipe for becoming innovative’ (2005:  29).  some authors argue that 
innovation is not a question of organization and cannot be organized permanently, 
suggesting that innovation management is more about managerial belief systems which 
are acknowledged by other actors (Pohlmann, Gebhardt and Etzkowitz, 2005).  
Innovation involves change and managing people in conditions of change indicates 
certain styles of leadership may be more appropriate than the management required for 
repetitive tasks involving little variability or change.  At times the appropriate 
leadership to enable innovation can seem to be at odds with accepted best practice for 
running a business (Christensen, 1997; Sutton, 2001; Farson and Keyes, 2002).  
However, in any design context, the influence of the top management leadership on the 
design strategy and therefore the innovation propensity is significant (Francis, 2002; 
Harborne and Johne, 2003).  Van de Ven (1986) argues that management of innovation 
has to deal with four basic problems; (1) a human problem of managing attention to the 
need to innovate, (2) a process problem in managing new ideas into good currency, (3) a 
structural problem of managing part-whole relationships and (4) a strategic problem of 
institutional leadership.  The management of innovation is perceived to differ between 
incremental and radical innovations (Ettlie, Bridges and O'Keefe, 1984).  Radical 
innovation often produces failures, and the magnitude and timing of results are highly 
unpredictable.  Faced with these issues, it is not surprising that managers feel more 
comfortable with an incremental approach to innovation.  Companies that succeed over 
the long haul punctuate incremental innovation with radical innovation (Leifer et al., 
2000). 
2.1.7 Established innovation management and inertia 
Established companies can become overly reliant on the systems and procedures that 
have brought them success.  They become locked in to these behaviours and reliant on 
following systems that have worked successfully in the past (Bate, 1994).  To overcome 
the obstacle of identifying and solving problems managers must actively encourage 
people to break from the past.  Employees are likely to adhere to methods which may 
have been relevant in the past but are no longer so, and then continue with these 
routines, which have become outdated and no longer beneficial (Leonard-Barton, 1995).  
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Some authors note the difficulties established firms face in reframing the underlying 
“mindsets” of the organization and hence their approaches and operations to take 
account of radical shifts in their operating environment (Foster and Kaplan, 2002; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992a; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), whilst others discuss the need to 
develop different operating processes and policies which may actively conflict with 
those “routines” developed for handling innovation under more “steady state” 
conditions (Francis, Bessant and Hobday, 2003; Leifer et al., 2000).  The challenge of 
connecting innovations with routine operations has long been noted (Burns and Stalker, 
1966).  When market conditions change and become more turbulent and instability 
replaces predictability, holding fast to established systems and procedures can be 
counter-productive (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; McDermott and Handfield, 2000).  In 
this environment ‘procedures take precedence over problem solving and innovation 
dims’ (Greiner, 1998:  62).  Accelerated competition means that it is no longer possible 
to wait for a competitor to move before deciding to react (Fleury and Fleury, 2003).  
The mindset of established and dependable procedures and systems in firms can inhibit 
“attempting the impossible”.  Hamel and Prahalad suggest that some companies focus 
on trimming their ambitions to match resources, with the result that they search only for 
advantages they can sustain (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989).  Other, more entrepreneurial 
companies leverage resources by accelerating the pace of organizational learning and 
try to attain seemingly impossible goals.  The concept of the Big Hairy Audacious Goal 
(BHAG), a major and ambitious target for the company to strive towards and which 
suggests behaviours for the employees, supports this perspective (Collins and Porras, 
1996). 
2.1.8 Innovation in large and small companies 
Schumpeter (1961) is considered to have initiated the argument about small, 
entrepreneurial companies being more likely to be the source of innovation.  Subsequent 
research has been inconclusive on this issue.  There is some indication that larger 
companies, having access to appropriate resources are better placed to innovate (Ali, 
1994; Leifer et al., 2000; Leifer, O’Connor and Rice, 2001; Bommer and Jalajas, 2004).  
As a counterpoint, large companies are also considered to be less flexible than their 
smaller counterparts and thus find innovation more difficult (Dougherty and Heller, 
1994).  The routine operations in large companies can suppress innovation (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003).  The structure and processes developed over many years nurture 
functional fiefdoms and conservative decisions rather than encourage cross-functional 
activity and risk taking (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996).  Radical innovation is extremely 
difficult to do.  It is high-risk, high-return and as such runs against the natural risk-
aversion of larger or established companies.  It also involves a higher level of creativity 
and out-of-the-box thinking than typically goes on in larger companies (Bessant et al., 
2004).  The business practices in some larger established companies mitigate against 
radical innovation, as the systems and processes that ensure continuity (the incremental 
improvements) become the inhibitors to innovation (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
However this is not a universal rule.  Large companies, for example Hewlett Packard, 
Johnson and Johnson, 3M and Sony can be innovative in a regular and repetitive 
manner (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996; Zien and Buckler, 1997; Gundling, 2000).  
Chandy and Tellis (2000) argue that since World War II, large incumbent firms have 
introduced many radical innovations.  Wagner and Hansen find that company size does 
impact on the innovation type pursued, at least in the wood products industry (2005).  
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Capital enjoyed by large companies allows them to excel in process innovation.  Small 
companies can compete in areas of product and business system innovation, as these 
can offer significant gain for little resources. 
2.1.9 Leadership 
Innovation driven organizations have innovative and committed leaders who continually 
show commitment to the process of innovation and are unwilling to rely on past 
performance (Humphreys, McAdam and Leckey, 2005).  As an influencer and 
developer of organizational culture, leadership plays a significant role.  The concept of 
leadership being a key element is found in many definitions of culture (Morgan, 1997; 
Drennan, 1992; Schein, 1992).  Culture is influenced by leadership (Selznick, 1984; 
Schein, 1992) in that leadership creates and promotes culture in an organization.  This 
theme is elaborated upon by several writers (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002; Kanter, 
1985; Selznick, 1984).  The influence of a strong leader can change or embed culture to 
the extent that it continues after the leader has departed (Bierly and Spender, 1995).  
This aspect is one of the key components in understanding the origin of culture and in 
making culture change (Drennan, 1992; Sharkey, 1999; Farson and Keyes, 2002).  
Weick (1985) suggests that culture and strategy are interchangeable, but 
asymmetrically, in that culture can substitute for strategic plans more easily than plans 
can substitute for culture.  A company that has a strategy of innovation and where 
innovation is part of the vision is likely to produce a better innovation performance 
(Bryman, 1992)  The view of culture, leadership and strategy being inter-linked is 
supported by Deal and Kennedy (1982), Peters and Waterman (1982) and Saffold III 
(1988).  Organizational culture can act to support individuals when they are under 
pressure, by providing decision makers with categories, routines and examples of good 
and bad solutions (Weick, 1987; Bierly and Spender, 1995).  The influence of 
leadership therefore has a similarly significant effect on the innovation capability of the 
individual (Amabile, 1988a; Ong, Wan and Chng, 2003) and the organization (Kanter, 
1988; Cooper, 1999; Jassawalla and Sashittal, 2002).  Chatman and Cha (2003:  32) 
argue that ‘It is a leader’s primary role to develop and maintain an effective culture.’  
This type of culture is easier to lose than it is to acquire (Leonard-Barton, 1995). 
     Leadership is a key aspect of both developing a radical innovation culture and 
sustaining it (Leifer et al., 2000).  Managers at Hewlett Packard are low key, modest, 
team players who promote variation through strong efforts to decentralize, to eliminate 
bureaucracy, to encourage individual autonomy and accountability, and experiment to 
take risks (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996).  The role is preaching and persuading 
rather than one of control (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996).  Senior management must 
be passionate about radical innovation.  The support, involvement, commitment and 
championing of the CEO and senior management is perhaps the most critical success 
factor.  The role of radical innovation in accomplishing the company’s long-term 
strategies and objectives must be clearly stated and reinforced at all levels.  Adequate 
funding should be provided and sustained, even in difficult economic times (Simon, 
McKeough, Ayers, Rinehart and Alexia, 2003). 
     The conflicting requirements of incremental – “do better” and radical – “do 
different” innovation require correspondingly conflicting approaches (Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1996; Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004; O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2004).  
Ambidextrous organizations build in the organizational capabilities to simultaneously 
explore and exploit, to decrease variance as well as simultaneously increasing variance.  
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Tushman and Smith state that ‘ambidextrous organizations are complex organizational 
forms that are composed of multiple internally inconsistent architectures that are 
collectively capable of operating simultaneously for short-term efficiency and long-term 
innovation’ (2004:  8).  Leadership to facilitate such ambidexterity is similarly 
contradictory in its requirements.  A clear emotionally engaging vision provides the 
strategic anchor from which senior management can balance the conflicting 
requirements of the ambidextrous organization (Tushman and Smith, 2004). 
     Facilitating radical innovation entails tolerating and encouraging experimentation 
and the inevitable failures, allowing latitude to the team, displaying a passion for radical 
innovation and taking an interest to signal that the leadership is on board with radical 
innovation and that it is acceptable to try something new, to “do different”.  This style 
sits uncomfortably with managers who are used to traditional controls and structures.  
They have to evaluate their own underlying beliefs and values if they are to be open and 
honest in supporting this type of radical innovation culture.  Mobilizing and managing 
knowledge becomes a primary task for managers seeking to develop radical innovation.  
Mobilizing high levels of participation in the innovation process is unfamiliar to many 
managers and appears untested and apparently risky.  Fear of uncontrolled change and 
expectations of short-term returns discourage allowing latitude for experimentation.  A 
disbelief in the ability of the employee to contribute – “not everyone is creative” – and a 
belief in specialists as the problem solvers and in “big bang” solutions encourages 
managers to look elsewhere for the steps to developing a radical innovation culture 
(Bessant and Caffyn, 1997).  “Cultivate” instead of “manage” epitomizes the modus 
operandi for this type of innovation management.  Successful managers prime minds to 
invent through cultivation, just as farmers encourage plants to grow.  Like farmers who 
remove impediments to the growth of plants, the manager seeking invention must 
remove impediments (Breton and Gold, 1987).  This resonates with Kanter’s 
horticultural analogy (1988). 
2.2 Culture and climate 
Although climate and culture are sometimes used interchangeably in literature, 
organizational climate is not the same as organizational culture.  Denison (1996) 
suggests that climate refers to a situation and its link to thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours of the organization members, whereas culture refers to an evolved context in 
which a situation may be embedded.  Climate is temporal, subjective, and can be 
manipulated, whilst culture is rooted in history, collectively held and difficult to 
manipulate.  If climate is to be included in the cultural model, it should be regarded as a 
manifestation of culture on what Schein (1991) has described as the level of artefacts, 
including visible and audible behaviour patterns (Ekvall, 1996).  Ahmed (1998) argues 
that culture is a reflection of climate, but operates at a deeper level.  However culture 
and climate are generally agreed to have an influence on the way things happen in an 
organization.  ‘Climate determines what and how things happen in an organization and 
culture explains why things happen the way they do’ (Tang, 1998:  301). 
     Climate can be regarded as an attribute of the organization, a conglomerate of 
attitudes, feelings and behaviours which characterize life in the organization, and exists 
independently of the perceptions and understandings of the members of the organization 
(Ekvall, 1996).  Climate is perceived as an organizational reality in the “objectivistic” 
sense.  In the context of organizational processes, climate plays the part of an 
intervening variable, which affects the results of the operations of the organization.  
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Climate has this moderating power because it influences organizational processes such 
as problem solving, decision making, communications, co-ordination, controlling and 
psychological processes of learning, creating, motivating and commitment (Ekvall, 
1996).  Climate is observable in the practices and policies of the organization.  Beliefs 
and values of culture are not visible but operate as cognitive schema which govern 
behaviour and actions to give environmental stimuli.  Culture can be thought of as 
having two components.  Explicit, representing the typical patterns of behaviour by the 
people and the distinctive artefacts that they produce and live with.  Implicit, 
representing the values, beliefs, norms and premises which underline and determine the 
observed patterns of behaviour (Ahmed, 1998).  Culture and climate are distinct 
constructs operating at different levels of meaning; yet at the same time they are closely 
interrelated (Tesluk et al., 1997). 
     Cameron and Quinn (1999) argue that the concept of organizational culture differs 
from organizational climate in that climate refers to more temporary attitudes, feelings 
and perceptions of individuals, whereas culture is an enduring, slow to change attribute 
of organizations.  Climate, because it is based on attitudes, can change quickly and 
dramatically.  Culture refers to implicit, often indescribable parts of organizations 
whereas climate refers to more overt, observable aspects of organizations.  Culture 
includes core values and consensual perceptions about how things are whilst climate 
includes individualistic perspectives that are modified frequently as situations change 
and new information is encountered. 
     Culture is recognized as having a significant influence on the propensity of the 
organization to be capable of innovation (Kanter, 1988; Soriano de Alencar and Bruno-
Faria, 1997; Bommer and Jalajas, 2002; Perel, 2002).  Radical innovation is generally 
accepted to be facilitated by an organizational culture that is different to the culture that 
facilitates incremental innovation (Judge, Fryxell and Dooley, 1997; Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1999; Leifer et al., 2000; O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2004).  In the same 
manner literature refers to climate enhancing and facilitating innovation (Dougherty and 
Heller, 1994; Utterback, 1994; Harborne and Johne, 2003; Al-Beraidi and Rickards, 
2003), with a discretely different climate being perceived as facilitating radical as 
opposed to incremental innovation (Humble and Jones, 1989; Ekvall, 1996; Chandy and 
Tellis, 2000). 
     The constructs of culture and climate have developed in parallel, but they have been 
driven by researchers from different disciplines and using different methodologies.  
There has been little cross-fertilization of methods and ideas.  There has also been 
considerable debate amongst researchers about the relationship between the two 
constructs.  For climate researchers the frame of organizational reference is 
psychological schema based on latent personal values.  These are individual or personal 
constructs that may be aggregated across the organization.  For culture researchers the 
frame of organizational reference is group understandings – interpretative schema 
(Sparrow and Gaston, 1996).  Denison (1996) argues that the differences in research 
approach are best viewed as differences in interpretation rather than differences in the 
phenomenon.  Ekvall (1996) differentiates between the concepts of culture and climate.  
He defines climate as the observed and recurring patterns of behaviour, attitudes, and 
feelings that characterize life in the organization.  Culture provides the foundation for 
these patterns of behaviour that are readily observable, described and changed.  Using 
Schein’s model the perspective of climate can be reflected in the artefact level of the 
model.  In this context, climate is represented by the visible and audible behaviour 
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patterns and the organizational processes.  Climate has a moderating power because it 
influences organizational processes such as problem solving, decision making, 
communications, co-ordination, controlling and psychological processes of learning, 
creating, motivating and commitment. 
2.3 Assessing climate 
Schein (1991) suggests that evaluation of culture should be undertaken at all three 
levels, starting with artefacts.  This indicates that the visible manifestations of culture, 
the climate (Ekvall, 1996) is a starting point for gauging organizational culture.  Several 
common instruments used to assess climate are reviewed in this section.  These are 
known and validated instruments that have support in literature.  They represent typical 
tools used to gauge climate but do not represent an exhaustive list of such instruments.  
The instruments evaluated have tended to focus on innovation and creativity climate.  
Operationalization of the definition of organizational climate has proceeded along two 
lines, objective and perceptual.  Objective approaches have attempted to characterize 
organizational differences in terms of objective variables such as size, levels of 
authority, ratio of administrative personnel to production personnel, quantity of formal 
rules.  These studies call attention to the importance of the environment in influencing 
behaviour and generally subscribe to the view that situational or environmental 
measures must be obtained independently of the individual’s perceptions of them.  
Perceptual refers to a set of measurable properties of the work environment, perceived 
directly or indirectly by the people who live and work in this environment and assume 
to influence motivation and behaviour (Sims Jr and LaFollette, 1975).  Several authors 
have suggested instruments for assessing the climate that facilitates innovation or 
creativity.  Amabile (1988b:  126) suggests that ‘organizational innovation is the 
successful implementation of creative ideas within an organization’.  It is further 
suggested that ‘creativity is the first step in innovation’ (Amabile, 1997:  40).  From an 
empirical perspective, ‘few differences seem to exist between those instruments 
measuring work environments for innovation and those measuring work environment 
for creativity’ (Mathisen and Einarsen, 2004:  136).  The following climate assessments 
were reviewed for suitability to this research. 
2.3.1 Litwin and Stringer Organizational Climate Questionnaire 
(LSOCQ) 
Litwin and Stringer (1968) constructed an assessment based on nine separate a priori 
scales which they defined as:- 
1. Structure – the feeling that employees have about the constraints in the 
group, how many rules, regulations, procedures there are; is there an 
emphasis on “red tape” and going through channels, or is there a loose and 
informal atmosphere? 
2. Responsibility – the feeling of being your own boss; not having to double-
check all your decisions; when you have a job to do, knowing that it is your 
job. 
3. Reward – the feeling of being rewarded for a job well done; emphasizing 
positive rewards rather than punishments; the perceived fairness of pay and 
promotion policies. 
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4. Risk – the sense of riskiness and challenge in the job and in the organization; 
is there an emphasis on taking calculated risks; or is playing safe the best 
way to operate? 
5. Warmth – the feeling of general good fellowship that prevails in the work 
group atmosphere; the emphasis on being well liked; the prevalence of 
friendly and informal social groups. 
6. Support – the perceived helpfulness of the managers and other employees in 
the group; emphasis on mutual support from above and below. 
7. Standards – the perceived importance of implicit and explicit goals and 
performance standards; the emphasis on doing a good job; the challenge 
represented in personal and group goals. 
8. Conflict – the feeling that managers and other workers want to hear different 
opinions; the emphasis placed on getting problems out in the open, rather 
than smoothing them over or ignoring them. 
9. Identity – the feeling that you belong to a company and that you are a 
valuable member of a working team; the importance placed on this kind of 
spirit. 
     Over a period of operation the nine scales were modified to combine Warmth and 
Identity, Identity and Support and Warmth and Support.  Conflict showed poorest 
consistency.  This was dropped from the measure or used only to show presence of 
conflict.  The scales were then reduced to:- 
1. Structure -  
2. Responsibility  
3. Reward  
4. Risk  
5. Identity, Warmth and Support  
6. Standards  
7. (Conflict) 
Four factor analytic studies of the LSOCQ were compared to assess the consistency of 
the instrument’s factor structure when administered to different organizational 
populations.  In addition, separate factor analytic results of the questionnaire for three 
functional sub-groups of a single organization were compared to investigate the 
LSOCQ’s factor consistency within a single organization.  Although there is somewhat 
more intra- than inter- organizational replicability of factors, both comparisons raise 
considerable doubt about the validity of the Litwin and Stringer instrument (Rogers, 
Miles Jr and Biggs, 1980). 
     These results indicate considerable doubt exists that the original climate a priori 
scales were able to measure what they purported to measure.  While the instrument was 
supposed to be measuring specific facets of an organization such as structure and 
standards, the climate instrument was actually measuring a general affect tone toward 
other people, and a general affect tone toward management (Sims Jr and LaFollette, 
1975). 
2.3.2 Creative Climate Questionnaire (CCQ) 
The CCQ (Ekvall, 1983; Ekvall, Arvonen and Waldenstrom-Linblad, 1983; Ekvall, 
1996) was designed to measure organizational conditions that may facilitate or inhibit 
creativity and innovation.  It is a questionnaire measuring the climate for creativity.  
Climate influences organizational processes such as problem solving, decision making, 
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communications, co-ordination, controlling and psychological processes of learning, 
creating, motivating and commitment (Ekvall, 1996).  The items on which the 
questionnaire construction is based came from an interplay between theory, field 
research and experiences of consultancy in organizational psychology.  The ten 
dimensions measured in the questionnaire are:- 
1. Challenge - the emotional involvement of the members in the 
organization’s operations and goals. 
2. Freedom - the independence in behaviour exerted by the people in the 
organization. 
3. Idea Support - the way new ideas are treated. 
4. Trust/Openness - the emotional safety in relationships. 
5. Dynamism/Liveliness - the eventfulness of life in the organization. 
6. Playfulness/Humour - the spontaneity and ease that is displayed. 
7. Debates - the occurrence of encounters and clashes between viewpoints, 
ideas, and differing experiences and knowledge. 
8. Conflicts - the presence of personal and emotional tensions, in contrast to 
conflicts between ideas. 
9. Risk Taking - the tolerance of uncertainty. 
10. Idea Time - the amount of time people can use and do use for elaborating 
new ideas. 
     The instrument is an organizational measure, not an individual one.  The respondent 
is addressed as an observer of life in the organization and asked to tell how people in the 
workplace usually behave.  He/she does not report his/her own behaviour nor 
communicate personal feelings.  Mathisen and Einarsen (2004) suggest that there is 
some uncertainty about the psychometric quality of this instrument arguing that ‘better 
documentation of its psychometric properties is required before it can be recommended 
as a reliable and valid instrument’ (2004:  125). 
2.3.3 Business and Organization Climate Index (BOCI) 
This survey instrument was developed by Payne and Pheysey (1971) by 
reconceptualizing the Organizational Climate Index developed by G. G. Stern.  It 
consists of a four point response scale measuring seventeen dimensions including, 
orientation to information technology, sociability, intellectual orientation and readiness 
to innovate.  The 17 dimensions of climate used in the BOCI are:- 
1. Leader’s psychological distance 
2. Questioning authority 
3. Customer service 
4. Quality issues 
5. Open-mindedness 
6. Information technology 
7. Future orientation 
8. Science and technical orientation 
9. Intellectual orientation 
10. Managing culture 
11. Industriousness 
12. Sociability 
13. Interpersonal aggression 
14. Rules orientation 
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15. Administrative efficiency 
16. Readiness to innovate 
17. Orientation to the wider community 
     Based on this questionnaire Sparrow and Gaston (1996) suggest eight climate maps 
representing the spectrum of organizations.  Their research has shown that a typical 
cross-section of British organizations can be classified into eight generic underlying 
“climate maps”.  These maps fall along a spectrum of negative to positive climates.  The 
maps are shown in Table 2-1. 
 
Table 2-1  Generic Climate Maps 
Cluster Unique characteristics 
 
Associated or shared characteristics 
Endangered 
Species 
Poor administration and 
organization systems 
Poor communication 
Inefficient work practice 
Low identification with 
corporate image 
No discernable shared values 
and beliefs 
Slow to implement change 
Discourage experimentation 
Discourage conceptual thinking about 
purpose and activity 
 
Cope with the 
present but don’t 
expect change 
Antipathy to research and 
analysis of own activities 
Internal focus, low attention 
to external business world 
 
Reluctance to change 
Low critical thinking about the future 
Slow to implement change 
Discourage experimentation 
Discourage conceptual thinking about 
purpose and activity 
Don’t think it, 
don’t say it, and 
don’t try it 
Undemanding work 
Low emphasis on quality of 
processes and outputs 
No challenge to existing 
practices 
High managerial authority 
accepted 
Reluctance to change 
Low critical thinking about the future 
Slow to implement change 
Discourage experimentation 
Research and 
development 
driven by a 
social 
conscience 
High scientific and technical 
orientation 
Customer service emphasis built into 
management systems 
Open-minded, intellectual, future-
oriented work style 
Complex problems dealt with by 
reasoning and logic 
Free expression of personal viewpoints 
Discussion of failures, basic goals and 
purposes 
Strong identity with corporate image 
Clear product or service philosophy 
External pride  
Ethos of service and connection to the 
wider community 
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Table 2-1  Generic Climate Maps 
Cluster Unique characteristics 
 
Associated or shared characteristics 
Flexibility of 
thought and 
action 
Strong attention to work 
High sustained levels of work 
effort and activity 
Quick decision-making 
Management traditions 
encourage autonomy over 
work 
 
Customer service emphasis built into 
management systems 
Open-minded, intellectual, future-
oriented work style 
Complex problems dealt with by 
reasoning and logic 
Free expression of personal viewpoints 
Discussion of failures, basic goals and 
purposes 
Strong identity with corporate image 
Clear product or service philosophy 
External pride  
Ethos of service and connection to the 
wider community 
The future is 
quality, but do it 
our way 
None Clear product or service philosophy 
Strong identity with corporate image 
Discussion of failures, basic goals and 
purposes 
Customer service emphasis built into 
management systems 
Future-oriented work style 
Not strongly innovative, open minded, 
limited logic and rationality 
Have we really 
got a culture? 
None 
 
None 
Isolated boffins Little contact with colleagues 
and other work groups 
Low team orientation 
Individual work focus 
High emphasis on research 
Value placed on expert knowledge 
Focus on up-to-date technical 
developments and application 
 
Despite methodological concerns with the measurement of climate, this instrument 
produces high levels of inter-rater reliability within a meaningful collective sample of 
individuals in an organization (Sparrow and Gaston, 1996). 
2.3.4 Siegel Scale of Support of Innovation (SSSI) 
This instrument assesses perceptions of leadership, ownership, norms for diversity, 
continuous development and consistency.  The SSSI was developed to assess 
organizational climate factors assumed to be present in innovative organizations.  The 
definition of organizational climate is based on Litwin and Stringer’s (1968) 
understanding of the concept as a ‘set of measurable properties of the work environment 
that are perceived by those working in the environment and influence their motivation 
and behaviour’ (Siegel and Kaemmerer, 1978:  554).  The theoretical dimensions used 
in the SSSI are: 
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Leadership – leadership for innovative organizations is postulated to be that 
which supports the initiation and the development of new ideas throughout the 
system and ensures the diffusion of power throughout the system.  It supports 
the personal development of individual members, and respects members’ 
capacity to function creatively. 
Ownership – this is defined as existing when group members feel they originate 
and/or develop the ideas, processes and procedures with which they work.  It is 
posited that when ownerships exist, group members do not limit themselves to 
the application of previously determined solutions or solutions of others, but are 
committed to their own work. 
Norms for diversity – when members of the system have a positive attitude 
toward diversity, the system responds positively toward creativity, and few 
behaviours are judged as being deviant. 
Continuous Development – in an innovative organization, change is continuous.  
As part of this, members of the organization maintain a questioning attitude 
toward the fundamental assumptions of the system.  An innovative organization 
continuously experiments with alternative conceptions of its approaches, 
problems and/or tasks.  Concurrently, its members cope with the frustration 
inherent in dealing with new approaches, problems or tasks. 
Consistency – between the innovative organization’s processes and desired 
products.  Members of the innovative system are sensitive to the notion that the 
way in which something is accomplished can have immediate and unintended 
consequences that may conflict with the objective of the activity. 
     Members’ perception of the climate within the organization was used as the basis for 
measurement, as opposed to objective variables.  An innovative organization was 
defined as one that ‘fosters the creative functioning of its members’ and a traditional 
organization was defined as ‘one that is not specifically oriented toward fostering the 
creative functioning of its members’ (Siegel and Kaemmerer, 1978:  554). 
     The SSSI was based on retrospective analysis of two projects which attempted to 
develop organizations that would foster the creativity of their members, and the analysis 
developed the five climate dimensions that were assumed to facilitate creativity.  The 
final version contained 61 items that are responded to across six response options – from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree.  However, only one study on validity has been 
conducted using the original version of the SSSI.  Little documentation exists on the 
reported psychometrics of the scales.  In addition the SSSI was developed in schools, 
which raises questions about the use of the instrument in a work organization (Mathisen 
and Einarsen, 2004). 
2.3.5 Assessing the Climate for Creativity (KEYS) 
The instrument was designed to assess perceived stimulants and obstacles to creativity 
in organizational work environments.  Three broad organizational factors are proposed 
and assessed over a five point response scale in a model of creativity and innovation in 
organizations (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby and Herron, 1996).  The authors assume 
that the social environment can influence both the level and the frequency of creative 
behaviour.  This departs from the traditional psychological approach to creativity, which 
focuses on the characteristics of creative persons.  It is argued that people will be at 
their most creative when they are primarily intrinsically motivated, by the interest, 
enjoyment, satisfaction, and challenge of the work itself.  This intrinsic motivation can 
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be undermined by extrinsic motivators that lead people to feel externally controlled in 
their work (Amabile et al., 1996; Amabile and Gryskiewicz, 1989). 
     The KEYS instrument comprises 78 questions taken by an employee at any level of 
the organization and is used to quantitatively measure the level of support for creativity 
in work place conditions (Amabile, 1998).  The key dimensions assessed are:- 
Challenging Work – A sense of having to work hard on challenging tasks and 
important projects.  Managers match people with the jobs that play to their 
expertise and skills in creative thinking, to ignite intrinsic motivation. 
Freedom – Giving autonomy to people concerning the means (process) but not 
necessarily the ends.  Clearly specified strategic goals often enhance peoples’ 
creativity.  Freedom is mismanaged when goals change frequently or are not 
defined clearly, or by granting autonomy in name only. 
Resources – The two main resources that affect creativity are time and money.  
Fake or impossibly tight deadlines kill creativity.  Adding resources beyond a 
threshold of sufficiency does not boost creativity.  Below the threshold, 
restriction of resources dampens creativity. 
Work Group Support – Managers must pay careful attention to the design of 
teams.  Diversity is a starting point.  Team members share excitement over the 
team’s goal.  Team members must be willing to help their team-mates through 
difficult periods and setbacks.  Every member must recognize the unique 
knowledge and perspective that other members bring to the table.  One common 
way managers kill creativity is by having homogeneous teams. 
Supervisory Encouragement – Taking time to encourage the work of the team 
and its members.  To sustain passion, people need to feel that their work matters 
to the organization, or to some important group of people.  Being critical of new 
ideas, looking for flaws kills creativity.  The supervisor encourages 
experimentation, sets goals appropriately, supports intrinsic motivation and 
shows confidence in the work group. 
Organizational Support – Creativity is truly enhanced when the whole 
organization supports it.  Mandating information sharing across the organization 
supports creativity.  The organizational culture encourages creativity through 
fair constructive judgement of ideas, reward for creative work, mechanisms for 
developing new ideas and a shared vision of what the organization is trying to 
do. 
     KEYS also assesses two management practices that inhibit creativity. 
Organizational Impediments – An organizational culture that impedes creativity 
through internal political problems, harsh criticism of new ideas, destructive 
internal competition, an avoidance of risk and an overemphasis on the status 
quo. 
Workload pressure – Extreme time pressures, unrealistic expectations for 
productivity and distractions from creative work. 
     In addition KEYS includes data on how productive and creative the organization is 
perceived to be. 
Productivity – An efficient, effective and productive organization or unit. 
Creativity – A creative organization or unit where a great deal of creativity is 
called for and where people believe they can actually produce creative work. 
     Mathisen and Einarsen (2004) suggest that studies carried out indicate that the KEYS 
is a promising instrument for assessing the work environment for creativity.  However, 
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the authors caution that that a revision of the instrument is needed to improve the factor 
structure, and that more studies are recommended to assess its validity.  Nevertheless 
the KEYS instrument has widespread acceptance and is used in empirical research 
(Bommer and Jalajas, 2002). 
2.3.6 Situational Outlook Questionnaire (SOQ) 
Isaksen and Kaufman (1990) performed an exploratory study that sought to determine if 
a relationship exists between cognitive style and individual perceptions of climate for 
creativity and change.  They explored this relationship by examining how people of 
strongly different cognitive styles perceived the climate for creativity and change in 
their organizations.  Clapp and Kirton (1994) responded to this study by challenging the 
theoretical relationship of the two instruments used in the original study.  Their 
response argued that both theoretical and methodological points required further 
explanation and investigation.  The outcome was the SOQ.  This is a 50 item 
instrument.  It is constructed to assess how much any particular context will support 
creativity and change.  The measure is a derivation of the creative Climate 
Questionnaire originally developed by Ekvall (1983), and is used as a tool for 
organizational diagnosis and development (Isaksen, Lauer and Ekvall, 1999).  The SOQ 
is a paper and pencil self-report measure.  It assesses nine of the ten dimensions 
measured in Ekvall’s Creative Climate Questionnaire. 
     Factor analysis of the SOQ showed that one of Ekvall’s dimensions, 
Dynamism/Liveliness, did not clearly emerge as a separate dimension in the English 
speaking cultures (Isaksen et al., 1999).  Very few studies on validity have been 
conducted using the original version of the SSSI.  Little documentation exists on the 
reported psychometrics of the scales and the SSSI was developed in schools, posing 
questions about the use of the instrument in a work organization (Mathisen and 
Einarsen, 2004). 
2.3.7 Team Climate Inventory (TCI) 
The TCI is a four factor, 38 item questionnaire using a ten point response scale 
(Anderson and West, 1998). 
     The four dimensions used are: 
Vision - To what extent are the team’s objectives and visions clearly defined, 
shared, valued and attainable?  The dimension is divided into the subscales, 
clarity, visionary nature, attainability and sharedness.  
Participative safety - How participative is the team in decision making 
procedures and to what extent is the environment perceived as interpersonally 
non-threatening so that it is safe to present new ideas and improved ways of 
doing things?  This dimension is divided into the subscales, information sharing, 
safety, influence and interaction frequency.  
Task orientation - To what extent does the team have a shared concern with 
excellence of quality of task performance in relation to shared vision or 
outcomes characterized by evaluations, modifications, control systems, and 
critical appraisals?  This dimension is divided into the subscales, excellence, 
appraisal and ideation. 
Support for innovation - To what degree is there expectation, approval and 
practical support for attempts to introduce new and improved ways of doing 
 25 
things in the work environment?  This dimension consists of two subscales, 
articulated support and enacted support. 
     The TCI is an instrument that reflects an explicit measure of climate within teams.  
The individual responses on the TCI should be aggregated to team level.  However the 
analyses conducted when exploring the psychometric properties have been done at an 
individual level, with the exception of confirmatory factor analyses.  People who work 
together on a daily basis will develop a common understanding of the work 
environment.  It is likely that other factors such as personality, cognitive style, personal 
values, informal group membership; and demographic factors such as education, gender 
and age, as well as specific work tasks, will also influence individual perceptions.  
Several studies indicate that the psychometric quality of the TCI is acceptable.  Because 
validity studies of the instrument have been conducted in different types of 
organization, the TCI may be used within different teams, making it highly useful 
(Mathisen and Einarsen, 2004). 
2.3.8 Team Factor Inventory (TFI) 
The TFI assesses seven team factors, leadership factors and performance criteria, along 
a five point response scale (Rickards, Chen and Moger, 2001).  The seven team factors 
assessed are:- 
Platform of understanding – how well the team works at understanding each 
others’ job requirements, personal needs and developing a common 
understanding of situational requirements 
Shared vision – the extent to which the team tends to have a shared view (vision) 
of team purpose, the extent to which the team has strong loyalty to its team 
purpose and team members have no confusions over its team purpose. 
Creative climate – The extent to which the team climate is warm and positive, 
the team environment is interesting and challenging and team members trust and 
support one another. 
Resilience – How the team responds if it hits an unexpected problem, how the 
team members pull together to deal with it, how they have confidence in their 
own abilities to sort things out and are able to bounce back after any setback to 
their plans. 
Idea owners – To what extent people suggest ideas and then run with them, and 
there are willing volunteers to try out new ideas.  How much people are prepared 
to take responsibility for making new ideas work. 
Network activators – To what extent team members have contacts outside the 
team that are helpful, are good at mobilizing help from outside the team and are 
good networkers. 
Learning from experience – To what extent the team is good at learning from 
mistakes, talk things over when things go wrong and tend to try out new ideas 
after things go wrong. 
     The team leadership factors assessed are: 
Team Leadership – To what extent does the team leadership tend to be 
inspirational, tend to be motivational and tend to be results oriented.  
Transformational leadership has been shown to be associated with seven 
predicted team factors and with output variables designated as creativity and 
productivity (Rickards et al., 2001). 
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     The performance factors assessed are: 
Performance criteria – To what extent is the team creative and to what extent is 
it productive.   
     The TFI has a large database of information (Al-Beraidi and Rickards, 2003). 
2.4 Assessing Culture 
Having evaluated the artefact level of culture through a climate assessment, a more 
holistic perspective of organizational culture can be made using an instrument designed 
to assess culture.  Organizational culture surveys focus on aspects of how things get 
done in the organization rather than the more visible aspects (Sleezer and Swanson, 
1992).  In the same manner as for climate, several instruments used to assess culture 
were reviewed.  These are also known and validated instruments that have support in 
literature and are supported with empirical examples of their use.   
     Definitions of culture reflect three different kinds of ontologies.  The most common 
is structural realist ontology, where organizations exist as structures that have a variety 
of properties, including culture.  Second is social construction ontology that places 
emphasis on the varying regularity in events that happen and gives observers room to 
select which set of events to group together into a culture.  An organization in this view 
is a kind of culture.  A third ontology treats organizations and cultures both as linguistic 
conveniences.  Concepts such as organization and culture serve the heuristic purpose of 
helping people to think.  Definitions also reflect three epistemological approaches.  
Deductive approaches emphasize broadly applicable cultural dimensions or analytic 
categories.  Here, knowledge is gained by constructing these dimensions, and evolving 
them to account for previously unrecognized phenomena.  Inductive approaches 
emphasize researchers’ capabilities to derive categories by directly observing particular 
groups.  Here, relationships among variables and the variables themselves may be 
unique to particular groups.  This approach tends to recognize the presence of tacit 
elements that always shape the experience of specified constructs.  A third approach is 
the view that observers are less dispassionately interested in accuracy than they are in 
producing constructions that reflect their own interests (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and 
Peterson, 2000).  More literature discusses the organizational culture qualitatively (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982; Barney, 1986) than assesses organizational culture quantitatively 
(Hofstede, 1997; Reigle, 2001).  This is unsurprising as organizational culture is a 
difficult concept to gauge and can sometimes be confused with management ideology 
(Elsmore, 2001).  Some authors have attempted to gauge it both qualitatively and 
quantitatively (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders, 1990). 
     ‘Organizational culture is the pattern of beliefs, values, ritual, myths, and sentiments 
shared by the members of an organization.  It influences the behaviour of all individuals 
and groups within the organization’  (Harrison and Stokes, 1992: 1).  As such, it is more 
difficult to ascribe a quantification to than climate.  The underlying values and beliefs 
are more difficult to uncover and more resistant to change than the more visible aspects 
of climate.  ‘Managers who seek to guide the process of changing organization cultures 
are generally compelled to gather from employees information about the system and the 
culture in which they work.’ (Sleezer and Swanson, 1992:  22). 
     Sleezer and Swanson (1992) suggest that for a successful culture survey the 
instrument should be designed to collect specific information.  The survey should 
consist of a set of written items that require employees to respond in some meaningful 
way.  Every item on the survey should focus on an aspect of how work gets done within 
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the organization.  The broader purpose of the culture survey is to use the results to 
improve the organization’s performance.  For this broader purpose to be achieved, the 
data must be shared with all employees.  Problem areas must be openly and honestly 
discussed in a non-threatening environment, solutions to problems must be proposed 
and actions must be taken. 
     The following culture assessments were reviewed for suitability to this research. 
2.4.1 Nadler and Tushman 
Nadler and Tushman (1980) suggest a general approach for thinking about 
organizational functioning and a process for using a model to analyse organizational 
problems.  They posit that organizations can be better understood if they are considered 
as dynamic and open social systems.  An open system is one that interacts with its 
environment (von Bertalanffy, 1972).  As systems, organizations display a number of 
basic systems characteristics.  They have internal interdependence in that changes in 
one component or subpart of an organization frequently have repercussions for other 
parts – the pieces are interconnected.  They desire equilibrium.  When an event puts the 
system out of balance the system reacts and moves to bring itself back into balance.  
They display equifinality.  Different system configurations can lead to the same or to the 
same type of input-output conversion.  There is no universal or “one best way” to 
organize.  They display adaptation.  For a system to survive, it must maintain a 
favourable balance of input or output transactions with the environment or it will run 
down.  These system characteristics are evaluated in the form of:- 
Individual/Organization 
• How are individual needs met by the organizational arrangements? 
• Do individuals hold clear or distorted perceptions of organization 
structure? 
• Is there a convergence of individual and organizational goals? 
Individual/Task 
• How are individual needs met by tasks? 
• Do individuals have skills and abilities to meet task demands? 
Individual/Informal organization 
• How are individual needs met by the informal organization? 
• How does the informal organization make use of individual resources 
consistent with informal goals? 
Task/Organization 
• Are organizational arrangements adequate to meet demands of the task? 
• Do organizational arrangements motivate behaviour that is consistent 
with task demands? 
Task/Informal organization 
• Does the informal organization structure facilitate task performance or 
not? 
• Does it hinder or help meet the demands of the task? 
Organization/Informal organization 
• Are the goals, rewards, and structures of the informal organization 
consistent with those of the formal organization? 
     The congruence model puts emphasis on the transformation process and specifically 
reflects the critical system property of interdependence.  It views organizations as made 
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Solidarity 
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Solidarity 
Low Sociability 
Networked Communal 
Mercenary Fragmented 
up of components or parts that interact with each other.  The congruence model is based 
on how well these parts fit together.  A relative degree of congruence or “fit” exists 
between each pair of inputs.  The congruence between the two components is defined as 
the degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structures of one 
component are consistent with those of another component.  Congruence is a measure 
of how well pairs of components fit together. 
2.4.2 Goffee and Jones 
Goffee and Jones (1998) posit a model of organizational culture based on the two 
dimensions of sociability and solidarity.  Sociability is a measure of the friendliness 
among members of the community.  People in high sociability work environments 
rarely have a clock punching mentality.  They work until the job is done because they 
do not want to let their friends down.  The opposite is a prevalence of friendships that 
may allow poor performance of members to be tolerated.  Solidarity, on the other hand, 
is based not so much in the heart as in the mind.  Solidaristic relationships are based on 
common tasks, mutual interests, and clearly understood shared goals that benefit all the 
involved parties, whether they personally like each other or not.  The opposite is that 
high-solidarity cultures can have a brutal “do-or-die” attitude.  If the two dimensions are 
considered as vertical and horizontal, there are four cultures, eight if the negative side is 
considered.  The four culture types are shown in Figure 2-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2  Culture types suggested by Goffee and Jones 
     The authors argue that the character of an organization can be illuminated by 
identifying its sociability and solidarity and suggest an assessment tool to determine the 
nature of a given organization.  This solidarity/sociability model is similar to the 
cultural model suggested by von Stamm (2003b). 
2.4.3 Harrison and Stokes 
Harrison and Stokes argue that culture is to an organization what personality is to an 
individual (1992).  Their instrument looks at how people treat one another, what values 
they live by, how people are motivated to produce, and how people use power in the 
organization.  This is used as a framework to assess the organizational culture based on 
how people use power in the organization. 
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     The instrument measures Power orientated culture, Role culture, culture based on 
Achievement and a Support orientated culture.  Every organization has some basic 
combination of these four basic organizational cultures.  The four cultures are only 
partly compatible with one another and the benefits of one can only be achieved at the 
expense of some of the benefits of the others. 
• A Power oriented organization is based on inequality of access to resources.  
People are motivated by rewards and punishments and by the wish to be 
associated with a strong leader.  At its best, leadership is based on strength, 
justice, and paternalistic benevolence on the part of the leader.  At its worst it is 
ruled by fear. 
• A Role orientated organization substitutes a system of structures and procedures 
for the naked power of the leaders.  These give protection to subordinates and 
stability to the organization.  At its best it provides stability, justice and efficient 
performance.  Because it seeks to control, it inhibits innovation. 
• Achievement orientation is when intrinsic satisfaction is part of the reward 
structure.  This may be inadvertent or be planned as a part of the role.  It is 
called an aligned organization as it lines people up behind a common vision or 
purpose.  It makes use of a mission to focus and align people. 
• Support orientation is based on mutual trust between the individual and the 
organization.  People are valued rather than viewed as just cogs in a machine. 
     The assessment tool evaluates the organizational culture based on these four 
dimensions.  These dimensions are similar to the four organizational culture types 
suggested by Handy (1985). 
2.4.4 Reigle 
Reigle (2001) proposes the Organizational Culture Assessment (OCA).  This is a 
measurement tool that assesses organizational culture and provides a five-dimensional 
score, one for each of the five culture elements.  The culture elements are:- 
1. Language 
2. Artefacts and symbols 
3. Patterns of behaviour 
4. Espoused values 
5. Beliefs and underlying assumptions 
     The OCA is a 45 question survey, divided into five sections, one for each culture 
element.  Each question is answered by marking one of eight answers on a Likert type 
scale with two possible answers in each of the following four categories, strongly agree, 
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.  There is evidence to confirm 
validity and reliability of the instrument (Reigle, 2001).  The results show four types of 
organizational culture based on the Organic-Mechanistic dimensions (Burns and 
Stalker, 1966). 
2.4.5 Hofstede 
Hofstede et al. (1990) suggest a survey based on questionnaire and interview to 
determine the organizational culture differences.  Data on task, structure and control 
characteristics are collected separately.  Quantitative measures are aggregated at the unit 
level.  The results show that a large part of the differences among the evaluated units 
could be explained by six factors, relating to established concepts from organizational 
sociology.  The underlying basis of the assessment is the existence of sub-cultures 
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within the overall organizational culture.  ‘One organization may include several 
culturally different departments, and these departments may consist of culturally 
different workgroups’ (Hofstede et al., 1990:  289).  The six dimensions assessed are:- 
1. Process orientated v Results orientated 
2. Job orientated v Employee orientated 
3. Professional v Parochial 
4. Open systems v Closed systems 
5. Tightly v Loosely controlled 
6. Pragmatic v Normative 
     The study empirically shows shared perceptions of daily practices to be the core of 
an organization’s culture.  Measurements of employee values differ more according to 
the demographic criteria of nationality, age and education than according to 
membership in the organization per se.  The study concentrates on the creation of a 
multi-layered model for organizational culture but this does not resonate well with the 
model used by Schein. 
2.4.6 Cameron and Quinn 
Martin (2002) differentiates among three perspectives of culture.  The integration 
perspective assumes that culture is what people share, or the glue that holds them 
together.  The differentiation perspective assumes that culture is manifested by 
differences among sub-units and that an organization’s culture is fraught with conflicts 
of interest.  The fragmentation perspective assumes that culture is ambiguous and 
unknowable, and that it describes not an attribute of the organization but the inherent 
nature of the organization itself.  Martin argues that each perspective has legitimacy and 
must be acknowledged as individuals study or try to manage the culture.  Cameron and 
Quinn (1999) suggest an Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) which 
is biased toward the integration approach to organizational culture.  The OCAI assesses 
‘how things are’ (Cameron and Quinn, 1999:  134) in the organization rather than how 
individuals feel about them.  The instrument also helps identify the culture the 
organization members think should be developed to match the future demands of the 
environment and the challenges to be dealt with by the organization. 
     The OCAI is based on the competing values framework (Denison and Spreitzer, 
1991).  This was developed initially from research conducted on the major indicators of 
effective organizations.  Two major dimensions were identified.  One dimension 
differentiates effectiveness criteria that focus on flexibility, discretion, and dynamism 
from criteria that focus on stability, order and control.  Some organizations are 
perceived as effective if they are changing, adaptable and organic.  This is epitomized 
by companies like Microsoft and Nike.  Other organizations are perceived as effective if 
they are predictable, stable and mechanistic.  Companies like Boeing and government 
departments are characterized by longevity and staying power in both design and 
outputs.  The continuum runs from organizational versatility and pliability at one end to 
organizational steadiness and durability at the other.  The second dimension 
differentiates effectiveness criteria that emphasize an internal orientation, integration 
and unity from criteria that emphasize an external orientation, differentiation and 
rivalry.  Organizations that typify harmonious internal characteristics are Hewlett 
Packard and IBM.  Others, such as Honda and Toyota, are perceived to be effective if 
they are focused on interacting or competing with others outside their boundaries. 
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     Together these two dimensions form quadrants.  Each quadrant represents a distinct 
set of organizational effectiveness indicators.  These indicators of effectiveness 
represent what people value about an organization’s performance.  They represent what 
is perceived as good and bad and define the core values on which judgements about 
organizations are made.  These four core values represent opposite or competing 
assumptions.  Each continuum highlights a core value that has opposites at either end of 
the continuum.  The dimensions produce quadrants that are also contradictory or 
competing on the diagonal.  These are shown in Figure 2-3. 
 
                                            Flexibility and Discretion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Control and Stability 
Figure 2-3  Competing Values Framework Organization Types 
 
     The four culture types are: 
Hierarchy Culture 
The early approach to organizing in the modern era was based on the work of Max 
Weber (1964).  Weber suggests seven characteristics that have become known as the 
attributes of bureaucracy; rules, specialization, meritocracy, hierarchy, separate 
ownership, impersonality and accountability.  These characteristics were highly 
effective in an environment where efficient, reliable, smooth flowing and predictable 
output was demanded.  This form of organization leads to a stable and efficient flow of 
products and services.  The organizational culture of this type of arrangement is 
characterized by a formalized and structured place to work.  Procedures govern 
behaviour, effective leaders are good organizers and co-ordinators, and formal rules and 
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policies hold the organization together.  Typical organizations of this type are 
McDonalds (Ritzer, 2000), Ford and Government Agencies. 
 
Market Culture 
As organizations faced new challenges a new form of organization evolved.  This relied 
on a different set of assumptions.  The new form was referred to as a market form.  The 
term market is not synonymous with the marketing function nor with consumers in the 
marketplace.  It refers to a type of organization that functions as a market itself.  It is 
oriented toward the external environment instead of internal affairs.  It is focused 
mainly on transactions with external constituencies such as suppliers, customers, 
contractors, licensees, unions and regulators.  Unlike a hierarchy where internal control 
is maintained by rules, specialized jobs and centralized decisions, the market operates 
primarily through economic market mechanisms.  The major focus of the market 
organization is to conduct transactions such as exchanges, sales and contracts with other 
constituencies to create a competitive advantage.  Profitability, strength in market 
niches, stretch targets and secure customer bases are primary objectives of the market 
organization.  The core values that dominate are competitiveness and productivity.  
These are achieved through a strong emphasis on external positioning and control.  The 
basic assumptions in a market culture are that the external environment is not benign, 
but hostile; consumers are selective and interested in value for money and that the 
organization is interested in increasing its competitive position.  The major task of 
management is to drive towards productivity, results and profit.  Typical companies of 
this form are Philips and GEC.  A Market Culture as assessed by the OCAI is a results 
oriented workplace.  Leaders are hard driving producers and competitors.  The glue that 
holds the organization together is an emphasis on winning.  The long-term concerns are 
on competitive position and achieving goals and targets.  Outpacing the competition and 
market leadership are important. 
 
Clan Culture 
This organizational type is so named because of its similarity to a family type 
organization.  Shared values and goals, cohesion, participation, individuality and a sense 
of team-identity permeate clan type organizations.  Instead of the rules and procedures 
of the Hierarchy, or the competitive profit centres of the Market, there is teamwork, 
employee involvement programmes, and company commitment to employees.  Some 
basic assumptions of a Clan Culture are that the environment can be best managed 
through teamwork and employee development.  Customers are best thought of as 
partners and the organization is in the business of developing a humane work 
environment.  The major task of management is to empower employees and facilitate 
their participation, commitment and loyalty.  These aspects have been advocated by 
writers associated with the Human Relations movement (Argyris, 1960).  Companies 
that typify the Clan Culture are People Express Airlines and Disney.  The Clan Culture 
as assessed by the OCAI is typified by a friendly place to work where people share a lot 
of themselves.  Leaders are thought of as mentors or parent figures.  The organization is 
held together by loyalty and tradition, commitment is high and the organization 
emphasizes the long-term benefit of individual development with high cohesion and 
morale being important.  The organization places a premium on teamwork, participation 
and consensus. 
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Adhocracy Culture 
This kind of organization emerged as the Information Age took over from the Industrial 
Age.  This organizational type is most responsive to the turbulent and fast changing 
conditions that typify emerging markets in the twenty-first century.  As product and 
service life-cycles shortened, a new set of assumptions evolved.  These assumptions 
were that innovative and pioneering initiatives lead to success.  Organizations are 
mainly in the business of developing new products and services and preparing for the 
future.  The major task of management is to foster entrepreneurship, creativity and 
actions on the cutting edge.  Emphasis was placed on creating a vision of the future, on 
organized anarchy and on disciplined imagination.  These are the aspects that facilitate 
radical innovation (Quinn, 1985; Gryskiewicz, 1999; Kuratko and Hodgetts, 2001; 
Bessant, 2003).  A major goal of an Adhocracy is to foster adaptability, flexibility and 
creativity in an environment where uncertainty, ambiguity and information-overload are 
normal.  Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) suggest that the culture best suited to dealing 
effectively with disruptive technology is an Adhocracy which values entrepreneurship, 
risk taking, flexibility, and creativity.  Typical organizations of this type are epitomized 
by Apple in the early days.  Examples can be found in some aerospace companies, for 
example Lockheed Skunk Works (Rich and Janos, 1994) and design consultancies, for 
example IDEO (Kelley and Littman, 2001).  An important challenge for these 
organizations is to produce innovative products and services and to adapt quickly to 
new opportunities.  Unlike Hierarchies and Markets, Adhocracies do not have 
centralized power or authority relationships.  Power flows from individual to individual 
or from task to task depending on what problem is being addressed at the time.  A high 
emphasis on individuality, risk-taking and anticipating the future exists as almost 
everyone in an Adhocracy becomes involved with production, customers, research and 
development.  Adhocracies can exist as sub-units of another organization that has a 
different culture as a dominant type.  The Adhocracy Culture, as assessed by the OCAI, 
is characterized by a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative workplace where people 
take risks.  Effective leadership is visionary, innovative and risk-oriented.  The glue that 
holds the organization together is commitment to experimentation and innovation.  The 
emphasis is on being at the leading edge of new knowledge, products and/or services.  
The organization’s long-term emphasis is on rapid growth and acquiring new resources.  
Success means producing unique and original products and services. 
     The leadership and effectiveness of the OCAI culture types is shown in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2  Characteristics of Cameron and Quinn’s four organizational culture types. 
Culture Type Organizational Leadership Organizational Effectiveness 
Hierarchy Managers are good at organizing, 
controlling, monitoring, administering, 
co-ordinating and maintaining 
efficiency. 
Efficiency, timeliness, smooth 
functioning and predictability. 
 
Market Managers are good at directing, 
producing results, negotiating and 
motivating others. 
 
Achieving goals, outpacing the 
competition, increasing market share and 
acquiring premium levels of financial 
return. 
Clan Managers are parent figures, team-
builders, facilitators, nurturers, mentors 
and supporters. 
 
Cohesion, high levels of employee 
morale and satisfaction, human resource 
development and teamwork. 
Adhocracy Managers tend to be entrepreneurial, 
visionary, innovative, creative, risk-
oriented and focused on the future. 
New products, creative solutions to 
problems, cutting edge ideas and growth 
in new markets. 
 
 
For an Adhocracy Culture the leadership characteristics accord with those considered to 
facilitate radical innovation (Leifer et al., 2000). 
     Mintzberg (1979) refers to an Adhocracy in his discussion about the structure of 
organizations.  There is a strong similarity in Mintzberg’s Adhocracy with the 
Adhocracy suggested by Cameron and Quinn.  He argues that none of the structural 
configurations for an organization, with the exception of the Adhocracy, is capable of 
sophisticated innovation.  He also notes that it is the most difficult structure to manage.  
‘Of all the structural configurations, Adhocracy shows the least reverence for the 
classical principles of management, especially unity of command.’  (1979:  433).  
However, along with the ability to support innovation comes a loss of efficiency.  ‘No 
structure is better suited to solving complex, ill-structured problems than the 
Adhocracy.  None can match it for sophisticated innovation.  Or, unfortunately, for the 
costs of that innovation.  Adhocracy is simply not an efficient structure.’  (1979:  463).  
While it is ideally suited for the one-of-a-kind project, the Adhocracy is not competent 
at doing ordinary things.  The Adhocracy is a custom producer, unable to standardize 
and so to be efficient.  The root of the inefficiency is in the high cost of communication.  
People talk a lot in an Adhocracy.  This is how they combine their knowledge to 
develop new ideas.  This takes considerable time.  A further source of inefficiency is the 
unbalanced workloads.  A profile of each of the OCAI cultures and typical 
characteristics for each is shown in Figure 2-4 on the quadrants generated by the two 
dimensions. 
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                                                      Flexibility and Discretion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           Control and Stability 
Figure 2-4  OCAI culture profiles 
Reliability and Validity 
Research has shown that the OCAI is considered to be reliable (Quinn and Spreitzer, 
1991; Yeung, Brockbank, and Ulrich, 1991; Zammuto and Krakower, 1991).  The 
authors state that in every known case the reliability of the culture types has shown 
patterns consistent with those suggested by the authors (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).  
Strong evidence for concurrent validity was produced by Cameron and Freeman (1991).  
Evidence for convergent and discriminant validity was produced by Quinn and Spreitzer 
(1991) using a multitrait-multimethod analysis and a multidimensional scaling analysis.  
Studies by Zammuto and Krakower (1991) support the claims for validity. 
The Response Scale 
The OCAI uses a response scale in which individuals divide one hundred points among 
alternatives.  This is known as an ipsative rating scale.  The most common alternative 
rating scale is the Likert scale.  The primary advantage of using the ipsative scale is that 
it highlights and differentiates the cultural uniqueness that actually exists in the 
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A very friendly place to work, where people 
share a lot of themselves.  It is like an 
extended family.  The leaders, or the heads of 
the organization, are considered to be mentors 
and perhaps even parent figures.  The 
organization is held together by loyalty or 
tradition.  Commitment is high.  The 
organization emphasizes the long-term 
benefit of human resource development and 
attaches great importance to cohesion and 
morale.  Success is defined in terms of 
sensitivity to customers and concern for 
people.  The organization places a premium 
on teamwork, participation and consensus. 
 
A dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place 
to work.  People stick their necks out and are 
prepared to take risks.  The leaders are 
considered to be innovators and risk takers.  
The glue that holds the organization together is 
commitment to experimentation and 
innovation.  The emphasis is on being at the 
leading edge.  The organization’s long-term 
emphasis is on growth and acquiring new 
resources.  Success means gaining unique and 
new products or services.  Being a product or 
service leader is important.  The organization 
encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
 
A very formalized and structured place to 
work.  Procedures govern what people do.  
The leaders pride themselves on being good 
co-ordinators and organizers who are 
efficiency minded.  Maintaining a smooth 
running organization is most critical.  Formal 
rules and policies hold the organization 
together.  The long-term concern is on 
stability and performance with efficient, 
smooth operations.  Success is defined in 
terms of dependable delivery, smooth 
scheduling and low cost.  The management of 
employees is concerned with secure 
employment and predictability. 
A results-oriented organization whose major 
concern is with getting the job done.  People 
are competitive and goal oriented.  The leaders 
are hard-drivers, producers and competitors.  
They are tough and demanding.  The glue that 
holds the organization together is an emphasis 
on winning.  Reputation and success are 
common concerns.  The long-term focus is on 
competitive actions and achievement of 
measurable goals and targets.  Success is 
defined in terms of market share and 
penetration.  Competitive pricing and market 
leadership are important.  The organizational 
style is hard-driving competitiveness. 
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organization.  The ipsative scale provides more differentiation than the Likert scale in 
the ratings.  A second advantage is that respondents are forced to identify the trade-offs 
that actually exist in the organization.  When the Likert scale is used respondents tend to 
rate all quadrants high or all quadrants low.  Less differentiation occurs.  A 
disadvantage is that ipsative scaling does not produce independent responses.  The 
response to alternative A in question 1 is related to the response to alternative B in 
question 1.  In a Likert format each response is assumed to be independent.  The authors 
suggest using whichever method suits the research agenda. 
2.5 Changing organizational culture 
The methods by which organizational culture may be changed to enable an innovation-
enabling environment are not clearly defined (Judge et al., 1997).  Three models stand 
as exemplars in change management literature (Mento, Jones and Dirndorfer, 2002).  
Kotter’s model (1995) is an eight step process for transforming organizations.  Kotter 
argues that the majority of change efforts fail and his model is constructed as a way of 
avoiding major errors in the change process.  Two key lessons learned from his model 
are that the change process goes through a series of phases, each lasting a considerable 
amount of time, and that critical mistakes in any of the phases can have a devastating 
impact on the momentum of the change process.  Kotter aims his model at the strategic 
level of the change management process.  Jick (1995) proposes a tactical level model to 
guide implementation of major organizational change.  He posits a ten-step approach 
which serves as a blueprint for organizations making change and as a method of 
evaluating progress of a change initiative that is underway.  Jick argues that change 
implementation is both art and science.  The way it is implemented is as important as 
the change itself.  Jick suggests that change is a continuous rather than a discrete 
process.  Garvin (2000) discusses the seven step acceleration process used within GE.  
This follows closely on Lewin’s (1947) model of unfreezing, movement and re-freezing 
as the essential components of a change process.  Garvin’s model focuses on the 
leader’s role in creating urgency for change, crafting and communicating the vision, 
leading the change, measuring progress of change along several dimensions and 
institutionalizing the change.  This institutionalizing or re-freezing involves changes in 
the organizational design factors, ie, creating a fit of systems and structures to enable 
change.  Creating a sense of urgency is supported by Akgün (2006) who suggests it as a 
means of facilitating unlearning, a sub process of organizational learning, in order to 
guard beliefs and routines against rigidity in responding to environmental turbulence. 
     As Bate argues (1994:  3) ‘In matters of change there is rarely a clear beginning nor, 
for that matter, a discernible middle or end, and few people ever agree on what “really 
happened”, or if indeed anything happened at all.’  Alvesson suggests that ‘cultural 
change calls for creativity, insight, coherence, a combination of culture-focused and 
more substantive material re-arrangements and considerable persistence.  It also calls 
for luck.’ (2002:  185).  Morgan (1997) suggests the metaphor of chaos theory (Gleick, 
1988) as one model for changing culture.  Many theories about culture change describe 
the process as though it were independent of the kind of culture that is changing or 
being changed.  Ouchi (1981) suggests a single strategy of moving from type A to type 
Z cultures.  Lundberg (1985) presents a highly sophisticated view of culture change but 
indicates a common change process for all cultures.  These represent the two approaches 
to organizational culture, one that it is what a company has, and the other that it is what 
an organization is (Smircich, 1983).  Neither of these ontologically opposed approaches 
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takes into account the history and past culture of the organization.  Schein (1992) 
presents one of the few departures from the concept that all cultures change in a similar 
fashion (Wilkins and Dyer Jr, 1988). 
     Changing culture is a combination of leadership and commitment, but not in a top 
down manner (Bate, 1994).  Leadership from top managers influences discontinuous or 
radical innovation within the company (DeTienne and Koberg, 2002).  The leadership 
that will create enduring culture change will engage with the members of the 
organization to create the culture change (Jick, 1995; Kotter, 1995; Gundling, 2000).  
This style of leadership is characterized by involvement with the team, supporting the 
innovation team, eliminating barriers, letting the team break rules on occasions, trusting 
and supporting the team in taking risks.  Leaders cannot impose the “hows” and “whys” 
of building a culture.  They must foster the questions and experimentation and accept 
the risks and uncertainty inherent in such latitude (Frohman, 1998). 
     Team-working is likely to play a significant role in the strategic intent to change 
(Tranfield, Parry, Wilson, Smith and Foster, 1999).  As Leifer et al. (2000:  196) state, 
‘implementing a change process for achieving a mature radical innovation capacity 
demands deliberate intention, strong and sustained commitment, and courage from the 
firm’s leadership.’  Leadership that facilitates radical innovation is likely to be 
supportive of “bad management practices”, such as tolerance of failure, encouraging 
experimentation and a chaotic environment (Arad, Hanson and Schneider, 1997; 
Thomke, 2001).  Making this type of change is likely to be characterized by 
delays, reversals, and oscillations rather than a smooth, linear transition (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1988).  Recent research confirms this (Amis, Slack and Hinings, 2004). 
     In changing culture most writers agree that the process must at least start with top 
management’s rethinking of its current values and deciding to be guided by other 
orientations (Fitzgerald, 1988).  Some management literature has focused on the role of 
leadership in managing major corporate transformations (Beckhard, 1989; Collins, 
2001).  Other researchers have found envisioning skills of the executives to be critical in 
managing change (Carter, Giber, and Goldsmith, 2001).  Tesluk et al. (1997) posit that 
the role of top management in defining a long-term vision of the organization based on 
concepts of creativity is one element important in changing an organization’s culture.  A 
key factor in many change efforts is the existence of a “championing” leader.  Such 
leaders fight persistently for their ideas, are more ideological than their business-as-
usual counterparts, manage by symbols and set an example of championing leadership 
for potential leaders in the organization (Beer and Walton, 1989).  Carter et al. (2001) 
state that support from senior management is identified as a critical step in overcoming 
resistance to change.  This form of leadership is also prevalent in organizational cultures 
that facilitate radical innovation.  Leadership by founders in entrepreneurial firms has 
been found to be different to that of managers.  Managers lead by using a variety of 
analytic tools, are conservative in their orientation and tend to follow the tenets of 
professional management.  Entrepreneurs tend to be impulsive, highly emotional and 
have high needs for control.  They tend to be visionaries who have the ability to create 
excitement and commitment among their followers.  These differences in behaviour 
have tremendous impact on the organization members’ behaviour and the culture (Dyer 
Jr., 2005).  Any change proposed to initiate and sustain a culture for radical innovation 
must therefore have a strong leadership component right from the first stages of 
intervention. 
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     Inertia can inhibit or slow a culture change programme.  Inertia is when 
organizations continue to extrapolate past trends in the face of environmental change.  
Inertia and resistance share significant similarities as sources of friction that slow the 
momentums of change but at different levels of analysis.  Shared resistant behaviours 
and attitudes contribute to organizational inertia (Wong-MingJi and Millette, 2002).  
This tendency for people to persist with the same approach to a problem regardless of 
whether that approach is productive is called the “Einstellung effect” and is suggested to 
be linked to the organizational culture (Bate, 1994).  Bate argues that in changing the 
culture the stages include a deformation of the existing culture, then conciliation, 
education and adoption of the espoused culture.  This is in line with the traditional 
unfreeze, change and refreeze model (Lewin, 1947).  Lewin’s model of change does not 
recognize that the organization’s external environment at the time of “refreezing” is not 
necessarily the same as it was at the time of “unfreezing”.  Thus the model assumes a 
static context in which the organization operates.  The model also assumes a linear 
conception of organization change where the first stage of the process is succeeded by 
another and so on (Styhre, 2002).  Although there is still support for this model (Burnes, 
2004), the perspective of organizational culture as dynamic and continuously evolving 
(Hatch, 1993) limits the applicability of a simple model based on two static positions, 
with a transition between them.  However the notion of initiating change by creating a 
disruption that allows changed ways of working to be initiated and then reinforced to 
become “the way things are done” is still in line with Lewin’s three stage model.  
Changes initiated at the attribute level (Schein, 1991) can be used to develop values that 
promote the espoused behaviour.  The initial stages still require a disruption of the 
equilibrium – the status quo that forces a coping process that goes beyond just 
reinforcing assumptions.  Change occurs through cognitive redefinition of key concepts, 
and the resulting behavioural changes become refrozen in the personalities of the 
individuals and in the norms and routines of the group (Schein, 1992). 
     Culture is slower and more difficult to change than climate, because climate is 
ultimately a manifestation of culture (Ekvall, 1996).  The long-term success of efforts to 
develop organizational conditions that support creativity and innovation requires the use 
of strategies that are targeted at both culture and climate (Tesluk et al., 1997).  Small 
scale efforts can facilitate large changes (Goldstein, 1994) and changes in the behaviour 
of people in the organization can initiate and sustain culture change (Schneider, Brief 
and Guzzo, 1996). 
2.6 Interventions to facilitate a radical innovation culture 
Much literature on interventions to develop a radical innovation culture is based on 
examples in larger companies.  There is little empirical work on smaller mature 
companies.  Some evaluation of failure stories adds depth to the perspective of what 
interventions are required to move the innovation culture towards facilitating radical 
innovation.  Advice to companies that want to be more innovative is usually in the form 
of developing the cultures and structures of the start-up firms.  This is described as ‘Just 
go on a diet and lose some of that excess weight, learn a few new tricks from the 
younger firms, and off you go’ (Markides, 2004:  35) and is suggested to have a low 
probability of success.  Developing a culture for radical innovation is a fundamental 
change of the way things are done and how experimentation is perceived.  Change of 
this type is doubly difficult.  Change on its own can be arduous.  Niccolo Machiavelli 
stated in The Prince (1961:  51) that ‘It should be borne in mind that there is nothing 
 39 
more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through 
than initiating changes in a state’s constitution.  The innovator makes enemies of all 
those who prospered under the old order, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming 
from those who would prosper under the new.  Their support is lukewarm partly from 
fear of their adversaries, who have the existing laws on their side, and partly because 
men are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things unless they have tested 
them by experience.  In consequence, whenever those who oppose the changes can do 
so, they attack vigorously, and the defence made by the others is only lukewarm.  So 
both the innovator and his friends come to grief’.  In addition to this, creation of the 
culture that facilitates radical innovation necessitates creation of some conditions that 
are counter-productive to incremental innovation (Ekvall, 1996; Tushman and O’Reilly 
III, 1996; von Stamm, 2003a).  Culture serves as a social control system.  For 
management, ‘culture provides an effective way of controlling and coordinating people 
without elaborate and rigid formal control systems’ (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1997:  
29).  Organizations can develop diverse competencies both to shape and deal with 
radical innovation.  They develop the capacity either to initiate these discontinuities or 
to respond rapidly (Anderson and Tushman, 1990).  The following interventions that 
facilitate this capability were identified from the literature: 
2.6.1 Resource provision 
Providing adequate resources will support radical innovation.  3M has long had 
interventions in place to facilitate radical innovation (Gundling, 2000).  Here, the 
“Goldilocks Principle” of not too much and not too little, is applied.  There is also a 
balance between innovation projects with departmental targets, and long-term 
investments with short-term profits.  The principle of having some “slack” in resources 
to assist experimentation and learning is also noted.  Slack resources, on an ongoing 
basis, without significant disruptions or discontinuities promote innovation (Judge et al., 
1997).  Delbecq and Mills (1985) argue that the process of innovation in organizations 
is dependent on the number of resources available to overcome or neutralize obstacles.  
In high innovation organizations there are separate funds for innovation, clearly 
mandated feasibility studies with adequate funds, and project groups to undertake the 
feasibility studies that are enlarged to include one or more opinion leaders other than the 
advocate.  Access to abundant, high quality resources increases an organization’s 
chances of coping with change (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000).  Christensen (1997) 
states that discontinuous innovation projects that obtain funding are likely to succeed.  
Those that do not are less likely.  He also notes that it is difficult to keep resources 
focused on a disruptive technology.   
2.6.2 Leadership for a radical innovation culture 
Top management motivates idea generation when it actively encourages the quest for 
new opportunities.  Mechanisms include think-tanks, corporate-wide requests for 
proposals, technology forecasting, slack time for doodling, periodic transfer of 
personnel from one unit to another and technical forums geared to scientific cross-
pollination (Leifer et al., 2000).  A common theme in making changes to facilitate 
radical innovation was the benefit of having top management involvement and 
commitment to this innovation process.  Raising the profile of radical innovation and 
giving it equal prominence with other aspects of the business were most effectively 
carried out by top management involvement.  ‘Top management is responsible for 
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climate and culture’ (Schneider et al., 1996:  18).  The effect of top management on 
developing and sustaining a culture of radical innovation is therefore a key issue.  For a 
mature organization this is complex, as there is a need to maintain the efficiency of the 
incremental improvement and interweave the disruption of the radical.  ‘The real test of 
leadership, then, is to be able to compete successfully by both increasing the alignment 
or fit among strategy, structure, culture and processes, while simultaneously preparing 
for the inevitable revolutions required by discontinuous environmental change.’ 
(Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996:  11).  These authors cite organizations such as 
Hewlett Packard, Johnson & Johnson and ABB as being guided by leaders who 
venerate the past but are willing to change continuously to meet the future.  Senior 
management plays a key role in leadership of radical innovation in mature companies.  
Encouraging experimentation, allocating resources to riskier projects and creating a 
vision of “what could be” help develop a radical innovation culture (Buckler and Zien, 
1996).  Top managers are active, not passive, in influencing discontinuous innovation 
within their organizations (DeTienne and Koberg, 2002).  It is important to “walk the 
talk”, otherwise there is a disconnect between the culture of the company and the 
culture the leaders are trying to create (Leifer et al., 2000).  Radical innovation is borne 
from a maverick culture, one that is at odds with the routinized culture of process 
adherence.  In overcoming the management resistance of such a culture, a sponsor in top 
management facilitates the adoption of radical innovation.  This was the case in the 
example of the adoption of continuous aiming in gunfire at sea.  Continuous aim gunfire 
resulted from the combination of a chance event and a prepared motivated manager.  On 
Admiral Scott’s ship, gunners were free to experiment.  This trial and error led to the 
particular trial that Scott observed and used to develop his new gunsight.  Scott’s unit 
had a maverick culture, not one that emphasized strict hierarchical authority, but one 
that promoted innovation and change (Morison, 1988).  Too little or too much control 
by management stifles innovation.  A balance is necessary to promote innovation (Judge 
et al., 1997).  Interventions to support radical innovation can appear to be counter-
intuitive to good business practice.  The contradictions inherent in the multiple types of 
innovation create conflict and dissent among the organizational units – between those 
historically profitable, large, efficient, older cash generating units and young, 
entrepreneurial, risky, cash absorbing units.  Because the power, resources and 
traditions tend to be anchored in the more traditional units, these units try to ignore, 
trample or otherwise kill the entrepreneurial units (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999).  
Christensen suggests that top management must be prepared to distrust those managers 
they have previously trusted (2003).  ‘What is sound management practice for 
incremental innovation – where speed, cycle time, and quick cash recovery are primary 
objectives – might actually hamper the radical innovation's progress’ (Rice et al., 1998:  
52).  3M management accept risk-taking and are supportive of the Development Team 
(Gundling, 2000).  This encourages longer-term thinking.  Short-term thinking 
encourages incremental improvement but not radical innovation (Stringer, 2000).  In 
developing a radical innovation culture that sits alongside an incremental one, 
empowered teams can be seen as an extension of the visionary leader.  The leader 
supports and guides team members in developing their own leadership skills (Tushman 
and O’Reilly III, 1997).  Being able to see the “art of the possible” is essential to 
leading radical innovation.  Polaroid’s difficulties in adapting to digital imaging were 
mainly determined by the cognitive inertia of its corporate executives (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000). 
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2.6.3 Idea gathering and sharing processes 
The 3M process of circulating people and ideas encourages the transfer of knowledge.  
This works in conjunction with the allocation of time to experiment, thus facilitating 
idea gathering (Gundling, 2000).  External sources of knowledge facilitate the radical 
innovation process (Amara and Landry, 2005; von Stamm, 2004).  In the case of very 
radical innovation involving disruptive technologies, the suggestion is to create fast, 
flexible and inexpensive forays into the market and the technology in order to develop 
ideas and gain knowledge.  In this context, failure and iterative learning are therefore 
inherent to the search for success (Christensen, 1997).  Managing innovation is about 
developing both the ability to scan for signals about change and a readiness to move 
into new areas- and let go of old ones (Tidd et al., 2001).  This process of going in 
search of new ideas facilitated the creation of a radical new product, Surlyn, at DuPont 
(Norling and Statz, 1998).  This type of idea generation is stimulated by connecting idea 
generators to external sources of new knowledge (Leifer et al., 2000).  Radical 
innovation needs external input and thrives on informal networks, both internal and 
external to the company (O’Connor and McDermott, 2004).  Volvo cars improved their 
radical product innovation capability by making use of external sources of innovation, 
new recruits, academic co-operation and the customers and supplier base (Mikaelsson, 
2002).  The use of external sources may be a function of national characteristics.  
Recent research has found that in SMEs studied to evaluate the importance of different 
sources of innovation, internal sources of innovation were more highly rated than 
external sources for both Canada and Portugal (Baranano, Bommer and Jalajas, 2005).  
This seems to be contradictory to other findings that promote the importance of external 
sources (van de Poel, 2000; Paap and Katz, 2004).  Information flows most easily 
amongst people who have strong ties.  As team members interact with the same people 
on a regular basis, there is little that is new to exchange as regards ideas.  It is more 
likely that novel information and new ideas will flow from weak ties – from those who 
are not known as well.  The people on either side of a weak tie can belong to different 
networks.  A tie is strong when the people they both know are the same.  It is a weak tie 
when the people they know are not known to each other.  There are advantages in 
developing network positions that connect different technology areas (Elfing and 
Hulsink, 2003; Hargadon, 2003).  Technology brokers take advantage of this by acting 
as go-betweens.  Connections between people make it possible to build new 
communities around a new venture from the previously disparate people of different 
technology areas.  In this respect, IDEO acts as a technology broker (Sutton and Kelley, 
1997; Hargadon and Sutton, 2000). 
2.6.4 Actions to encourage experimentation and learning  
Learning is a key part of developing radical innovation.  The creation of the radical new 
product, Surlyn, for DuPont was the result of learning in both market needs and 
technological solutions (Norling and Statz, 1998).  This learning often requires a 
clinical appraisal of existing knowledge.  In some cases this knowledge becomes the 
seed-corn for new knowledge.  A willingness to cannibalize current product ideas in the 
pursuit of experimentation is suggested as a means to facilitate radical innovation (Bart, 
1996; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Cravens, Piercy and Low, 2002).  This approach can 
also be applied to existing products in the search for radical innovation (Foster and 
Kaplan, 2002; Kaplan, 1999).  Recent research suggests that this willingness to 
cannibalize is a multidimensional construct that plays an important part in predicting an 
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organization’s propensity to radical innovation (Nijssen, Hillebrand and Vermeulen, 
2005).  This “nothing is sacrosanct” approach resonates with the experimentation 
culture necessary for radical innovation.  High innovation organizations use a small 
pilot study conducted by early adopters (Delbecq and Mills, 1985).  This approach 
facilitates learning and promotes radical innovation.  Mosey argues that learning in 
cross-functional teams who can learn from external sources is necessary for a small 
company which wishes to facilitate radical innovation (2005).  He further argues that 
such an approach is context-specific and cannot be applied by copying best-practice 
from exemplar firms.  The hiring of appropriate people will facilitate the continuous 
experimentation required to promote the continuous challenging of the status quo and 
experimentation (Leonard-Barton, 1992b). 
2.6.5 Team skills 
Wolff (1988) suggests guidelines based on twelve outstanding breakthroughs, to 
facilitate radical innovation; select those people for the radical innovation projects who 
are most likely to be successful in breakthrough innovation, provide management 
backing, and do not rely on market research.  Selection of appropriate team members 
who can think outside-the-box is considered beneficial.  In 3M particular emphasis is 
placed on recruiting innovative people and supporting the innovation process 
(Gundling, 2000).  ‘Radical innovation will not happen without the right people.  People 
with risk taking propensity, drive, and out-of-the-box thinking were involved in every 
project we followed’ (Leifer et al., 2001: 110).  A team comprising curious 
entrepreneurial people who are solution finders not problem solvers is necessary for 
radical innovation (Simon et al., 2003; Kelley, Neck, O’Connor and Paulson, 2004).  
Selection of team members based on psychological profiles by using Myers Briggs 
Type Indicators (MBTI) in order to facilitate radical innovation is suggested by Stevens 
and Burley (2003).  Empowered teams need to be given the autonomy and resources to 
serve effectively.  Members of the team should not be clones of the leader.  The leader 
supports and guides team members in developing their own leadership skills (Tushman 
and O’Reilly III, 1997).  O’Connor and McDermott (2004) found that for success in 
radical innovation, radical innovation team composition is different from incremental 
team composition both at the initiation of a project and as the project matures.  Project 
teams were small, five to six people, who were central to the project.  During periods of 
discontinuous innovation organizations require loose decentralized product structures, 
experimental cultures, strong entrepreneurial and technical competencies and relatively 
young and heterogeneous employees (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999). 
2.6.6 Product champion 
Product champions overview the course of a radical innovation process.  In the case of 
continuous aim gunfire at sea, the innovation was implemented solely because a product 
champion, in this case the President, was willing to jeopardize his career for the 
principle involved (Morison, 1988).  Lessons from large Fortune500 firms suggest that 
a strong product champion is necessary for a radical innovation process (Veryzer, 
1998).  “While innovation can start anywhere in a company, it can’t survive without the 
evangelism and a lot of push from the executive suite.”  (Leifer et al., 2000;  160).  
Marketing speaks for the customer.  R&D speaks for the technology and managers.  
Top manager champions are those who integrate these voices and who speak for the 
future of the firm (Ettlie and Subramaniam, 2004).  A complementary role to that of a 
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champion is suggested by Vincent (2005).  He argues that “midwives” serve as 
translators between the language, culture and needs of the sponsor’s world and the 
champion’s world, performing the function of justifying the innovation, reducing risks 
and resolving conflict 
2.6.7 Segregation from the routine 
A commonly quoted example of radical innovation facilitation is the Lockheed Skunk 
Works (Rich and Janos, 1994).  This approach segregates the do different group from 
the “do better” organization and provides higher degrees of autonomy and less control 
than the parent organization.  This approach of keeping the discontinuous part of the 
development separate from the main organization is supported by Bower and 
Christensen (1995), who argue that this facilitates innovation when faced with 
disruptive technologies.  Discontinuous innovation is facilitated by relatively small units 
that have loose decentralized product structures and experimental cultures (Tushman 
and O’Reilly III, 1999).  Companies attempting discontinuous innovation can separate 
their exploratory units from the traditional exploitative ones – to facilitate different 
processes, structures and cultures.  They can then manage this organizational separation 
through a tightly integrated senior team (O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2004).  
Organization for innovation appears to work best in the highly uncertain “fuzzy front 
end” of the process when it is separated from ongoing business activities (Rice et al., 
1998:  56).  A variation on the skunk works type of segregation is the use of hubs.  Hubs 
serve as a home base for the firm’s cadre of experienced radical innovators (Leifer et 
al., 2001; O’Connor and Rice, 2001).  Hubs can help implement mechanisms for 
capturing radical ideas.  Terry Fadem, DuPont’s corporate business development 
director, described it as being able to grab lightning everyday (Leifer et al., 2000).  
Boeing-Rocketdyne adopted segregation in the form of a virtual team to achieve a 
radical innovation success (Malhotra, Majchrzak, Carman and Lott, 2001).  The use of 
segregation can be taken further in terms of internal venturing where discontinuous 
innovation opportunities are promoted to become spin-off companies.  This works for 
larger firms (Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001; Macher and Richman, 2004), but is considered 
inappropriate for a small mature organization.  Ambidexterity is a goal for many mature 
firms, retaining the “do better” capability and adding a do different competency.  
Ambidextrous organizations reconcile these paradoxical demands by developing 
internally inconsistent architectures within the company.  These retain the advantages of 
experimentation and variability, alongside the benefits of exploitation and process 
control (Benner and Tushman, 2003). 
2.7 Literature summary 
Literature suggests that organizational culture enablers and inhibitors have an effect on 
the propensity of an organization to be innovative in new product development (Kanter, 
1988; Ahmed, 1998; Martins and Terblanche, 2003).  It indicates that mature firms 
often lose this propensity to be innovative, as the mechanisms that allow them to be 
successful become inhibitors to innovation (Leonard-Barton, 1992a; Dougherty and 
Heller, 1994; Leifer et al., 2000; Leifer et al., 2001).  Empirical research has 
concentrated on incremental innovation or innovation in general (Leifer et al., 2000; 
Stringer, 2000; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  As a result there appears to be little 
literature on the organizational culture aspects that facilitate radical innovation.  More 
literature focuses on innovation in larger firms (Edwards, Delbridge and Munday, 
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2005).  It is assumed that smaller firms are more agile and therefore more innovative 
(Oakey et al., 1988; Chandler et al., 2000; Freel, 2000).  This is reflected in the long-
running concern with managing innovation in two different modes – what March terms 
“exploitation” and “exploration” (1996). 
     Creativity is a key component of radical innovation (von Stamm, 2003a).  
Developing and sustaining a climate that supports creativity will facilitate radical 
innovation (Ekvall, 1996).  Creativity operates at group level to facilitate this type of 
innovation.  There are important differences between the process of individual creativity 
and the process of organizational innovation.  The individual process models something 
that occurs within the mind and activity of a single person or within the minds of a 
small number of people working together on the same specific problem.  The 
organizational process occurs at the level of a system with a larger number of 
individuals working together in different units on different aspects of the very general 
problem of implementing a new idea.  Leadership and management of the individual 
and group to support creativity is therefore important to facilitate the process of radical 
innovation (Amabile, 1988a). 
     Culture is the foundation on which innovation management methods, routines and 
idea handling systems can be built.  No single culture is best for innovation and no 
single culture can claim a superiority of ideas (Westwood and Low, 2003).  Climate is 
one aspect of organizational culture that is more visible than the underlying values and 
beliefs.  Assessment tools exist for both climate and culture and some that are relevant 
for assessing the innovation climate culture have been examined.   
     Literature indicates a number of interventions that have been successful in 
facilitating radical innovation in firms.  The interventions identified encourage a 
segregated area and systems that facilitate new ideas and the sharing of ideas.  
Experimentation and learning within the team is a visible and rewarded behaviour – part 
of “the way things are done” in the area responsible for radical innovation.  Leadership 
is visible from top management and a top management sponsored champion is used to 
drive the projects and overcome organizational obstacles.  Top management support is 
visible through allocation of adequate resources for the radical projects, either officially 
or semi-officially along with encouragement to experiment.  Top management actively 
demonstrates that “it is acceptable to be different” when doing radical innovation 
projects, that failure is a normal part of the learning process and that many blind alleys 
have to be explored before finding the “do different” solution.  These aspects of 
experimentation, learning and trying out ideas are key aspects of a radical innovation 
culture.  In addition, the team composition has to be modified to include “can-do” 
people who bring together diverse skills and backgrounds.  Taking a different approach 
and thinking the un-thinkable are behaviours that are rewarded, intrinsically or overtly, 
by the organization.  Here again, top management support and encouragement is 
essential for ensuring the resourcing of the team with the right mix of people and 
encouraging this type of behaviour are key aspects to developing this type of culture. 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1  Research overview- Methodology 
3.1 Researcher’s philosophy 
The researcher’s view of social reality is a composite of elements of natural laws and 
mechanisms embedded in a perspective of social reality that is partly subject to laws 
and partly constructed by the actors.  This perspective is similar to the postpositivism of 
Guba and Lincoln (1998:  205) in that social reality is viewed as ‘being imperfectly 
apprehendable because of flawed human mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable 
nature of phenomena.’  The researcher’s view is an amalgam of the perception that there 
can be a degree of objectivity in some circumstances but that this must be viewed in an 
environment where the understanding of reality is also a construction of the perceptions 
of the actors.  A tension is perceived between these two poles of perception and the 
researcher’s view is located between them, moving towards either pole depending on 
the contextual situation. 
     According to Guba and Lincoln (1998) human behaviour cannot be understood 
without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their 
initiatives.  The authors suggest that ‘Precise quantitative approaches that focus on 
selected subsets of variables necessarily “strip” from consideration, other variables that 
exist in the context that might, if allowed to exert their effects, greatly alter findings’, 
and therefore ‘their outcomes can be properly applied only in other similarly truncated 
or contextually stripped situations’ (1998: 197).  This perspective is in resonance with 
the researcher’s view of understanding the organizational culture in Cerulean. 
     Interpretation of the organizational culture is essential to understanding the 
underlying values and basic assumptions that influence the attitude towards innovation.  
Therefore the constructivist or interpretivist approach to understanding the reality of the 
social situation in Cerulean has some appeal.  The constructivist or interpretivist 
believes that to understand the world of meaning one must interpret it. 
     Schwandt (1998:  236) suggests that ‘Knowledge and truth are created, not 
discovered by mind’.  Reality is apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible 
mental constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature, and 
dependent for their form and content on the individual person holding the construction.  
However this constructivist perspective is constrained by a view that some regularity, 
that may be transposable between organizations, exists in the organizational culture.  
Therefore, following this perspective, an ontology of realism may be closer to this 
perception of reality.  Although reluctant to position a philosophical approach 
“positivistically” into one or another category, the researcher’s philosophical approach 
indicated by the above perspectives is closest to that of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978).  
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Bhaskar’s critical realist ontology is concerned with a reality that is claimed to consist 
of three overlapping domains.  His critical realism has three basic contentions.  First, the 
reality to which scientific theories primarily aim to refer is the structures and 
mechanisms of the world, rather than empirical events.  Structures are defined as sets of 
internally related objects and mechanisms as ways of acting.  Objects are internally 
linked in a structure in the sense that their identity depends on their relationship with the 
other components of the structure.  Second, the underlying structures and mechanisms 
are only contingently related to observable empirical events.  Third, although scientific 
knowledge of reality, especially social reality, is never infallible, it is still possible to 
acquire such knowledge through the creative construction and critical testing of 
theories.  The combined effects of structures and mechanisms may generate observable 
events.  The absence of an observable event does not necessarily mean that the 
underlying mechanisms do not exist.  They may just counterbalance one another (Tsang 
and Kwan, 1999). 
     This multi-level ontological perspective acknowledges the existence of the real 
domain or the mechanisms that produce observable events in the empirical world.  The 
concept of natural regularities is embedded in a broad perspective that social reality is to 
some extent, but not completely, determined by the actors.  The social constructionist 
perspective is rejected as the existence of the regularities is precluded from this 
ontology.  The pure interpretivist view is considered to be inappropriate because it does 
not allow researchers to add their own theories through social mechanisms and causal 
tendencies.  In the same manner, positivism is precluded due to the perception of a 
constructed reality in certain circumstances; ‘management actions are not always 
observable in an objective way, and because social processes are rarely reducible to 
absolute laws’ (Partington, 2000:  98).  This is the dichotomy between positivism and 
phenomenology (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 2002).  The researcher’s 
philosophical perspective is therefore closest to critical realism. 
     The epistemology flowing from this ontological perspective is based on the building 
of models of mechanisms such that, if they exist and act in the postulated way, would 
account for the phenomena being examined (Blaikie, 2000).  These models include 
hypothetical descriptions that reveal the underlying mechanisms.  The mechanisms can 
only be known by constructing ideas about them.  Unlike positivism, which advocates 
conjunction of events, the epistemology of critical realism is one of laws expressing 
tendencies of things.  This epistemology is suggested by Blaikie to indicate a 
retroductive strategy in research.  This strategy commences with an observed regularity 
that requires an explanation and is followed by producing an explanation for the 
regularity.  Explanation is achieved by identifying the generative mechanisms that 
produced the regularity (Blaikie, 2000).   
     The retroductive research strategy attempts to discover appropriate structures and 
mechanisms in order to explain observable phenomena.  The use of a model developed 
from existing sources will facilitate causal explanation of the observed phenomena since 
these structures and mechanisms will typically be unavailable to observation.  This is 
tested by developing further consequences of the model that can be stated in a manner 
open to empirical testing.  Suitable instruments may be of use in confirming the validity 
of the model.  The retroductive strategy attempts to explain by means of mechanisms 
which have already been established (Blaikie, 2000).  This strategy seeks to provide 
explanation, offer ways to change, and evaluate and assess impacts of this change.  As 
the research issue is focused on understanding the aspects of organizational culture and 
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suggesting mechanisms to change the culture, this strategy is considered to be 
appropriate for the research. 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
A useful framework for understanding innovation culture is Schein’s model of 
organizational culture (1984).  Schein suggests that culture is what a group learns over a 
period of time as the group solves its problems of survival.  He argues that culture is a 
pattern of underlying assumptions that have been evolved, discovered or developed by a 
given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration.  Schein (1992) suggests organizational culture exists at three levels, 
artefacts, values and underlying assumptions.  Schein’s model for organizational culture 
is shown in Figure 3-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-2  Schein’s model of organizational culture 
 
     Artefacts are the visible organizational structures and processes.  They include 
written and spoken language, the physical space and layout of the organization and the 
overt behaviour of the individuals.  Schein divides these into three levels.  The first is 
concerned with the physical artefacts like company logos.  The second level is 
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concerned with behaviour including organizational rituals.  The third level is concerned 
with organizational anecdotes, stories and myths, and organizational heroes and villains.  
Values are the social principles, goals and standards held within the culture to have 
intrinsic worth.  They define what the members of the organization care about.  They 
are unwritten rules that allow members of a culture to know what is expected of them.  
The organizational culture reflects the values of its employees.  By using these values 
the members are able to make decisions in order to tackle problems, issues and to 
develop solutions.  Underlying Assumptions are at the most invisible level of the model.  
These assumptions are taken for granted beliefs and habits of perception, thought and 
feeling.  They are rarely made explicit.  When a solution to a problem works repeatedly 
it becomes taken for granted.  These assumptions become learned responses that guide 
behaviour and determine how members think, act and feel. 
     A second complimentary framework is that of archetypes (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1993).  An archetype is defined in terms of two general statements.  First, organizational 
structures and management systems are best understood by analysis of overall patterns 
rather than by analysis of narrowly drawn sets of organizational properties.  This is the 
holistic perspective.  Second, patterns are a function of the ideas, beliefs and values – 
the components of an “interpretative scheme” – that underpin and are embodied in 
organizational structures and systems.  An archetype is thus a set of structures and 
systems that reflects a single interpretative scheme.  Defining an archetype in this way 
is a departure from the more common treatment of structures and systems as 
disembodied attributes of organizations in an adaptive way to context and performance.  
Structures and systems are not neutral instruments but embody wittingly or otherwise 
intentions, aspirations and purposes. 
     The concept of an archetype implies some form of classification.  The idea of 
coherence between elements of organizational arrangements is central to typologizing.  
This classification of organizations is made according to differences and similarities in 
overall patterns.  Organizations will develop structures and systems consistent with a 
single interpretative scheme.  Using the concept of “momentum” (Miller and Friesen, 
1984) organizations can be considered as evolving toward archetypal coherence because 
for any firm it is better to be one thing consistently than to be a combination of ill fitting 
parts.  In effect they recognize the economic benefits that flow from coherence.  
Organizations evolve towards archetypal coherence as advantaged groups seek 
consolidation of political position and control over the distribution of resources. 
     The term culture is often used to refer to both values and beliefs expressed through 
structures and systems and the degree to which actors accept and act in accordance with 
those values and beliefs.  In contrast Greenwood and Hinings (1993) posit that the 
pattern of commitments to one or more interpretative schemes is a potential dynamic for 
change.  For example the organization’s prevailing interpretative scheme (the one 
embodied in structures and schemes) need not be supported by any actors in the 
organization.  At some point in the organization’s history it may have been supported 
but over time this commitment has waned.  However the structures and systems have 
remained unchanged because of the organization’s tendency towards known inertia.  
Such a situation is amenable to change.  The interpretative scheme posited by 
Greenwood and Hinings is of archetypes that reflect the holistic view. 
     The development of archetypes, based in organizational design, represents a central 
thrust of organizational theory, which is the need to understand organizational diversity 
through typologies (Weber, 1964; Ouchi, 1981).  Greenwood and Hinings advocate the 
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typologizing of organizations be ‘made according to differences and similarities in 
overall patterns’ (1993:  1054).  Organizational culture emerges from the organization 
and in this respect is a manifestation of organizational design. 
     To position innovation in the context of archetypes it is necessary to define the 
researcher’s perspective of incremental and radical innovation.  Innovation can be 
considered as two types: incremental – “do better” and radical – “do differently” 
(Bessant, 2003).  Either type can be conceived as an ideal state at opposite ends of a 
continuum (Hage, 1980).  Along the continuum an innovation may exhibit some degree 
of both types.  At one end is incremental innovation, in which effort is focused on trying 
to “do better, yet more of the same”, at the other end is radical innovation in which 
ideas that are new to the company or new to the industry are actively being considered.  
Essentially this is a degree of resonance with McFadzean’s (2000) notions of paradigm 
preserving to paradigm breaking activities happing in this context.  For incremental 
innovation much is known about the management of the process, the innovation process 
is routine and systematic and can be modelled relatively simply.  For radical innovation 
less is known about its management, the process is ill-defined and modelling it is more 
complex.  This is represented as in Figure 3-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3  Innovation continuum 
 
     The archetypes proposed reflect the “ideal” positions at the ends of this continuum.  
Different kinds of innovation require different kinds of organizational hardware – 
structures, systems and rewards and different kinds of software – human resources, 
networks and culture.  During periods of incremental change organizations can rely on 
units with relatively formalized roles and responsibilities, centralized procedures, 
functional structures, efficiency-oriented cultures, strong manufacturing and sales 
capabilities and relatively homogeneous, older and experienced human resources.  
These units are characterized by a high degree of inertia, emphasizing efficiency, 
teamwork and continuous improvement.  During periods of discontinuous innovation, 
organizations may require entrepreneurial “skunkworks” type of units.  These units are 
relatively small, have loose decentralized product structures, experimental cultures, 
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strong entrepreneurial and technical competencies and relatively young and 
heterogeneous employees.  They build new experience bases and knowledge systems 
(Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999).  Incremental innovation usually emphasizes cost or 
feature improvements in existing products or services largely depend on exploitation 
competencies.  In contrast radical innovation concerns the development of new business 
or product lines, based on new ideas or technologies or substantial cost reductions that 
transform the economics of a business and require exploration competencies (Leifer et 
al., 2000).  Table 3-1 summarizes some of the basic differences between incremental 
and radical innovation. 
Table 3-1  Characteristics of incremental and radical innovation 
               Type I                                                                              Type II 
           Incremental                                                                        Radical 
 
• Formalized 
• Centralized 
• Systematic 
 
 
 
Procedures 
 
(Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1999) 
 
• Contingent 
• Decentralized 
• Loosely structured 
 
• Functional 
• Efficiency oriented 
 
 
Structure 
 
(Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1997) 
 
• Facilitating knowledge gathering 
• Supporting risk taking and 
experimentation 
 
 
• Homogeneous 
• Older and Experienced 
 
 
 
 
People 
 
(Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1999) 
 
• Heterogeneous 
• Younger and Entrepreneurial 
• Technical 
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• Mature 
• High Inertia 
• Focus on efficiency 
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• Continuous Improvement 
 
 
 
Aspects of the 
organization 
 
(O’Reilly III and 
Tushman, 2004) 
 
 
• Entrepreneurial 
• Focus on discovery 
• Individual co-operation 
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O’Reilly III, 1997) 
 
• New methods and technologies 
• Experimentation 
• New ideas 
• Creation 
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(Veryzer, 1998) 
 
• Mostly new 
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Management 
 
(Benner and Tushman, 
2003) 
 
 
Exploration 
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3.3 Research methodology 
This research is insider action research (Coghlan and Brannick, 2001), and a single case 
study that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 
2003).  Action research has traditionally been defined as an approach to research that is 
based on collaborative problem solving between researcher and practitioner.  It aims at 
both solving a problem and generating new knowledge.  It has developed largely from 
the work of Kurt Lewin (1946) and his associates and involves a cyclical process of 
diagnosing a change situation or a problem, planning, gathering data, taking action, and 
then fact finding about the results of that action in order to plan and take further action 
(Foster, 1972; Peters and Robinson, 1984; Argyris, Putnam, and McLain Smith, 1985; 
Schein, 1987; Elden and Chisholm, 1993; Eden and Huxham, 1996; Greenwood and 
Levin, 1998; Gummesson, 2000).  The nature of this research is involving and working 
with Cerulean employees and the unit of analysis is the Cerulean Development Team.  
The research falls into three parts corresponding to Projects One, Two and Three.  The 
first part was to establish the aspects of organizational culture acting to enable or inhibit 
radical innovation in the Cerulean organization.  The second was to assess the presence 
and intensity of the innovation culture.  The third was to develop a suitable set of 
interventions that would be applicable to Cerulean in the form of a strategic action plan, 
based on empirical examples of interventions designed to develop a radical innovation 
culture.  The methodology adopted for each project is described below. 
3.4 Project One methodology 
A grounded approach was used in Project One in order to surface the perceptions of the 
members of the organization (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Partington, 2002).  Wilkins and 
Dyer Jnr argue that they ‘cannot imagine how any instrument designed by researchers 
prior to their encounter with a culture can capture the particular frames [of culture] and 
apprehend change’ (1988:  530).  This perspective supports a grounded approach to 
surfacing the organizational culture aspects prior to attempting to gauge the culture.  
The method of surfacing the organizational culture aspects was to use an issue 
(Sackmann, 1991) to focus the members’ attention on a specific action or event.  This 
enables both the surfacing of the tacit components of culture and comparisons across 
individuals and research settings.  Given the ubiquitous nature of culture, organizational 
members cannot immediately reflect on their culture and describe it.  A key concern in 
eliciting tacit aspects of culture is to provide a stimulus to respondents so that they are 
forced to make an interpretation that is based on their cultural framework rather than on 
the researcher.  The stimulus should provide a specific context but leave enough latitude 
for interpretation.  Faced with ambiguity people tend to draw on pre-existing categories 
already available to them for sense making.  The tacit components of culture become 
apparent in the specific interpretations attributed by the respondents.  In addition, an 
issue focus enables comparisons because it introduces a specific context that forces 
respondents to draw on their existing knowledge.  It channels the attention of the 
respondents to the same cultural aspects within a given organization and reveals the 
perceptual framework they are using to conceptualize the issue. 
     Interviews that tended towards an unstructured form were used to explore the issues.  
The use of this type of interview is supported by Fontana and Frey (1998) who describe 
unstructured interviewing as going hand in hand with participant observation, as many 
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of the data gathered in participant observation come from informal interviewing in the 
field.  Unstructured interviewing aims to understand the complex behaviour of members 
without imposing any a priori categorization that may limit the field of enquiry, in 
contrast to structured interviewing which aims to capture precise data of a codeable 
nature, in order to explain behaviour within pre-established categories.  Narration by the 
Development Team members of their experience with products that had aspects of 
radical innovation was used to produce transcriptions that were analysed using content 
analysis using NVivo.  The codes derived, representing aspects of innovation culture 
influencing radical innovation, were checked by feeding back to each narrator to 
facilitate development and understanding.  These were conflated into a single list of 
codes and this was also validated with the Development Team during workshop 
reviews.  These workshops involved Development Team members who had participated 
in the interviews, and promoted discussion and reflection on the results of the 
codification of the transcripts.  This participative process of review and refinement 
enabled the team members to negotiate their view of the issue.  This facilitated the 
understanding and interpretation of the aspects of organizational culture influencing the 
radical innovation, and also promoted participation in the research process.  A model of 
“ideal” innovation culture archetypes based on Greenwood and Hinings (1993) was 
developed in this participative manner during the workshops.  In this workshop activity, 
members of the organization participated in the experiential learning cycle (Coghlan 
and Brannick, 2001) with the diagnosis becoming a collaborative activity (Coghlan, 
2001) of action research.  Action research implies a team of practitioners who cycle 
through a spiral of steps including planning, action, reflecting or evaluating the results 
of actions, and taking further action, continually monitoring the activity of each step in 
order to adjust as needed (Dickens and Watkins, 1999).  De Guerre (2002:  337) argues 
that ‘the local existing, often tacit knowledge of the insiders needs to be understood by 
the researcher, who can make it visible to the researched, and, finally it gets reframed in 
some new way through a dialogue with social science’.  In contrast to a programme of 
development, action research unfolds in a conversation over time, and it is this emergent 
aspect that makes some people feel uncomfortable, by making the management of this 
process difficult or impossible. 
     The issue of validity of action research is subject to discussion in literature.  Ottoson 
(2003) argues that it has strong scientific support in modern science from quantum 
physics and complexity theory.  It many ways this contradicts the classical (Newtonian) 
view of how “good” science should be performed.  Traditional research demands that 
researchers should not be involved in the studied object in a way that could affect their 
objectivity.  However, the quantum paradigm suggests that true objectivity does not 
exist, only relative objectivity, and the subjectivity of each individual.  This resonates 
with the researcher’s ontological perspective of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978).  The 
object of action research is a total social system with people in different situations with 
their own individual feelings, thoughts and perspectives.  Thus, in action research, the 
researcher takes part in a complex psycho-dynamic and cultural process that applies to 
the quantum holistic thinking and not the classical Newtonian thinking. 
     The fluid nature of action research requires that emphasis be placed on achieving 
rigour in the research.  The opportunity for triangulation was taken where possible.  
Action research provides an opportunity to seek out triangulation between (i) 
observation of events and social processes, (ii) the accounts each participant offers, and 
(iii) the changes in these accounts and interpretation of events as time passes (Eden and 
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Huxham, 1996).  In terms of providing knowledge outside the members of the 
organization, the research must at least achieve a situation in which it is recoverable by 
interested outsiders.  To do this it is essential to consider the epistemology of the 
researcher and so define what counts as acquired knowledge (Checkland and Holwell, 
1998). 
     Rigour in this research was demonstrated by following the guidelines suggested by 
Coghlan (2002).  He argues that practitioners must demonstrate; (a) how they engaged 
in the steps of multiple and repetitious action research cycles and how these were 
recorded to reflect a true representation of what took place, (b) how they challenged and 
tested their own assumptions and interpretations of what was happening continuously 
through their research, (c) how they accessed different views of what took place which 
produced both confirming and contradictory interpretations and (d) how they grounded 
their interpretations and diagnoses in solid theory rigorously applied, and how the 
research outcomes were challenged, supported or dis-confirmed by the theories 
underpinning these interpretations and diagnoses.  He further argues that quality can be 
demonstrated in terms of degree of collaboration, degree of reflexive concern for a 
practical outcome, degree to which the work includes differing ways of knowing 
(Reason, 1999) and degree to which the research led to change and could be considered 
as “significant”. 
     The researcher kept a journal of significant events and observations.  This journal is 
used as suggested by Coghlan and Brannick (2001) to record thoughts and reflections 
on observed events, to record comments made and to provide a timeline for the events 
that occur during the duration of the research.  This provided an opportunity to record 
observations from the Development Team and others about events and actions that were 
relevant to the research.  The use of a journal facilitated triangulation of observations on 
aspects of organizational culture. 
3.5 Project Two methodology 
Project Two gauged the presence and intensity of the innovation culture in the Cerulean 
Development Team.  In order to reflect both the deeper level values and the more 
visible artefacts of the innovation culture a combination of culture and climate 
assessments were considered to be more suitable than a single instrument.  Assessment 
tools for both climate and culture were evaluated from literature.  The evaluation was 
restricted to widely used instruments that had been validated and were suitable for use 
with the Development Team.  Specific instruments for gauging organizational culture 
and climate were considered.  The objective for this project was to have an assessment 
of the presence and intensity of the innovation culture in Cerulean in order to begin 
developing a plan of interventions suitable for moving the culture from the extant 
position to the desired position.  Using Schein’s model as a template, a model of 
innovation culture embedded in the organizational culture of the organization is 
proposed.  The top level of artefacts is represented as the creative climate in this model.  
The model is shown in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4  Model of innovation culture based on Schein’s model 
     Assessment tools were evaluated with a view to combining a culture and a climate 
assessment into a composite instrument.  This assessment provided an overview of the 
organization culture and aspects of the creative climate.  In the model proposed in 
Figure 3-4, innovation culture is a sub-set of organizational culture.  To assess this 
innovation culture more specifically, workshops were used to discuss and review the 
climate and culture assessment results.  This led to the participative development of an 
assessment tool based on the model of innovation culture archetypes developed in 
Project One.  The Development Team self-assessed their team’s position, measured 
against the ideal position of a radical innovation culture. 
3.6 Project Three methodology 
Project Three took the output from Project Two as a starting point to allow participative 
development of interventions suitable to develop a radical innovation culture.  
Workshops were held with the Development Team members to discuss the assessment 
results.  The discussions developed a series of suggested interventions for developing an 
innovation culture more supportive of radical innovation.  An evaluation of empirical 
examples of interventions to facilitate radical innovation in new product development 
teams was made using sources outside the company.  A review of literature, searching 
for radical innovation and intervention-specific terms yielded a number of interventions.  
Evaluation of empirical examples, both from case examples and from other companies, 
yielded a number of interventions that had been applied in other organizations.  These 
interventions were related to the interventions suggested by the Development Team 
based on the output from the assessments in Project Two.  This allowed the 
development of a planned series of inter-linked interventions suitable to move the 
Development Team innovation culture to be more supportive of radical innovation. 
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3.7 The researcher as a practitioner 
One issue that dominated the research was that the researcher was also a practitioner in 
the company.  The influence of this was recognized and care was taken by the 
researcher at each stage of the process to avoid personal perceptions and viewpoints 
distorting gathering and interpretation of the data.  In some cases the influence of the 
researcher as a senior manager in the organization may have been significant enough to 
cause distortion of data gathered by the researcher.  The question of team members 
divulging information that may be perceived as “detrimental” to their position in the 
company was also an issue.  This was an insider action research inquiry and therefore 
the researcher was a part of the organization that was undergoing the reflection and 
change that is part of action research.  To reduce bias associated with the researcher 
being a practitioner, care was taken to build confidence with the Development Team so 
that they could speak openly about their thoughts.  The researcher’s perceived style has 
been described by recent recruits to the Development Team as “open” and this style 
facilitated building a confidence in the team about speaking openly.  Care was also 
taken by the researcher not to appear to be detached and acting as a third party observer.  
By accepting that the researcher was a senior manager, but also attempting to 
participatively uncover aspects of innovation culture in the team, the team members 
were more likely to accept the presence of the manager as a researcher and be 
forthcoming in providing rich data about their perceptions.  This openness and 
transparency of purpose was discussed with the team members from the initial stages of 
the research.  This participation as both practitioner and researcher allows uncovering of 
the deeper aspects that may be missed by an outside observer. 
     To compensate for the possible bias of the researcher as a practitioner, three 
alternative perspectives of the research were developed.  Firstly, a journal was kept by 
the researcher to provide a record of observations and reflections about the research.  
Secondly, observations by Cerulean employees outside the Development Team were 
sought in order to provide validation of the data developed with the Development Team 
as part of the participative process.  Thirdly, the research was presented to other 
research groups for critical discussion and evaluation.  These included internal Cranfield 
presentations, conference doctoral track presentations and conference presentations.  
This opened up the research to external academic evaluation.
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4 Project One 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1  Research overview – Project One 
4.1 Introduction to Project One 
Uncovering aspects of innovation culture that influenced radical innovation in the 
Development Team was the focus for the first stage of the research.  A participative 
approach was adopted in order to work with the Cerulean Development Team to surface 
these aspects.  Two previous instances of a product introduction that included a radical 
technological aspect were proposed as examples around which the team members could 
narrate their experiences.  These two product introductions, one an example of a 
comparatively successful implementation of radical innovation and the other an 
example of less successful implementation of radical innovation acted as a mechanism 
for the employees to tell a story of their view of what happened and why it happened.  
For this research, radical innovation is considered as the use of a technology that is new 
to the company and new to the industry (Walsh, Kirchoff and Newbert, 2002; Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003).  The plan for Project One is outlined in Figure 4-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2  Project One plan 
The context of Project One in the overall research is shown in Appendix B. 
 
The members of the Development Team are shown in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1  Cerulean Development Team members involved in the research 
Development  
Team member 
Age 
@ 
July 
2005 
Month/
Year 
started 
Length of 
employment 
at July 2005 
Comment 
Development 
Manager 
58 12/1973 31  
Project Manager 45 07/2002 1 year  
 9 months 
Left company in March 2004 
Design Engineer 58 09/1969 36 years 
3 months 
Retired from company in 
December 2004 
Software 
Engineer 
37 01/2001 4  years  
Software 
Engineer 
41 05/1999 6 years  
Mechanical 
Engineer 
44 03/1988 17 years  
Conformance 
Engineer 
31 06/1996 8 years  
2 months 
Left company in August 2004 
Design Engineer 50 04/1982 23 years  
Software 
Engineer 
37 09/1985 19 years  
Design Engineer 56 08/1992 12 years  
Design Engineer 33 08/1999 5 years  
Technical Author 42 06/1999 4+6 years  (with 1 year break) 
Software 
Engineer 
47 09/1987 17 years  
Design Engineer 53 09/1969 35 years  
Software 
Engineer 
27 11/2003 1 year  
Electronics 
Engineer 
55 01/2004 1 year  
Electronics 
Engineer 
38 01/2004 1 year  
Technical 
Director 
38 05/1988 16 years  
5 months 
Technical Director from  
March 2004 until he left 
company in October 2004. 
Technical 
Director 
45 10/2004 10 months  
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4.2 Surfacing aspects of innovation culture 
In order to avoid contaminating the data with the researcher’s perceptions and to 
provide a focus for the team members to describe their thoughts, an issue focus was 
used to surface the innovation culture aspects that influenced the radical innovations 
selected.  The objective was to take a good, and a less successful, example of products 
containing a radical innovation experienced by the Development Team and allow team 
members to talk about their experience of the innovation.  The selection of the examples 
of radical innovations was made by the Development Team.  Their choice was of a 
product sampling probe from MC2 as the example of a better product innovation and the 
ASM500 vision system as an example of a less successful product innovation.  These 
products contained features that could be considered as radical innovation, ie, new to 
the company, new to the industry (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and as a clear departure 
from what had gone before (Delbecq and Mills, 1985; Dewar and Dutton, 1986). 
     The ASM500 is an automated machine that gathers particulate and vapour phase 
matter from differing smoking regimes for laboratory analysis.  This leads to a 
determination of the tar, nicotine and CO (carbon monoxide) present in the smoke from 
the cigarette.  It is this information that appears on cigarette packets in some countries.  
MC2 is an instrument that sits alongside a cigarette making line and automatically 
samples product from the mass flow.  It produces twenty-four measurements on the 
internal and external characteristics of each product sampled. 
     Twenty six interviews were carried out.  Each was recorded and transcribed.  Each of 
the interview transcripts was analyzed using NVivo and coded to elicit aspects of 
organizational culture that influenced radical product innovation.  Table 4-2 shows the 
total number of interviewees, time spent interviewing and number of pages of 
transcription resulting from all the interviews. 
Table 4-2  Interviews 
Number of 
interviewees 
Number of 
interviews 
Duration of 
interviews (Hours) 
Number of pages 
of transcription 
 
14 
 
26 
 
20 
 
325 
 
The list of aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation identified 
using NVivo codification from the interview transcripts is shown in Table 4-3. 
 59 
 
Table 4-3  Aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation 
Code 
No. 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture 
Development Team description of aspect 
1.  Acceptance of 
failure 
Accepting that failure is part of the development process 
of a radical innovation. 
2.  Allow adequate 
time 
Providing sufficient time to carry out the development 
tasks. 
3.  Autocratic 
management 
Dictatorial style in managing people.  Issuing 
instructions.  Command and control approach to dealing 
with people. 
4.  Autonomy to make 
decisions 
The ability and scope to take decisions without referring 
upwards to management. 
5.  Belief in the 
product’s worth 
Having confidence in the value and worth of the 
product.  Believing that the product is a suitable 
Cerulean offering.  Having belief in the need to develop 
the product.  Accepting that the product has a place in 
the Cerulean product offering. 
6.  Bureaucratic 
management 
Management style characterized by adherence to rules 
and regulations.  Management that is unwilling to bend 
the rules, or show flexibility. 
7.  Changing 
objectives 
Moving the goalposts during the project.  Changing the 
desired outcomes, the specification during the course of 
the project. 
8.  Clear objectives Unambiguous outcomes desired from the project. 
9.  Common objective Everyone on the team and in management having the 
same goal or desired outcome for the project.  Having 
the same understanding of the products desired 
performance capability. 
10.  Conflict in top 
team 
Visible fighting and disharmony amongst the managers 
who are directing the company.  Some members of the 
top team taking a differing approach to others in the top 
team.  Verbally negating comments made by others in 
the top team.  Verbal attacks on members of the top 
team by others in the top team. 
11.  Creative skills in 
the group 
Members of the Development Team having creative 
skills. 
12.  Customer 
involvement 
Having input from the customer to the product 
development and having the customer influence the 
design of the product. 
13.  Desire for a “safe” 
solution 
Wanting to produce a solution that is known to be 
acceptable to all concerned.  Using accepted methods 
and technologies to achieve the product development. 
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Table 4-3  Aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation 
Code 
No. 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture 
Development Team description of aspect 
14.  Desire to grow and 
develop 
The wish of the members of the Development Team to 
be able to expand their skills, abilities and knowledge.  
To learn of new systems, technologies and experience 
different methods of use in product development. 
15.  Desire to push the 
boundaries 
Development Team wish to push the capability of the 
Development area into new arenas, new technologies, 
into gaining new knowledge.  Wanting to learn more 
about known technologies and to discover new 
technologies.  Wanting to go beyond that which exists 
currently. 
16.  Discrete team 
identity 
Feeling amongst the Development Team that their team 
is separate and detached from the rest of the company. 
17.  Environment for 
creativity 
A location and atmosphere that enhances or facilitates 
creativity.  Quiet uninterrupted time in which to be 
creative.   
18.  Experience of 
technology 
Having Development personnel with knowledge of 
technologies that may be of use in the product 
development.  A broad skills base within the 
Development Team. 
19.  External 
technologies 
Looking outside the company at what technologies are 
available and being aware of their possible application 
in product development.  Keeping abreast of external 
developments that may influence or assist product 
development 
20.  Fear of failure Concern at an attempted solution or experiment not 
providing a successful outcome.  Frightened about a 
negative outcome to an attempted activity, project, 
experiment.  Worrying about the negative effect of an 
unsuccessful outcome to a task. 
21.  Feedback to team 
from management 
Management taking an interest in the development 
project, commenting on the team’s progress, providing 
guidance as the next stages develop.  Feeling that 
management has listened to proposals and then have 
responded with a thought through reaction.  
Management listen and question the team, take an 
interest in what is happening and offer suggestions to 
the team.  There is a dialogue between management and 
the Development Team. 
22.  Front-end 
opportunity to be 
radical 
The ability to be radical at the early stages of a project. 
23.  Homogeneous 
team 
A team with all members having the same views and 
same opinions about problem resolution. 
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Table 4-3  Aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation 
Code 
No. 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture 
Development Team description of aspect 
24.  Identification with 
the company 
The feeling the employees have about the company.  
How they identify with the company, its objectives, 
goals and way of working. 
25.  Inter-dependency 
of teams 
Appreciation of other teams within the company, their 
objectives, their constraints, their limitations.  How 
these teams work together for the good of the company. 
26.  Learning from 
failure 
Ability to learn from mistakes.  To build knowledge 
based on experimentation.  To learn through trial and 
error.  Accepting that each failure leads to a learning 
experience. 
27.  Management 
confidence in team 
Management trust the Development Team.  They 
understand the constraints and limitations the team 
operate within and appreciate what is possible or 
feasible in terms of product development. 
28.  Past successes Because the company has been successful in the past 
with product development, there is a belief or an 
expectation that it will be successful on the current 
development project. 
29.  Project champion A senior level person who is committed to the project 
and lends support when necessary to ensure continuity 
of the development process. 
30.  Provide adequate 
resources 
Make sufficient resources available to the Development 
Team, ie, labour, cash, equipment. 
31.  Recognizing the 
skills of team 
members 
Appreciating the contribution and ability of each 
Development Team member.  Understanding their 
skills, contribution and input and displaying awareness 
of these. 
32.  Respecting 
individuals 
Treating Development Team members with respect.  
Displaying appropriate courtesy to each team member 
and recognizing their contribution to the Development 
Team. 
33.  Self-confidence of 
team members 
Each team member feels a sense of security and 
awareness of their own worth to the Development 
Team. 
34.  Speaking openly Team members speak out with their views, present their 
own opinions and argue their case in an open and non-
adversarial manner.  Team members can openly criticise 
management decisions and Development Team opinions 
and in turn present their perspective in an open and 
participative way. 
35.  Team commitment A shared objective within the team, held by all team 
members.  The feeling from each team member that they 
are willing to support the team in its objectives. 
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Table 4-3  Aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation 
Code 
No. 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture 
Development Team description of aspect 
36.  Team confidence 
in management 
The team feel that management knows what it is doing 
and has a clear considered objective.  The team feel that 
management understands the Development Team 
objectives, the complexity of product development and 
the obstacles to be overcome during the development 
process. 
37.  Trusting the team The perception that the Development Team is trusted to 
undertake the development process.  The feeling that the 
Development Team can be left alone to achieve the 
development objective. 
38.  Using external 
Development 
The use of an external service for product development.  
This is not just access to the technology, but also 
includes part of the development process. 
39.  Apathy to target 
achievement 
Lack of concern about not achieving targets due to 
perceiving no detriment to not achieving the target. 
40.  Autonomy v Set 
objectives 
A tension between open discussion and having 
autonomy to define direction, and providing clear, 
unambiguous objectives to the team. 
41.  Customer 
conservatism 
The desire of the customer to retain what is known and 
"safe" in an instrument solution. Degree of comfort 
with change. 
42.  Degree of comfort 
with change 
Reluctance or discomfort in the team in responding to 
conditions of change. 
43.  Desire for an easy 
solution 
Desire to have a solution that is easy to bring about. 
44.  Desire to explore 
what is possible 
Desire to evaluate the art of what is possible or what is 
feasible with new technologies or methods. 
45.  Desire to try new 
technology 
Willingness to spend time and resources evaluating 
potential technologies which may or may not lead to 
possible solutions to product problems.  Willingness to 
accept the use of time and resources in evaluating these 
alternatives. 
46.  Encouragement to 
be radical 
Management encouragement for the Development Team 
to be radical in their approach to problem solving. 
47.  Holding 
information back 
Keeping back selected pieces of information or 
knowledge that may be useful to the recipient.  Being 
frugal in providing assistance in resolving problems.  
Tending to provide just enough help to resolve the 
immediate issue and not enough to provide a better 
understanding of the problem drivers and solutions. 
48.  Ideas from top 
management 
The view that new product ideas and specifications 
should be provided by top management, rather than 
from the Development Team. 
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Table 4-3  Aspects of organizational culture influencing radical innovation 
Code 
No. 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture 
Development Team description of aspect 
49.  Maintaining power Retaining, maintaining and strengthening the 
individual's position, status, or position within the 
development group.  This leads to withholding 
information or ideas to prevent others from gaining 
knowledge and thus jeopardizing the position of the 
individual. 
50.  Opportunity for 
experimentation 
Opportunity to experiment with new ideas or 
technologies or seek out new technologies or concepts. 
51.  Peer perception How members of the Development Team perceive each 
other.  The degree of respect and credibility an 
individual has from the rest of the Development Team. 
52.  Problem led 
solution 
Using the problem to determine which technologies 
should be used to achieve a solution, instead of 
evaluating potential technologies and adapting these to 
resolve possible problems.  ie, Problem led instead of 
Technology led. 
53.  Short v Long-term 
focus 
The tension between taking a short-term, immediate 
perspective as opposed to a longer-term, future, 
perspective. 
54.  Team delivery of 
radical solution 
Radical solutions coming from a team effort as opposed 
to an individual's effort. 
55.  Technology led 
solution 
Evaluating available technologies in order to determine 
which problems may be resolvable using those 
technologies, instead of using the available technology 
to resolve encountered problems.  ie, Technology led 
instead of Problem led. 
56.  Tension between 
safe and new 
The conflict between going for the safe, tried and trusted 
solution, and the new, untried solution. 
57.  Trigger for new 
ideas 
The triggers that generate new ideas in the Development 
Team. 
58.  Unstressed 
environment 
An environment that is unstressed and permits lateral 
thinking. 
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4.3 Emergence of themes influencing radical innovation 
A collective decision was taken to further validate and refine the aspects identified in 
the coding structure into higher level codes.  This involved participation of the 
Development Team members in grouping the aspects into themes.  This resulted in the 
clustering of the fifty eight lower level codes reflecting individual aspects of 
organizational culture into aggregate themes (higher level codes) that represented 
broader aspects of the innovation culture which were collectively considered to be 
associated with the facilitation of radical innovation.  The aggregate themes and key 
constructs were empirically derived through an inductive process in which the 
Development Team members continuously refined their meaning, and hence their 
internal validity, in a collective manner.  The nine themes were: 
• Company Infrastructure 
• External confidence 
• Clear objectives 
• Team constitution 
• External perspectives 
• Freedom/Latitude 
• Attitude to Risk 
• Internal confidence 
• Growth/Development 
The full list of themes and associated aspects obtained from all interview data is shown 
in Table 4-4. 
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4.4 Analysis 
4.4.1 The themes in relation to innovation literature 
The occurrence of each of the nine themes in each of the twenty-six interviews is shown 
in Table 4-5 and the themes are discussed below in relation to literature. 
Table 4-5  Occurrence of themes in the interviews 
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5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
11          
12          
13          
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25          
26          
Total 24 19 24 13 11 11 19 16 22 
 
Freedom/Latitude 
Freedom to develop is widely recognized as a prerequisite for innovation (Rickards, 
1985; Prather, 2000; Nijhof, Krabbendam and Looise, 2002).  Freedom in this context 
refers to deciding what to do or how to accomplish the task, a sense of control over 
one’s own work and ideas.  The most important type of freedom is operational 
autonomy – freedom in the day-to-day conduct of one’s work, freedom in deciding how 
to achieve the overall goal or mission.  Organizational characteristics such as openness 
are supportive of innovation success (Huizenga, 2000).  Prather (2000) also argues that 
trust and openness are important in shaping the climate for innovation.  This is in 
resonance with Kaplan (1960) who suggests that freedom to choose problems and 
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change direction (within restricted limits of programmes and projects and goals of the 
organization) is one of the essential factors that positively influence creativity. 
     In an incremental environment the degree of freedom can be reduced and replaced 
with systems and procedures.  These systems and procedures are those which are 
appropriate for successful operation of a business – the “do better” activities.  The 
routines and systems that work well for normal business operation become inhibitors 
when applied to radical innovation development (Christensen, 1997; Sutton, 2001; 
Farson and Keyes, 2002).  Abetti (2003) argues that over management can be as much 
an inhibitor to radical innovation as under management.  Over management, ie, arbitrary 
decisions, too many inputs and too much attention to detail may cause loss of creativity 
and enthusiasm, or worst, departure of the best contributors.  Under management may 
allow innovators to take off in the wrong market or strategic direction, overspend their 
budgets, make unrealistic commitments and even compromise the company’s future.  
Unnecessary bureaucracy prevents adaptation to changing environments and slows the 
innovation process down (Katila and Shane, 2005).  Management of radical innovations 
requires balancing the natural desire of control with the realization of insufficient 
technical and market knowledge in order to guide and assist, rather than interfere with 
the innovators.  Harborne and Johne suggest that ‘an informal, open, and entrepreneurial 
climate requires continuous attention from senior management if it is not to revert to a 
formalised, hierarchical and risk-averse one’ (2003:  126).  Risk is more likely to be 
taken if there is freedom to explore (Amabile, 1988b; Ekvall, 1991). 
Attitude to risk 
‘Attempts at radical innovation produce more failures than successes, and the magnitude 
and timing of results are highly unpredictable.  Faced with these double-barrelled 
negatives, it is not surprising that executives feel more comfortable in other approaches 
to future growth; sticking to their knitting; gaining access to innovative technologies 
through acquisitions; or being a “fast follower” as new concepts enter the competitive 
arena.’  (Leifer et al., 2000:  4).  Management systems and procedures set the 
environment which in turn influences the attitude to risk (Schmitt, 2003).  Groups that 
are risk-averse will inhibit radical innovation (Ekvall, 1996; Harborne and Johne, 2003; 
Simon et al., 2003).  Risk can be to both personal career development within the 
company as the radical innovation can be unsuccessful and also to the progress of the 
radical development in achieving an acceptable solution.  Risk taking is one of the 
climate dimensions that make the crucial difference between the creative climate that 
supports radical innovation and the creative climate that allows only incremental 
improvements.  There is need for more of these climate aspects when big leaps are 
aimed at than when small step improvement is the innovation strategy (Ekvall, 1996).  
The predilection towards conforming acts and rewards for conforming – risk aversion – 
is argued by Bouwen and Fry (1991) to inherently kill innovative ideas.  Group 
members must therefore be willing to be tolerant of risk and management of such a 
group must operate in a risk-tolerant manner.  Small losses, more than either major 
successes or failures, contribute to effective learning.  Success often fails to engage 
managers’ attention sufficiently so that they learn from experience.  Major failures raise 
defences that block learning.  Small failures cause individuals to pay greater attention to 
the process, but do not create defensiveness that impedes learning (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  A tolerance of risk is at odds with the approach to business management 
as suggested by standards such as ISO 9000.  ‘Practices such as continuous 
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improvement and ISO 9000, while valuable, are designed to operate in a smooth, low 
risk environment’ (McDermott and Handfield, 2000:  42).  Managers should be wary of 
using concurrent approaches to new product development if the product itself is not well 
defined and the market is uncertain (McDermott and Handfield, 2000).  In a similar 
manner the application of standard control, top down decision making, focus on 
decisions rather than evolution of ideas and a too rigid QFD system can inhibit 
creativity in product development (Rose-Anderssen et al., 2005). 
      The pursuit of knowledge is the rationale behind experimentation (Thomke, 2003).  
It is an iterative process of understanding what works and what does not work.  Both 
results are equally important for learning.  Learning is the goal of any experiment.  In 
the book “In Search of Excellence” (Peters and Waterman, 1982) excellent companies 
are conspicuous for their tendency to try things out, to experiment.  An informal, open, 
and inquiring environment that values experimentation, with leaders promoting 
innovation by creating a shared belief that team members are safe to take interpersonal 
risks will facilitate radical innovation (Claver et al., 1998; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 
2002; Gudmundson, Tower and Harman, 2003; Harborne and Johne, 2003).  When 
employees feel psychologically safe, they engage in learning behaviour – they ask 
questions, seek feedback, experiment, reflect on results and discuss errors or unexpected 
outcomes openly.  Leaders can create these norms by influencing the way creative ideas 
and errors are handled, which in turn, leads to shared perceptions of how consequential 
it is to make a mistake (Chatman and Cha, 2003).  Mistakes are seen as lessons to learn 
from, and learning is expected and celebrated (Frohman, 1998).  The confidence of the 
team in its own ability (Amabile, 1988b) and its view of how it is perceived (Simon et 
al., 2003) influence its willingness to take risk. 
Growth/Development 
This theme concerns learning within the team by individuals in the team.  It relates to 
pushing the team’s knowledge and experience and about discovering other technologies 
that are available.  ‘The training and experience of the people right in your own firm are 
the principal sources of information for successful innovations’ (Marquis, 1988:  85).  
Freel finds that innovation flows from intermediate levels of the organization and that 
more innovative organizations carried out more training of staff (2005).  Learning from 
mistakes is a part of the growth of the group and development of both individual and 
group skills and experiences (Frohman, 1998; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002; Chatman 
and Cha, 2003).  Group members should be encouraged and stretched beyond their 
comfort zone.  A managed learning process assigns challenging projects, and assists and 
monitors the individual participants (Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002).  Cohen and 
Levinthal argue that ‘problem solving and learning capabilities are so similar that there 
is little reason to differentiate their modes of development’ (1990:  130). 
     Engaging in shared learning and development across organizational boundaries, and 
increasingly across regional and national ones, facilitates the growth and development 
of the group and individuals and facilitates “do different” innovation (Bessant, 2003).  
This development can take the form of a knowledge brokering cycle, where the best 
innovators systematically use old ideas as the raw materials for one new idea after 
another (Hargadon and Sutton, 2000).  Challenge, the emotional involvement of the 
members in the organization’s operations and goals is part of the growth and 
development of the group.  This challenge is an enabler to both incremental and radical 
innovation (Ekvall, 1996).  Routines, systems, structures and strategy are elements of 
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organizational learning that can become institutionalized.  This institutionalized 
learning may impede new learning when it no longer serves the situation.  In these 
circumstances it is necessary to learn to “unlearn” in order to learn again (Vera and 
Crossan, 2005).  By encouraging conflict, creativity can grow and develop (Sutton, 
2001). 
External confidence 
One factor that differentiates radical innovation from incremental is senior management 
having belief in the team.  This can be a major enabler for radical innovation.  An 
example is the development of the Polaroid Land camera.  With weeks to go before the 
deadline, it was Dr Land’s unwavering support that drove his team beyond their limits 
to achieve a breakthrough innovation (Mascitelli, 2000).  The External confidence 
theme relates to the perception of the team as to how they are viewed by those outside 
the team.  A large component of this is the perception of the top management team 
about the Development Team.  Feeling valued and secure helps people relax enough to 
be creative (Kanter, 1988).  Management practices that permit freedom in conduct of 
work, provision of challenging interesting work, clear strategic goals, and teams with 
diverse skills and perspectives facilitate creativity (Amabile et al., 1996).  Senior 
management must be passionate about supporting radical innovation.  The support, 
involvement, commitment and the championing of the CEO and senior management is a 
critical success factor.  The role of radical innovation in accomplishing the company’s 
long-term strategies and objectives must be clearly stated and reinforced at all levels 
(Simon et al., 2003).  However although top management’s support is strongly related 
to technical performance there is no indication that this becomes more important when 
the innovation is radical (Lee and Na, 1994). 
     Pride in the team, in the company, coupled with knowing that innovation is 
mainstream rather than counter-cultural helps to stimulate innovation.  Organizations 
with “cultures of pride” in the company’s achievements and in the achievements and 
abilities of individuals will find themselves more innovative (Kanter, 1988). 
Internal confidence 
This theme is similar to the External confidence theme in that it relates to the perception 
the members of the team have about themselves and their team, and how they relate one 
to another.  Self-motivation, being self-driven, excited by the work itself, enthusiastic, 
attracted by the challenge of the problem, having a sense of working on something 
important and a belief in or a commitment to the idea also facilitate innovation of both 
types (Amabile, 1988b). 
     Organizational characteristics such as openness, respect and teamwork are assumed 
to be supportive for innovation success (Huizenga, 2000).  Creative thinking depends to 
some extent on the personality characteristics related to independence, self-discipline, 
tolerance for ambiguity, perseverance in the face of frustration, and a relative lack of 
concern for social approval.  It is the “something extra” of creative performance 
(Amabile, 1997).  This is supported by Hauser who argues that a culture that enables 
conflicts concerning discussion and prevents emotional conflicts will facilitate the early 
stages of innovation (1998). 
     Employees who acknowledge and support each others’ work and do not waste time 
protecting their own ideas or feeling threatened by others will facilitate this type of 
environment (Heilmeir, 2000; Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002).  Nemeth (1997:  72) 
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argues that ‘dissent is a very economical mechanism for producing innovation.’  In this 
environment people trust that others will listen to, learn from and inform them in order 
to facilitate innovation (Frohman, 1998).  For radical innovation, breakthroughs occur 
when thinking outside the box – making strategic trade-offs between conflicting 
priorities, attempting to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable (Syrett and Lammiman, 
2002).  Having confidence about their own capability will allow a team to evaluate 
technologies and applications outside the organization that will facilitate radical 
innovation (Kovach, 2000). 
External perspective 
Looking outside the organization means looking away from the focal points- “scanning 
the periphery”.  Day and Schoemaker suggest that the periphery is where your attention 
is not (2004).  When you shift attention to this area it is no longer the periphery.  It 
becomes the focal point.  Thus it is necessary to continuously scan away from the main 
areas of focus for the business, but not to the extent that focus on the key parts of the 
business is lost.  As more resources are devoted to scanning the periphery, information 
overload can become a serious problem.  There is a trade-off between scope and 
intensity.  Day and Schoemaker liken it to a flashlight or a laser.  A laser has an efficient 
narrow focus whilst a flashlight has a broader less intense view. 
     Successful innovation requires the ability to harvest ideas and competencies from a 
wide array of sources.  If a company stays locked within its own four walls it will be 
unable to uncover and exploit opportunities outside its existing businesses or beyond its 
current technical or operational capabilities.  This may satisfy incremental innovation 
but is unlikely to be of benefit for radical innovation (Wolpert, 2002).  ‘The need for 
external perspectives seems almost self evident.’  (Wolpert, 2002:  78)  The exposure to 
experience and technology outside the team or the company is a necessary component 
for innovation (Sutton and Kelley, 1997).  Huizenga (2000) found that external sources 
are used more than internal sources to create knowledge and that co-operation with 
universities is positively correlated with innovation success.  Cooper and Kleinschmidt 
(1990) find that in a study into new product innovation in 100 companies, one of the 
major factors that separates winners from losers is the effective use of outside 
technology and external scientific communication.  Willingness to communicate with 
external stakeholders (Hauser, 1998) and linkages with external sources (Rothwell and 
Dodgson, 1991; Rothwell, 1992) will facilitate innovation.  Formal and informal 
structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and 
direction of innovation (Teece, 1996). 
     All technology firms have organizational processes and infrastructures that facilitate 
the capture of customer requirement information and its integration into the new 
product’s design.  Most of these processes and infrastructures are designed for products 
that are in the latter stages of their life cycle, or are incremental and continuous 
innovations.  It appears that the development process for radical new products, 
including the manner in which users are involved, differs markedly from the 
incremental new product development process (Callahan and Lasry, 2004). 
While von Hippel (1988) and von Hippel et al. (2000; 2002) propose that users are an 
important source of new product ideas and Florida and Goodnight (2005) suggest 
customers as creative partners, others have argued that being too close to the customer 
or being “customer led” may prove detrimental to innovation and firm performance 
(Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000).  This is supported by 
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Trott who argues that market research constrains rather than facilitates innovative 
thinking and creativity (2002).  Veryzer argues that it may be possible to create a valid 
context for collecting market information so as to avoid unduly discouraging radical 
innovation (2005). 
     Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests a firm’s strategies 
are constrained by external forces that provide critical resources to the firm, such as 
customers, suppliers and investors.  These external constraints explain why a firm 
focuses on satisfying its established customers in existing markets.  The firm’s resource 
allocation processes are designed to optimize the profitability of the firm’s current 
operations.  This dependency and focus on customers can, however, inhibit radical 
innovation.  Companies listen to customers, give them the product performance they are 
looking for, and in the end, get hurt by the very technologies their customers led them to 
ignore (Bower and Christensen, 1995).  A high degree of co-operation with suppliers 
and customers is negatively correlated with innovation success (Huizenga, 2000).  
Callahan and Lasry (2004) suggest that the importance of customer input increases with 
the market newness of a product up to a point and then drops off for very new products, 
whereas the importance of customer input increases with the technological newness of a 
product without dropping off. 
     A major success factor in facilitating innovation is when individuals try to assimilate 
and internalize knowledge from external sources (Terziovski, Sohal and Howell, 2002).  
Scientists, engineers and firms from outside the organization may trigger radical 
technological change that transforms current technological regimes (van de Poel, 2000).  
Developing radical or disruptive innovations requires the meshing of actual 
sophisticated technological and market knowledge with visions about the future.  Both 
knowledge re-use (exploitation) and the search for new knowledge (exploration) are 
taking place in an ambiguous world, and require certain types of sense making 
dynamics to be successfully executed (von Wartburg, Teichert and Rost, 2003). 
Clear objectives 
Clarity of goals is generally agreed as an enabler of innovation (Arad et al., 1997; 
Frohman, 1998; Gundling, 2000).  This is refined to suggest that goals that are tight at 
mission level and loose at the level of employee autonomy, at procedural level will 
facilitate innovation (Amabile, 1988b; Amabile et al., 1996).  Simon et al. (2003) argue 
that goals should be consistent with and enable the accomplishment of the 
organization’s business objectives and strategies (2003). 
     The effect of clear objectives on radical innovation is considered to be different from 
incremental innovation.  General direction and strategic clarity are required for both 
types of innovation.  Having very clear and specific objectives is considered to be an 
enabler for incremental innovation only.  The confused uncertain aspect of radical 
innovation is inhibited by having clearly defined objectives at a tactical level (Humble 
and Jones, 1989; Martins and Terblanche, 2003).  Clarity of the desired outcome as well 
as the project specification for the innovation project can shift over time.  Innovation 
success criteria can also shift over time, differ between groups, and trigger power 
struggles between innovation managers and resource controllers (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989).  For radical innovation, “order and clarity” (generally accepted to support 
incremental innovation) may be detrimental.  ‘It is a well-known phenomenon that 
ambiguity is not threatening to highly creative people.  On the contrary they become 
stimulated by it, they see the possibilities in an unclear situation.  But it is also known 
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that people with above-average creative potentials, and with less self-confidence than 
highly creative people, often need frames and goal direction in order to realize their 
latent creativity.’ (Ekvall, 1996:  121). 
Team composition 
This theme relates to the team itself, the skills and experience of the team members and 
their heterogeneity.  The composition of a radical innovation team is suggested as 
comprising people with superior technical capability.  In addition team members should 
be inquisitive, passionate, not afraid to be different, broadly educated, extremely bright, 
integrative, aggressive, flexible, able to take risks, goal-orientated, entrepreneurial and 
eager to learn the business.  Types of people not recommended include, people who 
cannot communicate, people who want to pursue a lifetime career in one thing, people 
who are too oriented towards “group process”, politicians (as opposed to network 
builders) and those who are overly risk averse (Leifer et al., 2000).  Innovators are the 
idea generators who initiate idea generation.  They tend to be non-conformers and will 
disregard or violate existing organizational rules and norms as the need arises (Glynn, 
1996). 
     People appropriate for radical innovation are curious entrepreneurial people, solution 
finders not problem solvers (Simon et al., 2003).  Humble and Jones (1989) suggest that 
whilst most managers can achieve incremental improvements, radical innovation 
requires dedicated full-time staff with appropriate qualifications and personal 
commitment.  Team composition should be characterized by breadth of experience in 
addition to depth, a combination of product development skills and functional 
sophistication (Heine, 2001; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002).  Creative people are 
generally agreed to facilitate radical innovation (Amabile, 1988a; Cummings and 
Oldham, 1997; Stringer, 2000).  However, there must be more than just the presence of 
creative people.  ‘For creativity to occur, chaos is necessary but a structured and focused 
chaos.’ (Kuratko and Hodgetts, 2001:  122).  The theme of chaos acting to enable 
creativity is supported by Quinn (1985). 
     The composition of the radical innovation team is generally agreed to benefit from 
inclusion of non-conforming individuals and lateral thinkers.  These people add the 
ability to think of “do different” solutions to problems.  Sternberg, O’Hara and Lubard 
(1997) argue that the type of personality required is one of determination and 
persistence in overcoming obstacles.  They argue that creativity requires a risk-taking 
personality, someone who can take a stand and be a contrarian.  Group diversity is a 
major influence upon technical performance.  A group that stabilizes its membership for 
too long not only decreases its productivity but tends to become insular and to evidence 
“Not Invented Here” behaviour (Roberts, 1988).  Tushman and O’Reilly III (1999) 
support this perspective that team heterogeneity facilitates discontinuous innovation. 
Company infrastructure 
This theme reflects the company environment in which the team operates and influences 
the team.  The concept of an organic organization that can react to change as opposed to 
a mechanistic one that is bureaucratic and fixed has long been established (Burns and 
Stalker, 1966; Gresov, 1984).  Organizations that are structurally complex, formal and 
decentralized are likely to introduce new products and adopt only incremental 
departures from process technology when they are innovative.  Incremental innovation 
processes that lead to new product introduction appear to be dependent on more 
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traditional structural arrangements and market oriented strategies.  An aggressive 
technology policy and unique structural arrangements appear to be necessary precursors 
to pre-innovation conditions that support radical innovation (Ettlie et al., 1984).  High 
innovation companies in USA, Europe and Japan have flatter organization structures, 
smaller operating divisions and smaller project teams (Kanter, 1988).  Centralization 
and formalization should be reduced in order to facilitate radical innovation (Ekvall, 
1996).  Highly innovative organizations can become trapped by their own success.  The 
same factors that create a successful innovative company often plant the seeds of 
complacency and failure as competitive conditions change (Tushman and Nadler, 1986). 
     Making resources available is a management responsibility.  Managers who believe 
in innovation, provide the necessary resources and support and make time available for 
innovation will enable incremental innovation and continuous improvement (Irani and 
Sharp, 1997).  When a creative climate is aimed at, centralization and formalization 
should be minimized (Ekvall, 1996).  Yet these resources can act as both enabler and 
inhibitor for radical innovation.  The provision of too many or too few resources will 
inhibit radical innovation.  This perspective of “not too much” and “not too little” 
applies to several resources required for innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996).  
Gundling (2000) refers to this middle ground of resource provision as a “Goldilocks” 
principle. 
     The systems and procedures operated within the company have an influence on the 
propensity to deliver radical innovation.  Practices such as continuous improvement, 
QFD and ISO 9000, already discussed in the Attitude to risk theme, while valuable, are 
designed to operate in a smooth, low risk environment (McDermott and Handfield, 
2000) and are therefore inappropriate for enabling radical innovation (Leifer et al., 
2000). 
     Management of the radical innovation team is also part of the Company 
infrastructure.  Radical technological innovations are developed by highly creative 
engineers, scientists and other skilled persons.  These persons are difficult to “manage” 
either individually or in teams (Abetti, 2003).  In managing the people side of radical 
innovation, one of the leadership roles that facilitates innovation is that of a sponsor 
(Roberts, 1988; Dougherty and Heller, 1994; McDermott and O’Connor, 2002). 
     Style of management can enable or inhibit a risk tolerance within the team.  
Harborne (2003:  126) argues that ‘an informal, open, and entrepreneurial climate 
requires continuous attention from senior management if it is not to revert to a 
formalised, hierarchical and risk-averse one’.  Creation of an entrepreneurial climate 
that encourages the crises, dissatisfaction, tension and significant external stresses that 
are the major preconditions for stimulating people to act (Van de Ven, 1986) is the 
opposite requirement for management running normal business practices.  The 
management practices required to facilitate radical innovation are very different from 
those considered to be good business practice.  The familiar and often prescribed 
practices are more appropriate for incremental than for radical innovations (Kuratko and 
Hodgetts, 2001; Rice, Kelley, Peters and O’Connor, 2001; Sutton, 2001). 
4.4.2 Themes located on Schein’s model 
The themes do not exist as stand-alone entities but as inter-related representations of 
aspects of the radical innovation culture in the Cerulean Development Team.  They 
reflect the perceptions of the Development Team members and were developed through 
participative analysis with the team members.  Barley (1991) argues that focusing on 
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symbolic phenomena that lie on the surface of organizational behaviour, stories, myths, 
logos, heroes, and assorted other verbal or physical artefacts concentrates on the 
obvious while failing to reveal the core of the interpretive system that lends a culture its 
coherence.  In Schein’s model, artefacts may be easy to observe but difficult to decipher 
and values may only reflect rationalizations or aspirations.  To understand a group’s 
culture it is necessary to get at its shared underlying assumptions (Schein, 1992).  
However, unconscious taken for granted beliefs, habits of perception, thoughts and 
feelings that constitute the underlying assumptions are unlikely to be fully understood 
and made explicit by insiders of that culture (Schein, 1991).  Thus representation of the 
themes as aspects of the innovation culture using Schein’s model are only shown at the 
level of either visible manifestations (artefacts) or as perceived (values).  The 
underlying assumptions are the ultimate source of these artefacts and values (Schein, 
1992).  This is shown in Figure 4-3. 
 
• Company infrastructure 
• External perspective 
• Clear objectives 
• Team composition 
• External confidence 
• Freedom/Latitude 
• Attitude to risk 
• Internal confidence 
• Growth/Development 
 
Taken for granted and not visible to team 
members 
 
 
Figure 4-3  Representation of themes as internal/external and visible/perceived 
4.4.3 Using Greenwood and Hinings’ concept of archetypes 
Using the innovation continuum represented in Figure 3-3 and the characteristics of 
incremental and radical innovation shown in Table 3-1 as representing the two ends of 
the continuum, a model representing archetypes of these two “ideal” types of innovation 
was participatively developed.  The descriptions applied to each of the archetypes were 
developed through participatory analysis with the Development Team, using the nine 
themes as the basis for description.  These descriptions are supported in the literature.  
The two archetypes proposed reflect the perspective of innovation culture “ideal” types 
based on Greenwood and Hinings (1993) archetypes.  Type I is an incremental approach 
to innovation where there is a tendency to maintain or improve in small incremental 
steps – a “do better” attitude.  Type II is a radical approach to innovation where there is 
a desire to explore, to push the boundaries – a “do different” attitude.  The model of the 
two archetypes of “ideal” innovation culture is shown in Table 4-6. 
Artefacts 
(visible) 
Values 
(perceived) 
Underlying 
Assumptions 
(hidden) 
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4.5 Rigour in the research 
Coghlan and Brannick (2001) suggest that establishing rigour in action research must be 
shown to demonstrate quality of the research.  Rigour in action research refers to how 
data are generated, gathered, explored and evaluated, and how events are questioned 
and interpreted through multiple action research cycles.  The heart of the research is the 
story of what took place.  Taking the requirements suggested by Coghlan and Brannick, 
rigour for this stage of the research was established by:- 
• Use of action research learning cycles. 
This was demonstrated in the repeated refining that took place following data 
gathering.  The involvement and participation of the Development Team was 
sought from the first stages of the research.  The findings in each of the group 
sessions were developed and built upon at each subsequent session.  Each stage 
of the research process was discussed with the Development Team and their 
input sought.  The results were fed back to them and again their response 
solicited and used to develop the next stage of the process. 
• How multiple data sources were assessed to provide contradictory and 
confirming interpretations. 
The data gathered during the interviews provided one source.  Observations and 
reflections made in the researcher’s journal provide a second perspective that 
supported the data from the interviews.  Comments made by the Technical 
Director provide a third perspective. 
• Evidence of how the researcher challenged and tested assumptions and 
interpretations continuously throughout the research. 
This has happened in three ways.  Firstly, the participation of the Development 
Team to refine the gathered data provided one aspect of the testing process.  
Secondly, reflection and discussion with Cerulean employees outside the 
Development Team provided an additional perspective.  Thirdly, the research 
has been presented to the researcher’s Executive Doctorate peer group, doctoral 
colloquia and at conferences.  These presentations provided feedback and tested 
the findings from the data. 
• How the interpretations and outcomes are challenged, supported or dis-
confirmed by existing literature. 
An evaluation of the themes in context with the literature has been undertaken, 
with the literature being generally supportive to the outcomes.  One area where 
literature dis-confirms the finds is in clear objectives.  Development Team 
comments made during the interviews indicated that having clear and 
unchanging specifications for a project was considered desirable.  Literature 
indicates that objectives should be clear at an overview or objective level and 
relatively loose at a detail level.  The nature of radical product innovation is such 
that the detail specifications may have to change to accommodate any changing 
understanding and awareness of potential solutions.  This desire to have clear 
specification is perceived by the researcher and other organization members 
outside the Development Team to reflect a strong aversion to taking ownership 
for defining product specification.  For many years the Development Team were 
provided with a detailed product specification and asked to develop the product 
that met the specifications. 
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4.6 Key points from Project One 
The key points arising from Project One can be summarized as:- 
• Nine themes influencing radical innovation have emerged from the data. 
• These themes represent the extant innovation culture in the Cerulean 
Development Team. 
• The themes group aspects of organizational culture influencing radical 
innovation together.  The nine themes are: 
1. Freedom and Latitude within the team. 
2. Attitude to risk within the team. 
3. Growth and Development of the team. 
4. External confidence in the team by those outside the team. 
5. Internal confidence of the team to undertake radical innovation. 
6. External perspective by the team outside their immediate area. 
7. Clear objectives about the project for the team. 
8. Team constitution, skills and attitudes of the team members. 
9. Company infrastructure that the team works within. 
• The themes can be represented as visible/perceived to reflect Schein’s artefacts 
and values in his model of organizational culture. 
• The innovation culture that facilitates incremental and radical product 
innovation can be represented as archetypes representing characteristics of each 
“ideal” type. 
• The Cerulean Development Team exhibits strong tendencies towards an 
incremental “do better” pattern of product development. 
 
     Having developed the nine themes and a model to reflect aspects of incremental and 
radical innovation culture “ideal” types, the research turned to the issue of gauging this 
innovation culture.  The development of an instrument to assess the presence and 
intensity of the radical innovation culture in the Cerulean Development Team was the 
focus for Project Two.
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5 Project Two 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1  Research overview – Project Two 
5.1 Introduction to Project Two 
This chapter describes the development of an instrument to gauge the degree to which 
the innovation culture facilitates radical innovation.  Innovation culture can be 
considered as a sub-set of organizational culture.  Existing assessment tools were 
evaluated with a view to combining a culture and a climate assessment into a composite 
instrument.  Two were chosen and an assessment carried out.  Using the output from 
this assessment and the themes developed in Project One, a third self-assessment tool 
was developed with the team members.  The relationship between the instruments and 
the themes is discussed.  The results from the assessment provided an input into the plan 
of interventions suitable for developing aspects of a radical innovation culture.  The 
research plan for Project Two is outlined in Figure 5-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2  Project Two research plan 
The context of Project Two in the overall research is shown in Appendix B. 
5.2 Instruments to assess climate 
Several instruments were evaluated that were considered suitable for assessing 
organization climate.  The requirements were for a readily available, validated and 
reliable instrument that could be used as a composite with the cultural assessment 
instrument to obtain both a holistic and detailed assessment of the innovation culture in 
the Cerulean Development Team.  The instruments examined with these requirements 
in mind are tabulated in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1  Climate assessment tools evaluated 
Climate Assessment Instrument Key evaluative comments 
Litwin and Stringer Organizational 
Climate Questionnaire (LSOCQ) 
(Litwin and Stringer, 1968) 
Some doubt exists about the validity of 
the instrument (Rogers et al., 1980). 
 
Creative Climate Questionnaire (CCQ) 
(Ekvall, 1996) 
Reliability and validity concerns about 
the instrument (Mathisen and Einarsen, 
2004). 
 
Business and Organization Climate 
Index (BOCI) 
(Payne and Pheysey, 1971) 
 
Produces reliable results (Sparrow and 
Gaston, 1996). 
Siegel Scale of Support of Innovation 
(SSSI) 
(Siegel and Kaemmerer, 1978) 
 
Developed in a school environment 
(Mathisen and Einarsen, 2004). 
Assessing the Climate for Creativity 
(KEYS) 
(Amabile et al., 1996) 
Assesses the creative climate 
specifically.  Widely used with very 
large database of results (Bommer and 
Jalajas, 2002). 
 
Situational Outlook Questionnaire 
(SOQ) 
(Isaksen et al., 1999) 
 
Based on the Creative Climate 
Questionnaire (Ekvall, 1996). 
Team Climate Inventory (TCI) 
(Anderson and West, 1998) 
Reliable instrument with widespread 
use (Mathisen and Einarsen, 2004). 
 
Team Factor Inventory (TFI) 
(Rickards et al., 2001) 
Recently developed instrument with 
large database of information (Al-
Beraidi and Rickards, 2003). 
 
 
Two traditions in defining climate are evident; the cognitive schema approach and the 
shared perception approach.  The first approach regards climate as an individual 
perception and cognitive representation of the work environment.  From this perspective 
climate assessments should be conducted on an individual level.  KEYS is based on the 
cognitive schema approach.  The instrument measures individual perceptions of 
environmental factors on different levels: group, organization, individual and 
supervisory level.  The authors of SSSI also regarded climate as a psychological process 
(Mathisen and Einarsen, 2004).  Both the TCI and the CCQ were based on a view of 
climate as shared perceptions, although they operate to different levels of aggregation.  
Although the CCQ was developed to assess climate at the organization level, the TCI 
assesses team climate.  Both the CCQ and TCI are responded to by the individual before 
the individual responses are subsequently aggregated to the appropriate level.  The 
aggregation has been tested using inter-rater agreeableness for the TCI but not for the 
CCQ.  Mathisen and Einarsen (2004) suggest that TCI and KEYS are the most useable 
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instruments for assessing the environmental factors affecting creativity and innovation.  
The widespread use of KEYS and the use of both enabling and inhibiting factors in the 
questionnaire tend to suggest that such an instrument would be most appropriate for 
gauging the organizational climate within the Cerulean Development Team. 
     Schneider et al. (1996) suggest that culture can be changed through a focus on 
climate.  Climate reflects the tangibles that produce a culture.  By altering the everyday 
practices, policies, procedures and routines that impact on the beliefs and values that 
guide employee reactions change can be initiated and made durable.  Change will not 
occur through new mission statements, speeches, newsletters, or big kick-off parties.  
To communicate new values and beliefs requires changing tangibles, the thousands of 
things that define climate, that define daily life in an organization.  It is important 
therefore to address the climate that exists and to have some form of assessment in order 
to initiate change.  However, climate is at best represented by the artefacts level of 
culture (Ekvall, 1996) and as such it cannot be viewed or addressed in isolation to the 
underlying values and beliefs that underpin the organizational culture (Schein, 1984).  
The instrument considered to most closely reflect the climate level of the innovation 
culture was KEYS. 
5.3 Instruments to assess culture 
Several widely used organizational culture assessment instruments were evaluated for 
practicality of use, validity and availability.  The broader purpose of the culture survey 
was to use the results to improve the organization’s performance.  For this broader 
purpose to be achieved, the data must be shared with all employees.  Previous research 
suggests that problem areas must be openly and honestly discussed in a non-threatening 
environment, solutions to problems must be proposed and actions must be taken 
(Sleezer and Swanson, 1992).  This is in accord with the participative nature of the 
action research and consistent with the methods adopted in the first stage of the research 
to uncover the aspects influencing radical innovation in Cerulean. 
     The objective was to identify an instrument that provided a holistic perspective of an 
organizational culture that would indicate a present and desired position for the 
organizational culture and that would be suitable for feedback and discussion by the 
Development Team.  The instruments evaluated for suitability to the research are 
defined in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2  Organizational culture assessment instruments evaluated 
Culture Assessment 
Instrument 
Key evaluative comments 
Hadler and Tushman 
(1980) 
Overview of organizational culture based on open 
systems theory.  Similar perspective to the concept of 
“congruence” posited by Nadler and Tushman (1980) 
 
Goffee and Jones 
(1998) 
Assessment of organizational culture based on sociability 
and solidarity.  Similar to the culture model suggested by 
von Stamm (2003b) 
 
Harrison and Stokes 
(1992) 
Focused on the power and control aspect of 
organizational culture 
 
Reigle (2001) Output based on Burns and Stalker’s (1966) Mechanistic-
Organic paradigm 
 
Hofstede et al. (1990) Evaluates sub-cultures embedded within cultures 
 
Cameron and Quinn 
(1999) 
Displays current and desired position. 
“Adhocracy” culture similar to desired innovation culture 
 
 
The quadrants of the OCAI clearly display the current and desired positions for 
organizational culture.  The quadrant described as “Adhocracy” in this assessment tool 
is a close approximation to the radical innovation culture of a Type II “ideal” type.  The 
ability to provide a visual display of results that indicate current and desired positions of 
organizational culture was also considered to be advantageous in maintaining the 
participation of the team members.  Tukey (1977) states that ‘except when learning the 
numerical part of a new technique, no problem of exploratory data analysis is “solved” 
without something to look at.’  The OCAI was considered to be the most appropriate 
assessment of organizational culture for this research. 
5.4 Composite assessment instrument 
Initial gauging of Cerulean’s radical innovation culture using existing assessment 
instruments was carried out by using a composite of KEYS for creative climate and 
OCAI for organizational culture.  The OCAI is particularly attractive from the 
perspective of identifying extant and desired organizational culture.  The Adhocracy 
culture (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) attributes of creativity, entrepreneurship, 
adaptability and dynamism, combined with the emphasis on innovation, growth and 
new resources (Cameron and Freeman, 1991), has resonance with the Type II archetype 
of innovation culture defined in Project One as one that facilitates radical innovation.  In 
addition, market and adhocracy cultures are statistically correlated with innovation 
(Ahmed, 1998).  To provide target areas for improvement in the form of interventions to 
create a radical innovation culture, the KEYS instrument was considered to be most 
appropriate.  This is a climate specific tool that gauges six dimensions and offers the 
opportunity for planned interventions based on specific responses.  In addition the 
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KEYS tool is widely used with established reliability and validity credentials.  The use 
of the tool was subject to copyright approval being obtained, since instructions for the 
analysis are not in the public domain. 
     The assessment of the Cerulean Development Team organizational culture can be 
represented by considering Schein’s model of three levels being examined at the artefact 
level by the KEYS component and the overall level by the OCAI component.  This is 
represented in Figure 5-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3  Assessing climate and culture based on Schein’s model 
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     The structure adopted for the composite instrument was to use the questions as 
formatted in the original KEYS and OCAI instruments.  The KEYS part of the 
composite instrument is in the questionnaire booklet provided by the Center for 
Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro.  This is a copyright questionnaire and 
permission was obtained for its use from both Professor Teresa Amabile and CCL, who 
are the administrators of the KEYS tool.  Both OCAI and KEYS questionnaires were 
provided along with an explanation and instruction sheet.  This detailed the method of 
completing the questionnaires and the logistics of returning them for analysis.  Both 
assessments are a paper and pencil tool that can be completed within sixty minutes.  The 
instructions distributed for completion of the OCAI part of the composite instrument are 
shown in Appendix C. 
5.5 Relationship between the themes and the composite 
instrument 
The dimensions of KEYS and OCAI both encompass many issues relating to the 
creative climate and organizational culture.  The themes surfaced from Project One also 
group together a number of innovation culture aspects influencing radical innovation.  
Links between the nine themes, the KEYS and OCAI dimensions are discussed in the 
following section.  These linkages have been supported by references to the innovation 
management literature. 
5.5.1 The nine themes and the KEYS dimensions 
The questions used in the KEYS assessment can be related to the nine themes 
developed in Project One as discussed below. 
Freedom/Latitude 
The theme Freedom and Latitude is related to the KEYS dimension Freedom.  This 
dimension relates to the freedom the team members have in deciding what work to do or 
how to do it and to the sense of control they have over their own actions.  This sense of 
control over one’s own work is recognised to be necessary for facilitating “do different” 
innovation (Ekvall, 1996; Gundling, 2000). 
Attitude to risk 
Risk taking is a fundamental part of facilitation of radical innovation (Andriopoulos and 
Gotsi, 2002).  (Gudmundson et al., 2003; Harborne and Johne, 2003)The Attitude to 
risk theme is related to two dimensions in the KEYS survey.  The dimension 
Organizational Encouragement relates to the encouragement of creativity through 
constructive judgement of ideas and a shared vision of what the organization is trying to 
do.  Risk taking is encouraged in this environment.  The second dimension – an 
inhibitor, Organizational Impediment – relates to how new ideas are criticized, an 
avoidance of risk, and an overemphasis on the status quo. 
Growth/Development 
The desire to grow knowledge and to push the boundary of understanding supports the 
development of radical innovation (Roberts, 1988; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  The 
KEYS dimension Challenging Work is related to this theme.  The uncertainty inherent 
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in a radical innovation project that challenges the team members relates to this 
dimension. 
External confidence 
The external perspective of the team, the confidence and belief in the team’s capabilities 
supports their ability to “do differently” in pursuit of radical solutions (Mascitelli, 
2000).  Belief in the team can be a major enabler for radical innovation.  Team 
members’ perception about this external confidence relates to three of the KEYS 
dimensions.  The Organizational Encouragement dimension relates to the 
encouragement given by the company to the team to do differently and to solve 
problems creatively.  The Workload Pressure dimension relates to extreme time 
pressures, unrealistic expectations for productivity and distractions from creative work.  
The Organizational Impediment dimension relates to politics, criticism of new ideas, 
destructive interdepartmental competition and avoidance of risk. 
Internal confidence 
Creative thinking depends to some extent on the personality characteristics related to 
independence, self-discipline, tolerance for ambiguity, perseverance in the face of 
frustration, and a relative lack of concern for social approval.  It is the “something 
extra” of creative performance (Amabile, 1997).  Employees who acknowledge and 
support each others’ work and do not waste time protecting their own ideas or feeling 
threatened by others will facilitate a radical innovation culture (Heilmeir, 2000; 
Andriopoulos and Gotsi, 2002).  This theme relates to three of the KEYS dimensions.  
The first, Challenging Work, relates to there being a sense of working on important 
projects and undertaking challenging tasks.  The second dimension, Work Group 
Support, relates to the team being open to new ideas and constructively challenging 
each other’s work.  In this situation the team trust and help each other and feel 
committed to the work they are doing.  The third dimension, Supervisory 
Encouragement, relates to supervisory support for the team and encouragement for them 
in being creative. 
External perspective 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1990) find that in new product innovation, one of the major 
factors that separates winners from losers is the effective use of outside technology and 
external scientific communication.  There are no KEYS dimensions that relate to this 
theme.  Although some dimensions, (Organization Encouragement, Supervisory 
Encouragement and Work Group Supports) are associated with openness to new ideas 
and support for new ideas assists the External Perspective theme, these items do not 
refer to an external perspective specifically.  In a similar manner, the Sufficient 
Resources dimension relates to access to all data and material required for project 
completion.  This is necessary to facilitate access to outside ideas and information, but 
again does not refer to an external perspective. 
Clear objectives 
As radical innovation is invariably a confused, uncertain process (Humble and Jones, 
1989), some lack of clarity in the project specification is likely to facilitate radical 
innovation.  ‘Radical ideas tend to need room to grow and develop, they tend to change 
shape and scope’ (von Stamm, 2003a:  260).  This relates to the KEYS dimensions 
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Freedom and Supervisory Encouragement.  The Freedom dimension also links to the 
freedom to decide how the projects should be carried out.  There is therefore autonomy 
to decide the course of action within these goals. 
Team composition 
People appropriate for radical innovation are curious entrepreneurial people, solution 
finders not problem solvers (Leifer et al., 2001; Simon et al., 2003).  This theme relates 
to the KEYS dimension Work Group Supports.  This dimension relates to a team 
comprising a diversely skilled group of people who communicate well with each other 
and are supported by each other. 
Company infrastructure 
This theme relates to the infrastructure of the company and its support for radical 
innovation, the team and provision of adequate resources.  This theme is linked to five 
KEYS dimensions.  The first, Sufficient Resources, relates to the funds, materials, 
facilities and information necessary for the team.  The second dimension, Workload 
Pressure – an inhibitor to creativity – relates to extreme time pressures, unrealistic 
expectations for productivity and distractions from creative work.  The third dimension, 
Organizational Encouragement, relates to management style and mechanisms that 
encourage creativity.  The fourth, the other KEYS inhibitor – Organizational 
Impediments – relates to management style and mechanisms that encourage avoidance 
of risk, are critical of new ideas and an overemphasis on the status quo.  The final 
dimension, Supervisory Encouragement, relates to encouragement of the work of the 
team and its members.  With this dimension, the perception that team members feel, ie, 
that their work matters to the organization and that the organization is open to new ideas 
and not looking for flaws, is assessed. 
 
Representation of the Themes and the Keys dimensions 
Using aspects of a Type II radical innovation culture (from Table 4-6) grouped in the 
context of the nine themes, sample KEYS questions informing the KEYS dimension 
and related to the themes are shown in Table 5-3.  This is used to indicate where the 
KEYS dimensions relate to the nine themes. 
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n
 
en
co
u
ra
ge
s 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
 
th
ro
u
gh
 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
jud
ge
m
en
t o
f i
de
as
 
an
d 
a 
sh
ar
ed
 
v
isi
o
n
 
o
f w
ha
t t
he
 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
is 
tr
yi
n
g 
to
 
do
.
 
 
R
isk
 
ta
ki
n
g 
is 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d.
 
A
tti
tu
de
 
to
 
ris
k 
Ta
ki
n
g 
ris
ks
 
is 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d.
 
 
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 
is 
a 
pa
rt
 
o
f t
he
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t a
n
d 
di
sc
o
v
er
y 
is 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
as
 
be
in
g 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
ta
ki
n
g 
ris
k.
 
 
Q4
3.
 
To
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t d
o
es
 
n
o
t w
an
t t
o
 
ta
ke
 
ris
ks
 
in
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Q6
6.
 
Pe
o
pl
e 
ar
e 
to
o
 
cr
iti
ca
l o
f n
ew
 
id
ea
s 
in
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
.
 
  
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
Im
pe
di
m
en
t. 
 
N
ew
 
id
ea
s 
ar
e 
cr
iti
ci
ze
d,
 
th
er
e 
is 
an
 
av
o
id
an
ce
 
o
f r
isk
,
 
an
d 
th
er
e 
is 
an
 
o
v
er
em
ph
as
is 
o
n
 
th
e 
st
at
u
s 
qu
o
.
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ra
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at
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Sa
m
pl
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K
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S 
qu
es
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e 
di
m
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sio
n
 
(A
m
ab
ile
,
 
B
u
rn
sid
e,
 
an
d 
G
ry
sk
ie
w
ic
z,
 
19
99
) 
K
EY
S 
D
im
en
sio
n
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
th
e 
th
em
e 
 
(A
m
ab
ile
 
et
 
a
l.,
 
19
99
) 
G
ro
w
th
/ 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t 
A
 
de
sir
e 
to
 
gr
o
w
 
an
d 
de
v
el
o
p 
th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 
an
d 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e 
o
f t
he
 
gr
o
u
p.
 
 
A
 
hu
n
ge
r 
to
 
kn
o
w
 
m
o
re
 
an
d 
kn
o
w
 
w
hy
.
 
 
Q5
3.
 
I f
ee
l c
ha
lle
n
ge
d 
by
 
th
e 
w
o
rk
 
I a
m
 
cu
rr
en
tly
 
do
in
g.
 
Ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
W
o
rk
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
se
n
se
 
o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g 
o
n
 
im
po
rt
an
t p
ro
jec
ts
 
an
d 
u
n
de
rt
ak
in
g 
ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
ta
sk
s.
 
    
Q2
8.
 
In
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t e
x
pe
ct
s 
th
at
 
pe
o
pl
e 
w
ill
 
do
 
cr
ea
tiv
e 
w
o
rk
.
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
En
co
u
ra
ge
m
en
t. 
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y 
en
co
u
ra
ge
s 
th
e 
te
am
 
to
 
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
 
an
d 
to
 
so
lv
e 
pr
o
bl
em
s 
cr
ea
tiv
el
y.
 
  
Q3
1.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
u
n
re
al
ist
ic
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
w
ha
t p
eo
pl
e 
ca
n
 
ac
hi
ev
e 
in
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
.
 
W
o
rk
lo
ad
 
Pr
es
su
re
.
 
 
Ex
tr
em
e 
tim
e 
pr
es
su
re
s,
 
u
n
re
al
ist
ic
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
an
d 
di
st
ra
ct
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
cr
ea
tiv
e 
w
o
rk
.
 
  
Ex
te
rn
al
 
co
n
fid
en
ce
 
H
av
in
g 
co
n
fid
en
ce
 
an
d 
be
lie
v
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
te
am
 
su
pp
o
rt
s 
th
e 
te
am
’
s 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
”
 
in
 
pu
rs
u
it 
o
f r
ad
ic
al
 
so
lu
tio
n
s.
 
Q4
3.
 
To
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t d
o
es
 
n
o
t w
an
t t
o
 
ta
ke
 
ris
ks
 
in
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
.
 
Q7
8.
 
D
es
tr
u
ct
iv
e 
cr
iti
ci
sm
 
is 
a 
pr
o
bl
em
 
in
 
th
is 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
.
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
al
 
Im
pe
di
m
en
t. 
 
Po
lit
ic
s,
 
cr
iti
ci
sm
 
o
f n
ew
 
id
ea
s,
 
de
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
in
te
rd
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l c
o
m
pe
tit
io
n
 
an
d 
av
o
id
an
ce
 
o
f r
isk
 
di
sc
o
u
ra
ge
 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
.
 
 
  
 91
 
Ta
bl
e 
5-
3 
 
K
EY
S 
di
m
en
sio
n
s 
in
 
re
la
tio
n
 
to
 
th
e 
n
in
e 
th
em
es
 
Th
em
e 
(fr
o
m
 
Ta
bl
e 
4-
4) 
Ty
pe
 
II 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
cu
ltu
re
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
(fr
o
m
 
Ta
bl
e 
4-
6) 
Sa
m
pl
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qu
es
tio
n
s 
in
fo
rm
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th
e 
di
m
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sio
n
 
(A
m
ab
ile
,
 
B
u
rn
sid
e,
 
an
d 
G
ry
sk
ie
w
ic
z,
 
19
99
) 
K
EY
S 
D
im
en
sio
n
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
th
e 
th
em
e 
 
(A
m
ab
ile
 
et
 
a
l.,
 
19
99
) 
Q2
.
 
I f
ee
l t
ha
t I
 
am
 
w
o
rk
in
g 
o
n
 
im
po
rt
an
t p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
Q7
.
 
Th
e 
ta
sk
s 
in
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
ar
e 
ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g.
 
Q3
8.
 
Th
e 
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 
ha
s 
an
 
u
rg
en
t 
n
ee
d 
fo
r 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l c
o
m
pl
et
io
n
 
o
f t
he
 
w
o
rk
 
I a
m
 
n
o
w
 
do
in
g.
 
 
Ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
W
o
rk
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
se
n
se
 
o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g 
o
n
 
im
po
rt
an
t p
ro
jec
ts
 
an
d 
u
n
de
rt
ak
in
g 
ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
ta
sk
s.
 
 
Q1
5.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
fe
el
in
g 
o
f t
ru
st
 
am
o
n
g 
th
e 
pe
o
pl
e 
I w
o
rk
 
w
ith
 
m
o
st
 
cl
o
se
ly
.
 
Q1
9.
 
W
ith
in
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
gr
o
u
p,
 
w
e 
ch
al
le
n
ge
 
ea
ch
 
o
th
er
’
s 
id
ea
s 
in
 
a 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
w
ay
.
 
Q2
9.
 
In
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
gr
o
u
p,
 
pe
o
pl
e 
ar
e 
w
ill
in
g 
to
 
he
lp
 
ea
ch
 
o
th
er
.
 
Q6
7.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
fre
e 
an
d 
o
pe
n
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
w
ith
in
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
gr
o
u
p.
 
  
W
o
rk
 
G
ro
u
p 
Su
pp
o
rt
.
 
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
is 
o
pe
n
 
to
 
 
n
ew
 
id
ea
s 
an
d 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
el
y 
ch
al
le
n
ge
s 
ea
ch
 
o
th
er
’
s 
w
o
rk
.
 
 
Th
ey
 
tr
u
st
 
an
d 
he
lp
 
ea
ch
 
o
th
er
 
an
d 
fe
el
 
co
m
m
itt
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
w
o
rk
 
th
ey
 
ar
e 
do
in
g.
 
In
te
rn
al
 
co
n
fid
en
ce
 
Co
n
fid
en
ce
 
am
o
n
g 
th
e 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
ca
n
 
fin
d 
a 
ra
di
ca
l s
o
lu
tio
n
.
 
 
W
o
rk
in
g 
w
ith
 
an
d 
re
sp
ec
tin
g 
th
e 
in
di
v
id
u
al
 
ta
le
n
ts
 
o
f e
ac
h 
te
am
 
m
em
be
r.
 
Qu
es
tio
n
in
g,
 
ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
bu
t a
lso
 
su
pp
o
rt
in
g 
an
d 
n
u
rt
u
rin
g 
th
e 
o
th
er
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
Te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ar
e 
an
 
au
to
n
o
m
o
u
s 
u
n
it 
th
at
 
be
lie
v
es
 
it 
ca
n
 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
”
 
to
 
pr
o
v
id
e 
th
e 
ra
di
ca
l 
so
lu
tio
n
s.
 
    
Q6
8.
 
M
y 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
v
al
u
es
 
in
di
v
id
u
al
 
co
n
tr
ib
u
tio
n
s 
to
 
pr
o
jec
t(s
). 
Q7
3.
 
M
y 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
is 
o
pe
n
 
to
 
n
ew
 
id
ea
s.
 
 
Su
pe
rv
iso
ry
 
En
co
u
ra
ge
m
en
t. 
 
Th
e 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
su
pp
o
rt
s 
th
e 
te
am
 
an
d 
en
co
u
ra
ge
s 
th
em
 
in
 
be
in
g 
cr
ea
tiv
e.
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G
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19
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K
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D
im
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sio
n
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
th
e 
th
em
e 
 
(A
m
ab
ile
 
et
 
a
l.,
 
19
99
) 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
Pr
o
v
id
es
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
 
an
d 
aw
ar
en
es
s 
o
f n
ew
 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
.
 
 
Th
es
e 
m
ay
 
n
o
t s
o
lv
e 
th
e 
pr
o
bl
em
 
bu
t m
ay
 
tr
ig
ge
r 
a 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
t”
 
so
lu
tio
n
 
th
at
 
le
ad
s 
to
 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
.
 
N
o
n
e.
 
N
o
n
e.
 
Q9
.
 
M
y 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
cl
ea
rly
 
se
ts
 
o
v
er
al
l 
go
al
s 
fo
r 
m
e.
 
 
Su
pe
rv
iso
ry
 
En
co
u
ra
ge
m
en
t. 
 
Th
e 
su
pe
rv
iso
r 
se
ts
 
cl
ea
r 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
go
al
s.
 
Cl
ea
r 
o
bje
ct
iv
es
 
To
o
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
o
bje
ct
iv
es
 
m
ay
 
in
hi
bi
t 
th
e 
di
sc
o
v
er
y 
o
f a
lte
rn
at
iv
es
.
 
 
O
bje
ct
iv
es
 
th
at
 
ar
e 
n
o
t s
pe
ci
fic
 
an
d 
cl
ea
rly
 
de
fin
ed
 
w
ill
 
en
co
u
ra
ge
 
qu
es
tio
n
in
g 
an
d 
pe
rm
it 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e 
ad
v
an
ce
m
en
t. 
  
Q1
.
 
I h
av
e 
th
e 
fre
ed
o
m
 
to
 
de
ci
de
 
ho
w
 
I 
am
 
go
in
g 
to
 
ca
rr
y 
o
u
t m
y 
pr
o
jec
ts
.
 
Q1
2.
 
I f
ee
l c
o
n
sid
er
ab
le
 
pr
es
su
re
 
to
 
m
ee
t s
o
m
eo
n
e 
el
se
’
s 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s 
in
 
ho
w
 
I d
o
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
.
 
Fr
ee
do
m
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
cl
ea
rly
 
de
fin
ed
 
st
ra
te
gi
c 
go
al
s 
th
at
 
do
 
n
o
t c
ha
n
ge
 
fre
qu
en
tly
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
au
to
n
o
m
y 
to
 
de
ci
de
 
th
e 
co
u
rs
e 
o
f a
ct
io
n
 
w
ith
in
 
th
es
e 
go
al
s.
 
Te
am
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
m
u
st
 
ha
v
e 
a 
m
ix
 
o
f c
re
at
iv
e 
in
di
v
id
u
al
s 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
 
in
sid
e 
o
r 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
su
bje
ct
 
ar
ea
 
su
ch
 
th
at
 
th
ey
 
ca
n
 
ap
pl
y 
la
te
ra
l t
hi
n
ki
n
g 
to
 
pr
o
v
id
e 
a 
ra
di
ca
l 
so
lu
tio
n
.
 
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
sh
o
u
ld
 
co
m
pr
ise
 
di
ffe
re
n
t m
in
de
d 
in
di
v
id
u
al
s 
w
ho
 
ca
n
 
w
o
rk
 
w
ith
 
so
m
e 
de
gr
ee
 
o
f u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 
an
d 
co
n
fli
ct
 
as
 
pa
rt
 
o
f t
he
 
da
y-
to
-
da
y 
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
 
 
Q6
.
 
M
y 
co
-
w
o
rk
er
s 
an
d 
I m
ak
e 
a 
go
o
d 
te
am
.
 
Q4
1.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
go
o
d 
bl
en
d 
o
f s
ki
lls
 
in
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
gr
o
u
p.
 
W
o
rk
 
G
ro
u
p 
Su
pp
o
rt
s.
 
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
is 
a 
di
v
er
se
ly
 
sk
ill
ed
 
gr
o
u
p 
o
f p
eo
pl
e 
w
ho
 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
e 
w
el
l w
ith
 
ea
ch
 
o
th
er
.
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G
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K
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D
im
en
sio
n
 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 
th
e 
th
em
e 
 
(A
m
ab
ile
 
et
 
a
l.,
 
19
99
) 
Q2
6.
 
Th
e 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
I n
ee
d 
fo
r 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
ar
e 
re
ad
ily
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 
m
e.
 
Q3
2.
 
G
en
er
al
ly
 
I c
an
 
ge
t t
he
 
re
so
u
rc
es
 
I 
n
ee
d 
fo
r 
m
y 
w
o
rk
.
 
Q4
6.
 
Th
e 
bu
dg
et
 
fo
r 
m
y 
pr
o
jec
t(s
) i
s 
ge
n
er
al
ly
 
ad
eq
u
at
e.
 
Q5
7.
 
I c
an
 
ge
t a
ll 
th
e 
da
ta
 
I n
ee
d 
to
 
ca
rr
y 
o
u
t m
y 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
lly
.
 
Q6
3.
 
I h
av
e 
tr
o
u
bl
e 
ge
tti
n
g 
th
e 
m
at
er
ia
ls 
I n
ee
d 
to
 
do
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
.
 
Q7
5.
 
Th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
I n
ee
d 
fo
r 
m
y 
w
o
rk
 
is 
ea
sil
y 
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
     
Su
ffi
ci
en
t R
es
o
u
rc
es
.
 
 
Fu
n
ds
,
 
m
at
er
ia
ls,
 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
ar
e 
pr
o
v
id
ed
 
to
 
th
e 
te
am
.
 
 
Co
m
pa
n
y 
in
fra
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
                      
A
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ty
le
 
th
at
 
en
co
u
ra
ge
s 
ris
k 
ta
ki
n
g.
 
 
B
u
re
au
cr
ac
y 
o
r 
au
to
cr
ac
y 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
in
hi
bi
t t
hi
s 
gr
o
u
p.
 
 
So
m
e 
re
st
ric
tio
n
 
in
 
re
so
u
rc
es
 
is 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
fo
r 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
 
–
 
G
o
ld
ilo
ck
s 
pr
in
ci
pl
e 
–
n
o
t t
o
o
 
lit
tle
 
an
d 
n
o
t t
o
o
 
m
u
ch
.
 
H
av
in
g 
a 
ch
am
pi
o
n
 
to
 
pr
o
v
id
e 
su
pp
o
rt
 
at
 
a 
hi
gh
 
le
v
el
 
is 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
l. 
 
                
Q3
.
 
I h
av
e 
to
o
 
m
u
ch
 
w
o
rk
 
to
 
do
 
in
 
to
o
 
lit
tle
 
tim
e.
 
Q1
1.
 
I h
av
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t t
im
e 
to
 
do
 
m
y 
pr
o
jec
t(s
). 
Q7
0.
 
I f
ee
l a
 
se
n
se
 
o
f t
im
e 
pr
es
su
re
 
in
 
m
y 
w
o
rk
.
 
 
W
o
rk
lo
ad
 
Pr
es
su
re
.
 
 
Ex
tr
em
e 
tim
e 
pr
es
su
re
s,
 
u
n
re
al
ist
ic
 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
n
s 
fo
r 
pr
o
du
ct
iv
ity
 
an
d 
di
st
ra
ct
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
cr
ea
tiv
e 
w
o
rk
.
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5.5.2 The nine themes and the OCAI dimensions 
The linkages between the nine themes and the OCAI dimensions are less clearly 
mapped as there are only two dimensions assessed in the OCAI.  There is broad overlap 
along the themes relating to an Adhocracy culture.  This culture is one that is best suited 
to facilitate radical innovation.  The aspects of this culture type, ie, dynamic, 
entrepreneurial and creative, where people take risks and the leaders are considered to 
be innovators and risk takers, represent the Type II radical innovation culture.  In this 
culture the organization is committed to experimentation and innovation and it 
encourages individual initiative and freedom.  The two dimensions of the OCAI 
represent the degree of control or discretion applied to the organization’s members and 
the focus of the organization’s members towards an internal or an external perspective.  
The themes’ positions on the two dimensions are considered from the perspective of the 
radical archetype for each theme as defined in Table 4-6. 
     The Attitude to risk and Freedom/Latitude themes sit at the Flexibility and 
Discretion end of the vertical axis.  These themes are related to higher degrees of 
flexibility and discretion in the management of radical innovation projects.  The close 
control and stability at the opposite end of the dimension tends to inhibit radical 
innovation.  The Clear Objectives theme can be considered to sit midway on the 
Control/Flexibility axis.  A radical innovation is facilitated by clear, strategic and less 
well-defined tactical objectives, thus requiring objectives that are simultaneously tight 
and loose.  Along the horizontal axis, the themes, Company infrastructure, 
Growth/Development, External perspective, External confidence and Internal 
confidence are located at the External Focus and Differentiation end of this dimension.  
These themes relate to taking an external perspective and to taking a “do different” 
approach to radical innovation projects.  The predominance of the themes at the top and 
right of the two axes aligns with the Adhocracy culture.  However, one theme, Team 
composition does not align with either of the axes.  This is because this theme is 
predominantly concerned with the composition of the team, their skills and experience.  
This theme is, therefore, not mapped onto the OCAI model.  A representation of the 
alignment of the themes with the dimensions of the OCAI is shown in Figure 5-4. 
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Themes not mapped onto the OCAI map are: 
• Team composition 
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Figure 5-4  Relationship between nine themes and the OCAI dimensions 
5.6 First use of the composite instrument 
The composite instrument was discussed with the Development Team and a first 
assessment of the organizational culture and creative climate made.  The OCAI 
questionnaire (Appendix C) was distributed along with a KEYS workbook to each team 
member.  The presentation to the team included instructions on how to complete the 
questionnaires.  The OCAI data were analysed by the researcher.  The KEYS data were 
analysed by CCL after the completed workbooks had been returned to Greensboro, 
North Carolina. 
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5.7 Results from the composite instrument 
The results from the first use of KEYS showed a very low climate for creativity.  All the 
dimensions scored extremely low and in some cases, Supervisory Encouragement and 
Freedom, the Cerulean score was below the lowest previously recorded in the KEYS 
database.  The KEYS scores are shown in Table 5-4 and the graphical representation is 
shown in Figure 5-5. 
Table 5-4  KEYS scores from assessment of October 2004 
 
 
The scoring in the KEYS assessment is based on a scale from 0 to 100.  The units are 
derived from the output from the individual KEYS questionnaires.  The mid point of 50 
represents a median score.  Scores above 60 are considered to represent very high levels 
of creative climate and scores below 40 are considered to represent very low levels of 
creative climate.
KEYS dimension 
Cerulean 
score 
Highest in 
KEYS 
database 
Lowest in 
KEYS 
database 
Organizational Encouragement 28.8 84.2 25.3 
Supervisory Encouragement 17.5 75.7 27.9 
Work Group Supports 40.6 70.0 22.6 
Freedom 20.9 71.7 26.4 
Sufficient Resources 26.4 82.4 26.9 
Challenging Work 34.1 75.8 22.1 
Organizational Impediments 33.3 74.3 24.6 
Workload Pressure 23.7 88.3 21.9 
Creativity 35.4 75.9 29.3 
Productivity 27.1 78.9 25.0 
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     The OCAI analysis for the Development Team indicated an organizational culture 
that was perceived to be highly oriented towards Market and Hierarchy cultures.  This is 
in line with a “do better” culture.  The perception of the team members for a preferred 
culture was for one that was highly scored in Clan and Adhocracy culture.  The 
Adhocracy culture scored highest in the preferred culture.  The OCAI scores are shown 
in Table 5-5, and the graphical representation of current and preferred organizational 
culture positions is shown in Figure 5-6. 
 
Table 5-5  OCAI scores from assessment of October 2004 
CURRENT 
POSITION Score 
CLAN 16.4 
ADHOCRACY 14.9 
MARKET 35.2 
HIERARCHY 33.3 
  
PREFERRED 
POSITION Score 
CLAN 27.5 
ADHOCRACY 32.0 
MARKET 20.9 
HIERARCHY 19.9 
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Figure 5-6  Results from first use of the OCAI assessment 
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5.8 Self-assessment of proximity to a Type II radical innovation 
culture 
The OCAI and KEYS results were discussed with the Development Team.  This led to a 
joint review of the assessment results and their relevance to a radical innovation culture.  
In order to gauge the radical innovation culture more specifically, an assessment tool 
based on the radical innovation culture archetype described in Table 4-6 was 
participatively developed with the Development Team.  Descriptions of what a radical 
innovation culture would “look like” and “feel like” were developed for each of the 
themes.  A series of short statements relating to each of the nine themes were developed 
with the team members to describe an ideal radical innovation culture – the Type II 
position.  These descriptions were grouped together to form nine theme-based 
descriptions of a radical innovation archetype.  The statements for each theme indicated 
a state that would exist for the team if the ideal archetype, ie, Type II – a radical 
innovation culture, existed in the team.  The team members assessed their perception of 
the radical innovation culture by gauging how close they perceived they were to each of 
the theme statements reflecting the ideal position of a Type II radical innovation culture. 
The statements used in the self-assessment for each theme are shown in Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6  Ideal position for a Type II radical innovation culture. 
Theme Statements used to assess position against an ideal Type II position 
Freedom/ 
Latitude 
Exploration and discovery are part of the way things are done.  Opportunity is 
provided to try new ideas.  The team has a high degree of control over what steps it 
takes to achieve the objective 
Attitude to risk Taking risks is encouraged.  Uncertainty is a part of the environment and discovery is 
accepted as being linked to taking risk. 
Growth/ 
Development 
There is a desire to grow and develop the ability and knowledge of the group.  A 
hunger to know more and know why.  The team is encouraged to gain new skills. 
External 
confidence 
People outside the team expect a “do differently” approach to new product 
development.  People outside the team have confidence that the team will develop a 
radically different solution that will resolve the problem. 
Internal 
confidence 
The team is confident that it can find a radically new solution.  Working with and 
respecting the individual talents of the other team members is a normal way of 
working.  The team is comfortable with a questioning, and challenging of new ideas, 
and this is usually built upon to develop useable new ideas.  The team is an 
autonomous unit that believes it can “do differently” to provide the radical solutions. 
External 
perspective 
Alternative perspectives and awareness of new technologies are constantly being 
sought by the team.  These provide an array of possibilities that the team can call 
upon to resolve internal problems. 
Clear objectives Overall objectives are not specific but outline targets.  These allow the team to make 
decisions about how to achieve these objectives.  A degree of latitude in the set 
objectives is provided to the team. 
Team 
composition 
There is a mix of creative individuals in the team who have sufficient experience 
inside or outside the subject area such that they can apply lateral thinking to provide a 
radical solution.  The team comprises different minded individuals who can work 
with some degree of uncertainty and conflict as part of the day-to-day activities.  If 
disagreement happens because of this, then that is accepted. 
Company 
infrastructure 
A management style that encourages risk taking is prevalent.  Rule following and 
conformance to procedures is not enforced and not considered to be necessary.  
Resources are neither abundant nor too tightly restricted.  A “Champion” provides 
support for new product projects at a high level in the company. 
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     Each individual score was added together and averaged to produce a group 
perspective of the Development Team’s position against an ideal Type II radical 
innovation culture.  The result is shown in Table 5-7. 
  Table 5-7  Innovation Culture self assessment scores 
Theme 
 
Average 
score 
Freedom/Latitude 3.93 
Attitude to risk 3.36 
Growth/Development 4.93 
External confidence 5.07 
Internal confidence 5.00 
External perspective 5.57 
Clear objectives 4.64 
Team composition 6.36 
Company infrastructure 3.71 
 
     The object of this assessment was to identify the themes that were farthest away 
from the ideal position, and use these as a starting point for group discussion about 
possible interventions to change the innovation culture.  By having statements about an 
ideal position, the team members would have a point of reference as a target for the 
result of the interventions.  The results indicate that the team perceives itself as a little 
like a radical innovation team in respect of Team composition, whilst for the other 
themes the team perceives itself as generally unlike a radical innovation culture.  The 
lowest scoring theme is Attitude to risk, with a score indicating the team felt that it was 
generally unlike a radical innovation culture.  Also of interest in this assessment is the 
lower score for Company infrastructure.  The team feels that the company support, 
management style and resource provision is not supporting radical innovation.  This is 
in resonance with the low score in KEYS for Supervisory Support for Creativity.  A 
graphical representation of this assessment is shown in Figure 5-7. 
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5.9 Key points from Project Two 
The OCAI assessed organizational culture, KEYS assessed creative climate and the 
innovation culture assessment can be considered to gauge the proximity of the team to a 
radical innovation enabling culture.  The areas of relevance for the three assessments 
and their overlap are represented in Figure 5-8 using the model of innovation culture 
shown in Figure 3-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8  Relationship between assessments 
The key points arising from Project Two can be summarized as:- 
• KEYS and OCAI provided a composite assessment of the extant organizational 
culture and creative climate. 
• Self-assessment by the Development Team of its perceived position against an 
ideal Type II, radical innovation culture indicated a similar position to that 
shown by OCAI and KEYS. 
• Creativity is restricted by poor Supervisory Encouragement and restricted 
Freedom. 
• The Development Team’s self-assessment of its position with respect to a 
radical innovation culture was that the themes of Attitude to risk and 
Freedom/Latitude were particularly distant from the ideal position. 
• The team perceived that the theme Company infrastructure, which includes the 
environment around the team, is not supportive to radical innovation. 
• The team feels that their skill-set and experience, reflected in the theme Team 
composition, is more enabling for radical innovation than any of the other 
themes. 
The output from this set of instruments indicated the extant position against an ideal 
type for a radical innovation culture.  It also indicated areas where there were perceived 
inhibitors to developing a radical innovation culture.  This provided a starting point for 
a participative evaluation of the assessments and developing a plan of integrated 
interventions to facilitate a radical innovation culture.  The evaluation of suitable 
interventions to achieve this end and development of a plan suitable for the Cerulean 
Development Team formed the basis for Project Three.
Values 
Artefacts and 
 Creations 
 
 
Basic 
Assumptions 
Climate for 
 creativity 
 
 
 
     Innovation 
       culture 
Organizational 
culture assessed by 
OCAI 
Creative climate 
assessed by KEYS 
Radical innovation 
culture assessed by 
innovation culture 
assessment 
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6 Project Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1  Research overview – Project Three 
6.1 Introduction to Project Three 
The third project in the research focused on identifying suitable interventions to 
facilitate a radical innovation culture.  Participative review with the Development Team 
of the results of the assessments in Project Two in context of the ideal archetype of a 
radical innovation culture developed in Project One developed a series of possible 
interventions.  A literature search identified interventions relevant to developing a 
radical innovation culture.  Case and empirical examples of interventions that had been 
tried were evaluated.  This provided examples of interventions used, how they were 
implemented and their perceived influence on changing the innovation culture.  The 
empirical examples were sourced from case studies and from firms involved with DIF 
(Discontinuous Innovation Forum) activities (Bessant, Lamming, Noke and Phillips, 
2005).  Interventions in the context of this research refer to specific actions that have 
been or could be applied to a group with the objective of facilitating aspects of a radical 
innovation culture.  Evaluation of these interventions permitted an “action plan” for 
Cerulean to be developed.  A plan of linked interventions designed to develop aspects of 
a radical innovation culture forms the output for Project Three.  The research plan for 
Project Three is represented in Figure 6-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2  Research plan for Project Three 
The context of Project Three in the overall research is shown in Appendix B. 
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6.2 Development Team suggested interventions 
The Development Team engaged in a process to review the results from the three 
assessments described in Project Two, with the objective of making suggestions to 
facilitate a radical innovation culture.  The OCAI culture profile indicated that 
movement along one dimension, towards more flexibility, discretion and freedom was 
the change required to move to a more radical innovation supporting culture – the 
Adhocracy (Cameron and Quinn, 1999).  KEYS results (Amabile et al., 1996) indicated 
extremely low scoring on Supervisory Encouragement and Freedom, and low scoring on 
the other dimensions.  The assessment against the ideal position for a radical innovation 
culture indicated generally low scores across all the themes.  The lowest scoring themes 
were Attitude to risk, Company infrastructure and Freedom/Latitude.  All three 
assessments indicated low scores for freedom and risk taking.  The assessment results 
were used as the basis for exploring the issues associated with these scores and possible 
methods of improving them.  Brainstorming was used to gather the Development 
Team’s ideas related to developing a radical innovation culture.  These ideas were 
discussed and refined in an iterative process to develop possible interventions that 
would facilitate aspects of a radical innovation culture.  Where possible, each 
intervention was described in terms that specified an end point and a group of people 
responsible for undertaking the intervention.  The output from the discussion was a list 
of six interventions.  These were considered to be feasible for the team members and 
management, to be realistic in their intent and to be capable of developing a Type II 
radical innovation culture.  The interventions suggested are shown in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1  Interventions suggested by Cerulean Development Team 
 Intervention 
1 Better time management, to allow slack, to allow some personal (radical) 
development projects to take place. 
2 Development Team members be permitted and supported to undertake personal 
development projects that would be available for an “Ideas Market” session.  This 
venue to be used as a forum to allow decisions to be made on what should be 
allowed to continue and what should be dropped amongst the personal (radical) 
development projects. 
3 Resource allocation be made available to support these personal (radical) 
development projects. 
4 Visits to external sources for ideas.  Other companies, suppliers, customers, 
universities would provide sources of ideas for what is possible. 
5 Exposure to the Sales team members and customers to better understand the 
potential issues facing customers, the industry and the company. 
6 Management to work with the Development Team to facilitate these actions and 
to demonstrate trust in the team. 
 
Following the development of these suggested interventions, interventions from 
literature and empirical examples of interventions used to facilitate a radical innovation 
culture were examined. 
6.3 Interventions from the literature 
The literature was examined for empirical examples of interventions made to improve 
radical innovation capability in firms using the criteria of an action and subsequent 
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outcome that was made to improve radical or discontinuous innovation capability.  
Examination of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggested a number of 
interventions.  These are summarized in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2  Interventions from literature that facilitate radical innovation 
 Intervention Supporting literature 
1 Resource provision 
to support 
experimentation 
(Delbecq and Mills, 1985), (Christensen, 1997), (Judge et 
al., 1997), (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000), (Gundling, 
2000) 
2 Leadership for a 
radical innovation 
culture 
(Buckler and Zien, 1996), (Schneider et al., 1996), 
(Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996), (Judge et al., 1997), 
(Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1997), (Morison, 1988), (Rice et 
al., 1998), (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999), (Gundling, 
2000), (Leifer et al., 2000), (Stringer, 2000), (Tripsas and 
Gavetti, 2000), (DeTienne and Koberg, 2002), (Abetti, 
2003), (Christensen and Raynor, 2003) 
3 Idea gathering and 
sharing process 
(Christensen, 1997), (Norling and Statz, 1998), (Gundling, 
2000), (Leifer et al., 2000), (Tidd et al., 2001), (Mikaelsson, 
2002), (Elfing and Hulsink, 2003), (Hargadon, 2003), 
(O’Connor and McDermott, 2004), (von Stamm, 2004), 
(Amara and Landry, 2005) 
4 Actions to 
encourage 
experimentation 
and learning 
(Delbecq and Mills, 1985), (Bart, 1996), (Leonard-Barton, 
1992b), (Chandy and Tellis, 1998), (Norling and Statz, 
1998), (Cravens et al., 2002), (Mosey, 2005) 
5 Team skills to 
promote “do 
different” 
behaviour 
(Wolff, 1988), (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1997), (Tushman 
and O’Reilly III, 1999), (Gundling, 2000), (Leifer et al., 
2001; Simon et al., 2003), (Stevens and Burley, 2003), 
(Kelley et al., 2004), (O’Connor and McDermott, 2004) 
6 Product champion 
for radical 
innovation projects 
(Morison, 1988), (Veryzer, 1998), (Leifer et al., 2000), 
(Ettlie and Subramaniam, 2004), (Vincent, 2005) 
7 Segregation of 
radical innovation 
activities from the 
routine 
(Rich and Janos, 1994), (Bower and Christensen, 1995), 
(Rice et al., 1998), (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1999), 
(Leifer et al., 2000), (Leifer et al., 2001), (Loutfy and 
Belkhir, 2001), (Malhotra et al., 2001), (O’Connor and Rice, 
2001), (Benner and Tushman, 2003), (Macher and Richman, 
2004), (O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2004). 
 
The interventions that emerged from the literature indicated that leadership which 
encourages exploration and learning is important.  To support this, the team should be 
developed and provided with adequate resources to facilitate this exploration.  
Segregation of radical activities and using a management champion are also noted as 
enabling interventions. 
6.4 Examples of Type II radical innovation cultures 
Greenwood and Hinings (1993) suggest that there are unlikely to be many organizations 
that are uniquely one archetype or another, but that they are more likely to display 
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characteristics of both.  However, two examples of organizations that are predominantly 
Type II can be seen in Lockheed’s Skunk Works and IDEO.  They exist specifically to 
develop “do different” solutions for their customers.  The characteristics of these 
organizations therefore tend towards a Type II radical innovation culture. 
6.4.1 Skunk Works 
A well known example of an organization set up to facilitate radical innovation is 
Lockheed’s Skunk Works (Rich and Janos, 1994).  Skunk Works is the unofficial name 
for Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Projects Unit.  This was the production 
unit responsible for a number of famous aircraft, including the U2, the SR71, and the 
F117.  The history of the Skunk Works began in World War Two, when covert projects 
were located near Burbank airport (now Bob Hope Airport) in California.  Kelly 
Johnson and his team developed the P80 in makeshift quarters in only 143 days.  This 
aircraft was the US air force’s first operational jet fighter.  Kelly Johnson headed the 
Skunk Works until 1975, when Ben Rich took over leadership.  In 1989, Lockheed 
reorganized its operations and relocated the Skunk Works to Palmdale, California, 
where it is still in operation today.  Lockheed now considers the term “Skunk Works” to 
be a trademark of theirs, and has several registrations of it with the US Patent Office.  
The name came from a popular comic strip cartoon “Li’l Abner” by cartoonist Al Capp.  
In the cartoon, “Skonk Works” was a small factory whose business used skunks.  (The 
exact nature of this enterprise was never explained).  The Skonk Works was located far 
from other human habitation due to the terrible odour.  In addition people who worked 
at the Skonk Works could only communicate with people of the outside world by 
yelling at them from a great distance while downwind.  This name was deemed to be 
appropriate for the Lockheed development unit.  The aspects of segregation, providing a 
“do different” focus and culture through innovation leadership and product champions 
are visible in this operation.  The Skunk Works attitude was to attempt the impossible, 
and in so doing they created several radical new products for Lockheed.  A culture of 
experimentation is encouraged by a management team who values its independence and 
isolation from the mainstream business activities.  This creates confidence amongst the 
team members that encourages them to “attempt the impossible” in undertaking 
development projects.  Rich and Janos define the heart of a Skunk Works operation as 
having extremely difficult but specific broad objectives and the freedom to take risks 
and fail. 
6.4.2 IDEO 
Another well known example of a radical innovation organization is IDEO, a 350-
person design consultancy.  It has offices in Palo Alto, San Francisco, Chicago, Boston, 
London, and Munich.  Office-furniture maker Steelcase Inc. owns a majority stake in 
the firm, which operates as an independent unit.  Its client list includes Hewlett-Packard, 
AT&T Wireless Services, Nestlé, Vodaphone, Samsung, NASA, and the BBC.  IDEO 
began in 1991 as a merger between David Kelley Design, which created Apple 
Computer Inc.’s first mouse in 1982, and ID Two, which designed the first laptop 
computer in the same year.  It has designed hundreds of products and won more design 
awards over the past decade than any other firm.  IDEO is best known for designing 
user-friendly computers, PDAs, and other high-tech products such as the Palm V, 
Polaroid’s I-Zone cameras and the Steelcase Leap Chair.  It also designed the first no-
squeeze, stand-up toothpaste tube for Proctor & Gamble’s Crest and the Oral-B 
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toothbrushes.  IDEO advises clients by teaching them about the consumer world 
through the eyes of anthropologists, graphic designers, engineers, and psychologists 
(Kelley and Littman, 2001). 
     This organization has the people skills and attitudes, systems and processes that 
facilitate a radical innovation culture.  IDEO prospers by producing “do different” 
innovations, so this is a key focus for the organization.  The behaviours and 
characteristics of this organization provide a clear indicator of a successful Type II 
innovation culture.  The organization members in IDEO are no smarter, more rebellious 
or more courageous, than other organizations.  They are simply better connected.  These 
external connections provide an input of new ideas and knowledge into the group to 
facilitate innovation.  Existing ideas and/or technologies are continuously re-evaluated 
to create something new.  There are advantages in finding networks that connect 
different worlds.  IDEO acts as a technology broker making it possible to build new 
connections between disparate organizations and groups (Hargadon and Sutton, 2000). 
     Hargadon and Sutton state that ‘Culture has a profound effect on innovation via the 
value it places on tradition versus change, the stigma that is associated with ignorance 
and failure, the role of competition versus collaboration, and the value placed on 
invention versus using old ideas.’ (2000:  153).  The culture in IDEO supports the 
structure and the work practices within this organization by creating a shared sense of 
purpose and process.  Individuals are encouraged to learn as much as they can about 
each new industry they enter because they share the value placed on learning about 
things that others might not have seen before.  Thus they are willing to help others in the 
team, and are comfortable asking for help from others in the team.  Asking for help is 
not seen as a sign of weakness.  In IDEO, sharing problems and admitting failures is 
expected.  However, failing alone attracts little sympathy. 
6.5 Case examples 
The database of the European Case Clearing House (ECCH) at Cranfield was searched 
for case studies that included interventions focused on improving radical or 
discontinuous innovation capability of the organization.  Cases that included 
interventions relating to “innovation” and “new product development” were identified 
from the ECCH database.  Four cases of a success were identified (BMW, Harley-
Davidson, Mattel and 3M) and one of a failure (Hewlett-Packard).  These cases discuss 
broader areas of business change than innovation or new product development.  
However, within the cases selected, there is an aspect of radical innovation, and 
interventions that were intended to improve the outcome of the radical innovation aspect 
of the project or could be considered to have improved the radical innovation capability 
based on literature findings, were identified.  These cases were considered to be most 
relevant to this research in respect of the “do different” aspect of the innovation process 
and from the perspective that each case displayed one or more interventions focused on 
improving the product development capability of the organization.  The key 
interventions are identified using the criteria defined above.  There is overlap between 
the innovation projects that are incremental and those that are radical in some of the 
case studies.  This is not always explicitly stated in each case.  The analysis of the cases 
ignored any intervention unless it had an application to a “do different” type of project. 
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6.5.1 3M 
3M (Gayatri, 2004) is an exemplar of innovation and innovation culture.  It was ranked 
Number One in the Fortune list of most admired companies in the category “precision 
equipments” in 2004.  From its origins as an abrasive manufacturer, it has developed a 
diverse range of products based on the innovative ideas of its employees.  It is well 
known for is 15% rule, where employees are encouraged to devote 15% of their work 
time to developing novel ideas and their implementation.  Employees who spent more 
than the stipulated time were never stopped from doing so.  The allocated time was later 
increased to 25% and then to 30% in the early 1990s.  Since its early years it has 
encouraged a culture of innovation.  Despite this background, the 1990s saw the 
company performance decline.  Profits fell and R&D stagnated.  The company was not 
coming out with the new products at the pace it done previously.  Many functions were 
duplicated and the cost structure was high.   
     A new CEO, W. James McNerney Jr., took the reins in 2001.  He was the first 
outsider to lead the company and was unfamiliar with the 3M culture.  McNerney, a 
veteran of GE, believed he could leverage the organizational and financial discipline to 
provide shorter times to market for new ideas, whilst protecting the corporate spirit for 
innovation.  He laid off 5000 people in his first few weeks.  He instigated cost savings 
in the business.  He removed the 30% rule, whereby 30% of revenues were to come 
from products launched in the last four years.  He considered that this rule was 
promoting haphazard ideas rather than promoting innovation.  McNerney was 
concerned about the large number of products in the pipeline, in excess of 1500 on 
occasions.  He believed quicker time to market was essential.  He introduced a market 
oriented approach to new product innovations.  Marketing functions were brought closer 
to research and manufacturing functions.  He allocated more cash to promising ideas 
and dropped unprofitable ones.  The programme was called 3M-Acceleration.  This 
accelerated the research and implementation of new ideas with high probability of 
success.  This allowed the R&D budget to be used more effectively and reduced 
unnecessary expenditure on projects that had no potential.  Although a larger 
corporation, 3M was in a position where it had restricted resources and had to also focus 
on cost control and reduction.  McNerney was taking an approach that a small firm 
would be forced to adopt due to its small size and resultant limit on resource 
availability.  He expressed a desire to cut costs and restructure, but clearly indicated that 
he wanted to retain the innovation focus that had been the cornerstone of the company.  
The innovation aspect remained a top management priority.  He also implemented a 
programme called Leadership Development to train employees to discuss problems and 
encourage them to contribute to providing solutions.  This was based on a similar 
development programme at GE.  Research and Development became more focused.  
Researchers, instead of accidentally stumbling on ideas, had a clear scope for their 
research and this was aligned with business needs.  Early indications are that the 
strategy is benefiting 3M.  Profits are improving and the innovation culture is retained. 
6.5.2 BMW 
The Munich based Bayerische Motoren Werke AG (BMW) (Radhika, 2003) started as 
an aero engine manufacturing company.  Its roots can still be seen in the “spinning 
propeller” badge used on their products.  It diversified into motorcycle and car 
manufacture and these became the core products of the business.  In the 1950s the 
company came to the edge of bankruptcy and was rescued by Quandt, an industrial 
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financier.  Quandt acquired a majority of shares and restructured the company to 
improve performance.  During the 1970s and 1980s the company expanded globally.  
Although emerging as a major competitor to Volkswagen and Mercedes, BMW’s 
performance began to suffer.  During the 1990s BMW was criticized for having a model 
range where all the models looked alike.  “One sausage three different lengths” was 
how it was described in the Press.  In addition there were production and quality 
problems.  The market was becoming more demanding, and this along with the 
problems faced by BMW made it imperative for the company to focus on product 
efficiencies, constantly generate new product/component ideas and launch a continuous 
stream of new and upgraded models.  The company recognized that most of the new 
ideas generated were not getting the required attention in the innovation process.  The 
company restructured its innovation routines to create a focused innovation process that 
would reduce time to market for new products and components to meet changing 
customer requirements.  BMW used an external consultancy that confirmed that 
although many new ideas were in circulation, the innovation process failed in selecting 
the best ideas and in allocating appropriate resources.  The consultants found more than 
1200 innovations in progress at one time.  There was also a lack of coordination 
between the different company divisions. 
     The restructuring plan was aimed at integrating the innovation process with the 
business plan, thus aligning the innovation activities with specific customer 
requirements.  The new process focused on three major areas, unique selling 
propositions for each vehicle to be launched, breakthrough innovations and concept cars 
to convey brand image.  The innovation process involved idea gathering from external 
technological sources in a database called Technis.  In addition inputs from external 
sources, individuals, universities and other companies were sought and collated using a 
Virtual Innovation Agency (VIA) intranet system.  The VIA generated more than 1000 
ideas within one and a half years of its launch.  Ideas were selected and prioritized 
through an Innovation Management stage.  This weeded out weak ideas from the 
potentially successful, and prioritized the innovations.  The company focused on 
specific areas of innovation.  These included breakthrough innovations, premium 
branding environment and social responsibility and safety.  Management resource was 
allocated to the innovation process and involvement of senior management took place at 
several stages, where selection, prioritization and resource allocation decisions were 
made.  Top management leadership was demonstrated by the involvement of BMW 
board members in the Innovation Strategy Team.  This group decided on the direction 
of innovations and the extent to which breakthrough innovations were pursued.  The 
innovations selected to progress were guided by a steering committee.  This group 
review progressed and facilitated cross-functional communication of ideas.  This 
assisted with retaining a focus on company objectives rather than departmental 
objectives.  There was a specific recognition of “breakthrough innovations” and 
management resource was allocated to projects of this type.  Breakthrough innovations 
were categorized as such by a committee called the Innovation Field Committee.  This 
group also prioritized the innovation project and allocated resources.  The breakthrough 
projects were managed as part of the total innovation programme.  Radical innovations 
therefore had their own categorization and were managed separately, but within the 
overall development programme.  These innovations were reported to the main board 
much before the other innovation projects, as there was recognition that they involved 
potentially higher expenditures and strategic significance than the other projects.  The 
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result of the adoption of the new system was that there were roughly 100 projects 
running at any one time, down from over 1200 prior to the adoption of the new system.  
The company has decreased time-to-market for new products by two-thirds and linked 
its revenues to the introduction of leading edge products. 
6.5.3 Harley-Davidson 
Harley-Davidson began operations in 1903 (Sarvani, 2004).  The hallmark Harley V 
twin first emerged in 1909.  Since then the basic concept has been developed to produce 
several generations of motorcycle products.  In 1969 the company was acquired by 
American Machine and Foundry (AMF) and this began a period of attempting to 
increase sales but the push for output had the effect of reducing quality.  Against a 
background of poor quality and falling sales AMF sold the business to thirteen members 
of the management team.  From the brink of bankruptcy in the early 1980s, Harley-
Davidson staged an improvement that led to an award for “Outstanding Corporate 
Innovator” in 2003.  Harley-Davidson is committed to continuing product innovation.  
This philosophy, dating from the early days of the company in the early 1900s, had been 
abandoned during the 1970s, contributing to the critical state of the company by the 
early 1980s.  From this point a turnaround programme improved the situation.  Part of 
this turnaround was the change to the new product development process.  To ensure 
survival, Harley focused on both product improvement and new product development.  
Harley’s innovation philosophy was to use technology and engineering to support the 
processes that aimed at enhancing the overall customer experience.  Several radical new 
technologies were developed to ensure that the market success of the trademark V-twin 
engine could be continued into the twenty-first century, meeting both the traditional 
customers’ requirements and the increasingly stringent noise and emission legislation 
demands.  The process, known as the Concurrent Product and Process Delivery 
Methodology (CPPDM) made recommendations for new products as well as 
improvements in existing products.   
     An idea gathering, evaluation and selection process was used.  These stages are 
known as Swirl, Bins, and Cadence and Flow.  Swirl is an idea discussion process 
where new ideas are discussed amongst the employees, competing for attention, time 
and legitimacy.  The Swirl process comprised three phases, Zone of Consideration, 
Firewall and Acceptance.  Initially, innovative and potential ideas circulated in a swirl 
of discussion among employees competing for attention, time and legitimacy.  They 
then entered the Zone of Consideration when new ideas or changes were considered to 
be beneficial to enhancing the customer experience.  These ideas then moved to the 
Firewall stage where political power of an idea and its ability to win supporters was 
tested.  Next, the idea moved to the Acceptance stage after gaining enough support and 
overcoming any challenges.  New concepts and ideas stayed in this Swirl until they 
evolved and expanded or contracted sufficiently that they had a group of strong 
proponents in the organization.  This method facilitated assessment of the ideas’ 
benefits to the organization and allowed ownership for the new ideas to be developed.  
The Bins stage allowed ideas exiting from the Swirl stage to be placed in one of several 
categories- Bins.  Each category was associated with a level of risk and size of project.  
This facilitated portfolio management and life-cycle management.  The next stage was 
Cadence and Flow.  This stage scaled the project to fit the Bin and therefore resource 
allocation.  Once this stage was complete the project was then launched as a 
development project.  The success of Harley’s innovation philosophy was in part 
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attributable to the fact that it used technology and engineering to support the process 
that aimed at enhancing customer experience. 
6.5.4 Hewlett-Packard 
Hewlett-Packard’s Disk Memory Division wanted to develop a radical new rigid disk 
drive, codenamed the Kittyhawk (Christensen, 2003).  This was a product that was 
envisioned for future market opportunities.  Several possible design concepts were 
presented for the new drive.  A decision was made to develop the smallest option for the 
drive- the 1.3 inch box.  It was recognized as a risky venture, and it was felt that the 
main company could afford the cost of the risk.  Management wanted the product 
development to be unconstrained by the traditional development process.  To facilitate 
this, the Kittyhawk team were given autonomy to develop the drive, find new markets 
and cultivate a customer base. 
     Management looked for risk-takers for the new team.  People who were not 
necessarily experienced in developing new architectures or cultivating emerging 
markets but were considered to be “can-do” people.  The team members were carefully 
chosen.  The team, from the outset, actively cultivated a culture that differentiated it 
from the Hewlett-Packard culture.  All new team members were required to sign a creed 
(“I am going to build a small, dumb, cheap disk drive”) before they were allowed to join 
the team.  Those that refused were not allowed onto the team and returned to the 
Hewlett Packard mainstream areas.  The team set tight goals relating to delivery time, 
sales growth and technology targets.  Although aggressive, the targets were considered 
to be within reach.  Management worked to create a sense of urgency in the team, 
promoting the view that the competition was close behind them. 
     Kittyhawk was introduced right on schedule.  The design won new technology and 
new product awards for 1992.  However, customer requirements grew beyond the initial 
specifications and despite plans for upgraded versions a customer (Hewlett-Packard’s 
own Corvallis division) was lost to a competitor product.  Other customers, in the form 
of PDA suppliers, found sales slow and several withdrew from the market.  A customer 
product innovation (Microsoft operating system) had requirements beyond the planned 
specification for the upgraded product.  This was offset against new unanticipated 
customers such as cash register machines and digital cameras.  However this was a 
string of disappointments peppered with a few successes.  The newness of the 
Kittyhawk product encouraged customers to think about what would be possible with 
this type of device and as a result their requirements began to become more specific.  
Unfortunately these demands could not be met by the developed product.  In 1994 the 
company announced it would discontinue the Kittyhawk drives.  The team recognized 
the commercial failure of the product, but were also pleased with the results of the 
project in bringing the product to market.  Although the Hewlett-Packard case is 
considered to be a failure from a commercial perspective, the project team did deliver a 
“do different” project within the timescale specified.  The changes in market 
requirements and evolution of customer expectations meant that the product had 
substantially reduced commercial opportunities.  Despite the lack of success of 
Kittyhawk, no one was fired and several members of the team received promotion.  The 
main problem the team members had was re-integrating into mainstream Hewlett 
Packard. 
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6.5.5 Mattel 
Mattel is an industry leader in the design, manufacture and marketing of toys 
(Zacharias, 2004).  It employs over 25,000 people worldwide.  The company is based in 
California and has manufacturing operations in China, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia and 
Thailand.  It sells its products in 150 countries.  One of its most well known products is 
the Barbie doll.  From its launch in 1959, it has grown to be a market leader worldwide.  
In 2001 Barbie had a 90% market share for the fashion doll industry. 
     In the competitive world of toys, innovation is essential in remaining competitive.  
Mattel had responded to the ever changing trends in consumer behaviour by changing 
existing product lines and expanding into new markets through a series of acquisitions.  
Mattel wanted to create a new brand and needed a recurring product development 
process with emphasis on open idea sharing.  Project Platypus was born from this 
desire.  A platypus is a duck-billed mammal that lays eggs.  It is native to Tasmania, 
semi-aquatic and is considered to be an uncommon mix of different animal 
characteristics.  This represented the mix of cross-functional employees on the project 
team.  It was an unconventional project team with the mission of developing “a new hit 
in a new market”.  It was described as a toy company “skunk works” that brought 
together a dozen people from various parts of the company, marketing, licensing, 
engineering for twelve week shifts.  Project Platypus was basically about being able to 
think in an imaginative way and understand the sociology and psychology behind 
children’s play patterns. 
     Initial response in the company was one of scepticism.  The feeling was that 
employees would be unwilling to return to their jobs at the end of the project.  The first 
Project Platypus delivered Ello, a girl’s construction set.  The team comprised 
designers, model makers, copywriters, child psychologists and other specialisms.  The 
manager encouraged team members to stretch beyond their job, to apply skills they did 
not ordinarily use and even to discover new talents.  Co-workers covered whilst 
employees were on the team on the basis that they would get their turn at a later date.  A 
new environment was created, which was specifically different from the company’s 
design centre.  The intention was to provide a totally different environment for the team 
members in order to facilitate creativity.  The layout of the work area encouraged idea 
exchange and out-of-the box thinking.  The desks had wheels on to encourage 
spontaneous collaboration.  Deadlines were not typical for a development project.  They 
were given an outline that in twelve weeks they had to develop a new opportunity for 
Mattel that does not yet exist.  They were required to conceive everything from the 
business plan to the product packaging at the end of the twelve weeks.  A general 
outline target was provided but the specific details were left up to the team.  External 
input was provided to stimulate ideas.  Outside experts presented their ideas to the team.  
The team members were encouraged to visit external sites that were not directly 
relevant to the company or the project in order to encourage lateral thinking.  Unrelated 
areas were studied in order to trigger new ideas.  Sharing experiences was an integral 
part of the team culture.  This acted as a glue to bind the team together.  An idea wall (a 
40 foot by 10 foot chalkboard) was used to suggest, expand and develop new ideas.  
This facilitated idea sharing, and a common ownership of the ideas.  The project team 
acted out rituals to break down hierarchy and encourage participation amongst 
participants.  There was a clear customer focus to the project in that the team members 
were encouraged to observe children playing with improvised toys.  By the end of the 
project the team unveiled their first hybrid toy.  This was Ello, a creative toy that 
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allowed girls to design and make characters, room accessories, jewellery, and houses 
amongst other things.  It was intended to spark imagination and inspire creativity.  
Project Platypus generated such interest and enthusiasm from the Mattel employees that 
there was a waiting list to join the project team. 
6.6 Analysis of the cases 
6.6.1 Interventions suggested by case examples 
The interventions that emerged from evaluation of case examples and which are 
relevant to the facilitation of radical innovation are:- 
 
1. Idea gathering process to amass new ideas 
In three of the cases there was a specific intervention aimed at gathering ideas and 
collating them.  BMW used the Technis and VIA systems, Harley-Davidson used the 
Swirl process and Mattel, with a smaller project, used a 40 foot by 10 foot chalkboard to 
gather new ideas. 
 
2. Knowledge exchange process to share ideas 
The exchange of knowledge about the ideas gathered uses essentially the same 
mechanisms to promulgate those ideas.  The Technis/VIA intranet systems used by 
BMW and the Swirl process used by Harley both achieve this at a macro level for all 
new ideas.  At a micro level, Project Platypus’ chalkboard and the team approach to 
discuss and develop ideas achieves the same result of sharing ideas. 
 
3. Use of external sources for ideas 
Two of the cases show a specific focus on looking outside the company for new ideas.  
BMW set up an intranet system to allow external input to their idea gathering process.  
They encourage input from external bodies and solicit input from external sources on 
their website:- ‘Our task is to secure the long-term innovation and technology leadership 
of the BMW Group.  To realise this goal, the BMW Group is permanently looking for 
unusual innovations on the subject “mobile future”.  We are not only interested in our 
own research and development departments, but also in the creative minds outside the 
BMW Group.  We seek contact with small and medium-sized innovative companies.  
Your submission through the Virtual Innovation Agency is the platform for you to bring 
your achievement into the world of the BMW Group’ (BMW, 2004).  The Mattel 
project specifically took actions to encourage external input.  This was done by asking 
people who worked outside the industry to provide talks to the team, by setting up visits 
to external sites that were considered to promote creative thinking and encouragement 
from top management to talk to people about areas that were not related to the project 
on hand. 
 
4. Allocation of resources is made to approved projects 
In 3M Acceleration and in BMW’s Innovation process, there is specific provision of 
resources to projects that are considered breakthrough.  In Mattel, the creation of the 
project and resources required are an allocation of resources to the radical innovation 
project.  In these cases there is a visible acknowledgement and support through 
resourcing that the radical project has legitimacy and support from the organization. 
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5. Idea selection and prioritization process 
Four of the five cases use a specific process to select and prioritize the new ideas.  3M 
adopted a system called 3M Acceleration that focused on identifying potential 
innovations that had commercial benefit and allocating resources in an attempt to speed 
them to market readiness.  BMW use a formal system in their Innovation Management 
process, with senior management involvement, to select suitable projects.  Harley use 
the Swirl and Bin phases of their process but allow the involvement of employees in the 
selection process.  Mattel’s approach in Project Platypus is the use of the chalkboard 
and team discussion to select a suitable project.  In this method, as with the Harley 
process, the team is involved in making the decision.  At 3M and BMW, a group of 
innovation managers along with senior management make the decision on project 
selection.  These processes all identify potential projects that have some degree of 
commercial or customer benefit to the organization.  3M Acceleration, BMW’s Technis 
and VIA, and Harley-Davidson’s Swirl processes indicate an organization-wide 
emphasis on idea generation.  These have top level support and are encouraged by 
management to facilitate ideas in the organization.  For the Platypus and Kittyhawk 
projects, there were specific interventions focused on gathering ideas that may be of 
benefit to the project. 
 
6. Commercial focus for innovations 
There was a focus on a commercial or customer potential for the radical innovation.  3M 
specifically focused on only projects that had commercial potential.  BMW’s innovation 
strategy was aligned with the business plan, and therefore any breakthrough innovation 
project would be aligned with a commercial benefit.  Harley’s philosophy of enhancing 
the customer experience drives the innovation selection process.  Only those ideas that 
meet this requirement pass through to the adoption phase of the innovation process.  
Mattel’s project team had a very specific objective of a commercial application at the 
outset. 
 
7. Limit to the number of projects that are allowed to run 
For 3M and BMW, there was a deliberate intervention to reduce the number of projects 
running, from numbers in the thousand range to numbers in the hundred range in both 
cases.  Mattel and Hewlett-Packard focused on a single radical project for the duration 
of the radical innovation process.  In these cases there is a specific intervention that 
attempts to concentrate the attention of the organization and therefore resource 
provision onto fewer projects.  This is achieved without curtailing idea generation. 
 
8. Team selection to promote “do different” capabilities 
For Hewlett-Packard and Mattel, there was a deliberate intervention to populate the 
radical innovation project team with people who were considered to be more capable of 
being effective in this type of project.  For Hewlett-Packard a “can-do” attitude was 
desired.  For Mattel, the deliberate selection of different types of people from different 
parts of the business was used. 
 
9. Creation of a sense of urgency or time pressure in the project 
For Hewlett-Packard and for Mattel, the team management created a sense of time 
pressure for the team.  Although resources were made available for the team members, 
time was not an unlimited resource.  In the Kittyhawk project, management deliberately 
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created the sense that the competition were just behind the Hewlett-Packard team in 
their progress, while in reality they were over a year behind.  In Mattel’s case a defined 
period of twelve weeks to produce the business plan and project proposal was used to 
generate the time pressure. 
 
10. Innovation leadership from top management 
In the case of 3M and BMW there is a clear support from top management for the 
innovation process.  This includes the acknowledgement that some of the innovations 
will be “do different”.  3M has and continues to have innovation as part of its culture.  
Innovation and 3M are synonymous.  BMW has an innovation strategy approved at 
board level, with recognition that breakthrough innovations are unlike incremental 
innovations, and need to be managed and monitored separately, again with board level 
interest.  For Hewlett-Packard and Mattel, the creation of a specific radical innovation 
project team is evidence of top management support for “do different” innovation. 
 
11. Recognition of “radical” as different from incremental 
BMW define their “do different” ideas as breakthrough innovations.  Hewlett-Packard’s 
Kittyhawk and Mattel’s Platypus were explicitly stated to be a “do different” project 
that would create something new where there had been no product before.  In this 
respect there is recognition that radical innovation is different to other innovation 
projects and as such needs to be managed differently. 
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6.6.2 Summary of case study interventions 
The interventions suggested from the case studies indicate a focus on fewer project 
numbers, support from top management, and developing legitimacy of the project in the 
eyes of the organization- supported by formal approval and resource provision.  Idea 
gathering and distillation into fewer workable ideas that can be handled by the 
organization allows a focus of limited resources on those ideas that bring benefit to the 
business.  Too many ideas without having a commercial objective impede innovation 
inviting time wasting and conflict (Kanter, 2001).  A mechanism for idea gathering and 
exchange facilitates idea development.  BMW and Harley-Davidson have formalized 
idea gathering and evaluation systems.  Facilitating external input, seeing other 
locations and listening to outsiders used to enhance creativity, provide additional input 
for new ideas and knowledge.  BMW use the internet to facilitate external input (BMW, 
2004).  Idea gathering continues after innovation projects are selected in order to 
provide a nursery of ideas that can be taken and developed into commercially beneficial 
products.  By creating the concept of a “different to the mainstream” product 
development, the radical innovation project is given legitimacy and status in the 
organization.  At Mattel there was a waiting list to participate in these types of project 
teams.  Even if the project failed, there was still a benefit to participation.  At Hewlett-
Packard, some of the Kittyhawk project members were promoted after the project was 
wound up.  This approach reinforces the view that radical is different, that it is 
supported, that failure might be the outcome.  This enhances legitimacy for the “do 
different” methods used in Type II innovation culture.  Radical innovation is seen in 
these organizations as non-threatening and positively perceived.  Throughout the cases 
there is a strong strand of top management support, either through initiation of changes 
to support a radical project, creation of a project team to develop a radical product or 
through active participation in the development of radical projects.  This sends a clear 
message that radical is important to the company, and is reinforced when this is aligned 
with business strategy, indicating that the development of radical products is part of the 
overall business, ie, “way we do things round here” rather than a “bolt-on” that resolves 
an immediate problem for the organization.  The interventions to facilitate radical 
innovation capability identified from the case study analysis are shown in tabular format 
in Table 6-3. 
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6.7 Discontinuous Innovation Forum companies 
Cerulean is a member of the DIF- the Discontinuous Innovation Forum (Bessant et al., 
2005).  DIF is a group of companies sponsored by the Department of Trade and 
Industry, facilitated by The Oxis Partnership and Thames Valley Technology who wish 
to improve their discontinuous innovation capabilities (The Oxis Partnership, 2004).  It 
is supported by the Universities of Bath and Cranfield.  Four companies indicated that 
they would be willing to discuss the interventions that they had taken to facilitate 
discontinuous innovation.  Each company was visited and a semi-structured interview 
with a company representative who was involved with discontinuous product 
development was conducted.  The interview allowed the individual to talk generally 
about actions that had been taken, their impact, and lessons learned from these actions.  
The researcher avoided suggesting ideas about interventions by asking the individuals to 
“talk about interventions made to facilitate discontinuous or radical innovation in your 
organization”.  Questions were restricted to points of clarification wherever possible.  
The interviews were recorded and transcribed.  Each transcription was analysed using 
NVivo to identify interventions that were used to facilitate radical innovation. 
6.7.1 Analysis of DIF companies’ interventions 
Company A 
Company A operates in the security printing industry.  It produces cheques, identity 
cards, security labels and specialized paper products that require protection against 
counterfeiting.  The company has a research and development department, comprising 
28 people, that produces new products.  Its turnover is around £200 million per year and 
it has been established for many years.  The development function is charged with 
creating both incremental and radical product developments to keep the company 
competitive.  Innovation was described as being at the heart of survival for the business 
by an R&D manager.  The company operates a technology management process to 
manage product developments with a manual which defines what has to be done at each 
stage-gate and who acts as the gate keeper.  The manual defines what sort of specific 
activities that would generally be expected to happen at each gate.   
     Projects that tend towards discontinuous innovation do not fit the stage gate process 
particularly well.  The R&D manager stated that “the projects that are to do with new 
processes tend not to fit this model very comfortably and we’ve been thinking about 
how to run these in a sort of formal project management way for about 10 years, haven’t 
as yet come up with a fully fledged version of the technology management process that 
really fits them, although we have attempted to shoehorn them into various different 
types of process”.  As a result the company has taken actions to improve its capability to 
manage radical innovation. 
     The company recognizes radical innovation as a separate activity.  It provides 
segregation for the Development Team from day-to-day production and technical 
support activities.  In addition where some experimentation is believed necessary to 
develop new levels of knowledge, this is facilitated by “ring-fencing” the personnel and 
resources required to facilitate this.  A culture of experimentation is encouraged.  This is 
not purely speculative research, but is focused on achieving a product development or 
enhancement that utilizes a radical aspect.  Time and resources are allocated to pursue 
experimentation or radical developments.  The number of projects running at any one 
time is restricted in order to balance supply of resource with project demand.  The 
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company operates a system for gathering and sharing ideas.  This is an SQL database 
that is available to all members of the Development Team.  All ideas are recorded and 
shared using this mechanism.  To assist idea generation the team members are also 
encouraged to revisit old ideas, in some cases from centuries ago, in order to re-evaluate 
their potential in the current market.  This has the effect of generating further ideas for 
development.  There is top management involvement though participation in review 
committees.  Top management maintains an interest in what radical projects are 
running.  There are imposed project deadlines with which the team members are 
required to comply.  Although there is involvement by top management, the team is 
encouraged to be autonomous and take responsibility for its own management.  It is 
allowed to balance its experimentation activities, radical projects and day-to-day 
activities for itself.  This is aided by the high calibre of team members.  Most team 
members are graduates.  The mix of the team is craftsmen, engineers and scientists, 
most of whom are educated to doctoral level.  Radical innovation is perceived as 
different from incremental, and although the company has not been able to shoehorn 
radical projects into its stage-gate development process, this has not prevented those 
projects from being successfully completed.  Knowledge gathering and sharing is part 
of the way of working in the Development Team.  This is perceived as the seed-corn for 
new product ideas.  This knowledge and idea gathering is supported by encouragement 
to look outside the company, either through institutions such as universities or trade 
associations or through individual contacts.  Individual networking outside the company 
is encouraged amongst the team members.  The team is a group of people who have the 
capability to think of “do different” solutions as well as “do better” solutions, and who 
have a wide spread of technical knowledge and interests.  There is a homogeneous mix 
of skills and attitudes.  The team is deliberately maintained with this mix of capabilities.  
Radical innovation is rewarded through bonus schemes based on new product 
developments.  This can sometimes create conflict with the overall bonus scheme based 
on “do better” activities that also operates within the team.  The interventions identified 
from Company A are: 
• Allocation of approved resources 
• Commercial focus for innovations 
• Creation of a sense of urgency 
• Idea gathering process 
• Idea selection and prioritization process 
• Innovation leadership from the top management 
• Knowledge exchange process 
• Limit the number of projects running at any one time  
• Radical recognized as different to incremental innovation 
• Team selection for “do different” capabilities 
• Use of external sources for ideas 
• Allocation of slack time 
• Autonomy for the Development Team 
• Reward mechanism for radical innovation projects 
• Evaluation of past ideas 
• Segregation of radical activities 
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Company B 
Company B is a leading UK supplier of temperature control, monitoring and 
refrigeration management services.  It is a highly innovative company, winning many 
national awards for product innovation.  It was formed in 1986 and is now based on two 
sites in the UK.  It employs less than 50 people.  The company works closely with its 
customers to develop new products and systems to improve the efficiency and 
performance of refrigeration, particularly in the commercial sector.  It offers energy 
saving products with software tools for remote access and system analysis.  These are 
supported by the services of their Monitoring Centre, which manages refrigeration 
alarms for over 420 stores around the clock.  Commitment to innovation is 
demonstrated by the presence of a full-time Project Manager who is responsible for 
discontinuous product innovation projects.  The Managing Director’s support for 
discontinuous innovation is demonstrated by the hiring and provision of resources for a 
Project Manager whose remit includes radical new products.  The company has a long 
history of discontinuous innovation and the Project Manager has been in this position 
for twelve years. 
     The company is small and as a result has limited resources to allocate to radical 
product development.  Nevertheless, the presence of a full-time manager tasked with 
developing the radical innovation projects is a clear indication of the commitment to 
radical innovation.  The manager operates almost autonomously and acts as a one man 
Development Team for the radical projects.  There is a commercial focus to these 
projects, driven from external contact with industry bodies and a desire to develop new 
ideas for product applications to meet those commercial opportunities.  This contact is 
maintained through active involvement of the Project Manager in the industry trade 
associations and institutions. 
     The Project Manager was recruited specifically to manage discontinuous 
development projects.  He attempts to provide additional resource for these projects 
through grants and awards from government and industry bodies.  The Managing 
Director supports this activity and participates in an informal knowledge exchange and 
idea generation process with the Project Manager.  This is described as “sofa 
discussions” by the Project Manager.  These discussions act as an idea selection and 
prioritization process.  There is no formal idea gathering process but extensive use is 
made of external sources to identify potential ideas.  External input of ideas is actively 
sought through trade bodies, other companies and universities.  The company has 
undertaken three teaching company schemes in recent years that focused on a radical 
product innovation.  The Project Manager is an active member of the trade associations 
and institutions.  This external input facilitates knowledge gathering and also provides a 
range of commercial opportunities for exploitation through new products.  Slack time is 
provided through the mechanism of a manager devoted to discontinuous innovation 
activities.  When discussing the team characteristics of a radical innovation team, the 
Project Manager described a suitable team member as being “a controlled maverick”.  
Retaining some degree of control is important as uncontrolled creativity can be 
destructive.  This aspect can be seen in the example of Enron.  The term creative 
destruction as suggested by Joseph Schumpeter (1961) can be applied to Enron’s 
demise.  This company encouraged employees to pursue new ideas and rewarded them 
when they succeeded.  Funds were made available to support speculative activities.  
Whilst these policies were sound in advocating “do different”, taken as a whole they 
created a system that ratcheted up pay and rewards for individuals to such an extent that 
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people were prepared to lie, steal and cheat rather than miss their growth targets.  This 
ultimately destroyed the company (Buckland, Hatcher, and Birkinshaw, 2003). 
The interventions identified from Company B are: 
• Allocation of approved resources 
• Commercial focus for innovations 
• Idea gathering process 
• Idea selection and prioritization process 
• Innovation leadership from the top management 
• Knowledge exchange process 
• Radical recognized as different to incremental innovation 
• Limit the number of projects running at any one time  
• Team selection for “do different” capabilities 
• Use of external sources for ideas 
• Allocation of slack time 
• Autonomy for the Development Team 
• Segregation of radical activities 
 
Company C 
Company C designs and manufactures a range of instrumentation for use in the surface 
coatings industry.  It is part of a UK based group.  The group employs less than 50 
people of which Company C employs around 15 people.  The holding company is based 
in Oxford.  There is also a sister company that sells electronic components in the UK.  
The company was established around 15 years ago.  It is a technology company that 
aspires to increase its level of technological capability and therefore the research and 
development function is tasked with improving the technological capability of the new 
products.  In a similar manner to Cerulean, company C has had a period of several years 
where there have been few new product launches.  It wanted to improve this situation 
and undertook a series of actions to improve its development capability.  Some of this 
development capability is focused on new to company and new to industry products, 
and thus encompasses radical innovation. 
     Ideas tend to flow from the Chairman of the company or from contact with industry 
personnel.  The Sales force ideas tend to be of a more incremental nature focused on 
improvements to the product or maybe cost reductions.  The Chairman takes an active 
interest in product development in the company, regularly reviewing progress and 
ensuring adequate resources are provided for the projects.  Although there is no formal 
idea gathering and selection processes, this activity is managed by the direct 
intervention of the Chairman in the development activities of the company.  The 
Development Team is allowed a high degree of autonomy in how they manage the new 
product development projects.  Resources are made available as required to support this 
method of working.  There is a high degree of latitude provided to the Development 
Team in Company C.  The Chairman also acts as a link with industry personnel, 
utilizing a personal network of contacts that allows the identification of potential 
product opportunities.  The identification of product opportunities tends to be driven by 
the Chairman.  There is therefore support for “do different” projects, speculative 
development and a clear innovation leadership demonstrated to the Development Team.  
Although segregation of radical innovation projects is not practised by Company C, this 
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was suggested by the R&D manager as being beneficial for this type of development.  
The interventions identified from Company C are: 
• Allocation of approved resources 
• Commercial focus for innovations 
• Idea gathering process 
• Innovation leadership from the top management 
• Knowledge exchange process 
• Radical recognized as different to incremental innovation 
• Use of external sources for ideas 
• Allocation of slack time 
• Autonomy for the Development Team 
• Segregation of radical activities (desired, but not part of an intervention) 
 
Company D 
Company D is a UK based organization that designs and manufactures medial devices.  
The company was formed in 1995 to research, develop, finance and commercialize 
neural computing technology developed at a university.  The first product, an 
ambulatory monitor and event recorder for cardiac arrhythmia and morphology changes, 
was launched in 1999.  This product received an award for innovation.  The company 
has continued to develop products based on this technology.  Although the company is 
relatively new, market changes have meant that the product has not sold in the 
anticipated numbers.  The company is therefore evaluating alternative opportunities for 
its products and simultaneously seeking to bring innovative new products to the market.  
It is attempting to enhance its capability in discontinuous innovation.  Close relations 
are maintained with several universities and with the medial community.  The company 
operates in an industry that is highly regulated.  These customers tend to be very slow in 
the adoption of new technology because the main customer in the UK is in a monopoly 
position, so there are no competitive pressures to innovate or adopt anything too radical.  
The company recognises radical innovation as different and there is strong leadership 
from the top management to adopt radical solutions to product problems.  Employees 
are encouraged to offer several solutions to a problem rather than just one.  This “do 
different” approach, described by the Technical Director as encouraging the employees 
to think more laterally, is reinforced by training focused at developing the technique and 
by recruitment of people who can provide solutions that are not “rule based”.  Idea 
exchange is facilitated by annual company two-to-three-day workshops where the 
employees go off site and discuss all issues relevant to the business.  Mind mapping 
software is used to capture and connect the ideas.  Whilst these workshops are not 
specifically focused on radical innovation projects, the nature of the company and its 
small size means that these projects are part of the issues discussed.  This workshop 
facilitates knowledge sharing amongst the employees.  The small size of the company 
and the fact that the employees work in one open plan office means that conversations 
are overheard and employees are aware of each other’s problems.  The culture in the 
company encourages the employees to join the discussion and offer their ideas on the 
problems being discussed.  This further shares ideas and knowledge amongst the 
employees.  This is similar to the way in which employees of IDEO, the design 
consultancy operates.  Employees will overhear other conversations and join these 
discussions, offering their ideas and knowledge in an attempt to resolve the problem 
(Hargadon and Sutton, 2000).  The interventions identified from Company D are: 
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• Commercial focus for innovations 
• Idea gathering process 
• Innovation leadership from the top management 
• Knowledge exchange process 
• Radical recognized as different to incremental innovation 
• Team selection for “do different” capabilities 
• Use of external sources for ideas 
6.7.2 Potential interventions suggested by the DIF examples 
The interventions identified from the DIF companies are similar to those identified from 
the case examples.  Some of the eleven interventions identified from the case examples 
(Table 6-3), were identified amongst the DIF companies.  Five additional interventions 
were identified from the DIF examples.  These are; (1) allocation of slack time, (2) 
autonomy for the Development Team, (3) evaluation of past ideas, (4) reward 
mechanism for radical innovation projects and (5) segregation of radical activities.  The 
additional five interventions are discussed below. 
 
12. Allocation of slack time. 
The allocation of time specifically for radical projects is well recognized in literature 
(Gundling, 2000).  Company A allocates 10% of the Development Team members’ time 
specifically for radical project work.  In company C the allocation of slack time is an 
informal process, where the Development Team members are encouraged to take time 
to examine ideas, opportunities and technologies outside their day-to-day projects.  The 
use of a dedicated manager for discontinuous innovation in Company B ensures that 
time is allocated to scanning the market for opportunities, other industries and external 
bodies for potential technologies and for experimentation to evaluate their application in 
pursuit of the potential opportunities.  This time is beneficial in facilitating 
experimentation and knowledge gathering in pursuit of radical solutions.  In addition, 
the acceptance of time being spent on radical project work helps legitimize radical 
innovation as part of the “the way things are done” in the organization. 
 
13. Autonomy for the team 
Some degree of self management for the team is evident in three of the DIF companies.  
Whether through the single manager in company B, the small team in company C or the 
Development Team in Company A, they all have a degree of control over their own 
work.  This develops confidence that the team is trusted to manage its development 
projects, its experimentation, its idea gathering and selection activities without 
management interference.  This demonstrates confidence in the team from top 
management and facilitates a sense of freedom within the team.  This sense of freedom 
reinforces the perspective that the radical innovation activities are accepted by the 
organization, are beneficial to the organization and that the team is trusted to undertake 
those activities. 
 
14. Evaluation of past ideas 
In one of the DIF companies old ideas were re-evaluated at different stages to determine 
if they were relevant to any of the current innovation projects.  This acts to maintain 
knowledge diffusion amongst the team and is similar to the re-evaluation of previous 
discarded ideas practised by the design consultancy IDEO (Sutton and Kelley, 1997; 
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Hargadon and Sutton, 2000).  For radical innovation, knowledge reuse may facilitate a 
solution where incremental thinking does not allow a solution (Majchrzak, Cooper and 
Neece, 2004). 
 
15. Reward mechanism for radical innovation projects 
Rewarding radical innovation activity reinforces this behaviour.  This is a mechanism 
applied in Company A to encourage radical innovation activity.  In its larger 
development group the normal reward systems encourage “do better” activities.  The 
company applies a bonus scheme specifically focused on radical innovation projects to 
encourage this type of activity.  This acts to reinforce the “do different” behaviour as 
acceptable to the team and therefore part of the group culture. 
 
16. Segregation of radical activities.   
This is the long advocated “Skunk Works” approach to radical innovation (Rich and 
Janos, 1994).  Having a segregated radical development area that operates apart from 
mainstream business activities is considered to facilitate radical innovation.  Company 
A allocates separate areas and personnel to radical activities within the Development 
Team.  The Development manager described this as “we take people away and put them 
into a ring fenced environment”.  This segregation provides protection from day-to-day 
activities and creates an environment “where they are not distracted by long-term 
projects with harsh milestones that have to be met”.  Although still part of and operating 
within the main Development Team, the team members working on a radical project are 
allocated separate space and relative segregation from the main part of the team.  
Company B, in having a separate manager who sits in his own area with his own 
resources, has in effect created a mini skunk works to facilitate radical innovation.  
Company C, although not undertaking an intervention to segregate this type of 
development activity, suggested that in hindsight this would have been beneficial to 
radical innovation activity.  Recent research by O’Connor and Ayers (2005) indicates 
that total segregation may not be beneficial.  Successful Development Team structures 
observed were connected to the mainstream business in some way and they suggest that 
“skunkworks” is not a widespread structure for innovation. 
6.7.3 Summary of interventions identified in DIF companies 
The DIF companies had taken action specifically to improve their discontinuous 
innovation capability, so the interventions identified are specifically linked to achieving 
this type of innovation activity.  In all four cases there is again a clear innovation 
leadership dimension.  Several interventions feature in all four DIF examples,  (1) idea 
gathering process, (2) knowledge exchange process, (3) external sources for ideas, (10) 
innovation leadership and (11) recognition of “radical” as different.  This indicates that 
gathering, storing and reviewing knowledge and ideas is a key feature and is 
strengthened by looking outside the company.  Radical innovation is perceived in all 
four DIF examples as a different type of innovation to incremental.  The active support 
and involvement of top management is also evident in all four DIF companies.  This 
innovation leadership appears as support through creation of structures and processes to 
support radical innovation or as a direct involvement or interest from top management 
in the radical innovation projects.  This in turn acts to provide legitimacy for radical 
innovation, where otherwise it can be seen as an illegitimate activity within the 
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organization (Dougherty and Heller, 1994).  The occurrence of each intervention among 
the four DIF companies is shown in Table 6-4. 
Table 6-4  Interventions identified from the DIF companies 
Company  
   Intervention A B C D 
1 Idea gathering process to amass new ideas X X X X 
2 Knowledge exchange process to share ideas X X X X 
3 Use of external sources for ideas X X X X 
4 Allocation of resources to approved projects X X X  
5 Idea selection and prioritization process X X X  
6 Commercial focus for innovations X X  X 
7 Limit the number of projects allowed to run X X   
8 Team selection to promote “do different” capabilities X X  X 
9 Creation of a sense of urgency or time pressure in the project X    
10 Innovation leadership from top management X X X X 
11 Recognition of “radical” as different from incremental X X X X 
12 Allocation of slack time X X X  
13 Autonomy for the team X X X  
14 Evaluation of past ideas X    
15 Reward mechanism for radical innovation projects X    
16 Segregation of radical activities X X x  
 
                                           X-  Intervention tried by the company 
                                           x-   Intervention not tried, but suggested as being beneficial 
 
 
The sixteen interventions from the empirical examples (Table 6-4) are shown in relation 
to the interventions from literature (Table 6-2) and the interventions suggested by the 
Cerulean Development Team (Table 6-1) in Table 6-5. 
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The interventions suggested by the empirical examples cover a broader spectrum and 
are more detailed than those suggested by either literature or the Development Team.  
Table 6-5 indicates that the sixteen interventions overlap the interventions from 
literature and the Development Team.  These sixteen interventions were used as the 
foundation for developing Cerulean specific interventions designed to create the 
conditions for a radical innovation culture.  The desired effect and influence of the 
sixteen interventions in developing the desired aspects of a radical innovation culture 
are shown in Table 6-6. 
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6.8 Making the change 
6.8.1 Intervention plan for Cerulean 
The results of the assessments in Project Two provided an indication of areas of inadequacy with 
respect to a radical innovation culture.  The suggested interventions from the Cerulean team were 
made within the context of this information.  Two components are outside the influence of the 
team- Team selection to promote “do different” capabilities and Innovation leadership from top 
management.  Of these two, the leadership appears to be the most critical.  Companies that have 
been successful with radical innovation demonstrate clear leadership of, or involvement with, 
radical projects as part of the business strategy.  This demonstrates strong commitment from the 
organization to this type of activity.  This support and involvement provides a strong message that 
radical innovation and its associated practices, which are sometimes counter-productive to 
incremental activities, are legitimate, important to the business, valued by the company and are 
worth allocating resources to.  In talking about the Lockheed Skunk Works, Ben Rich suggests that 
‘going “skunky” is a very practical way to take modest risks, provided that top management is 
willing to surrender oversight in exchange for a truly independent operation’ (1994:  318).  The 
success of the Skunk Works was facilitated by this hands-off approach from top management whilst 
at the same time displaying support for the operation.  This development of radical as a legitimate 
activity, that is equal to other business activities, is an important feature of the planned 
interventions.  Being cognizant of this issue, a plan of interventions was developed to foster aspects 
of a radical innovation culture in the Cerulean Development Team.  The intervention plan was built 
on interventions identified from empirical examples.  The shortcomings identified in the innovation 
culture assessment from Project Two provide guidance for the aspects of innovation culture that 
must be modified.  These sixteen interventions are moderated by the desired Type II innovation 
culture characteristics, and by the specific position of the Cerulean innovation culture, to produce a 
series of proposed interventions suitable for nudging the innovation culture to be more supportive of 
radical innovation.  This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 6-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-3  Developing interventions suitable for Cerulean 
The planned interventions for Cerulean are sequential and focus on developing confidence to 
suggest, select and undertake a “do different” project which will have team ownership and 
commitment.  This is likely to encourage behaviours that facilitate radical innovation.  The seven 
inter-linked Cerulean specific interventions are shown in Table 6-7.
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The plan comprises the following seven interventions as a sequence of steps:- 
1. Team membership 
Team membership is modified to add in “do different” skills and attitude.  This intervention 
seeks to add individuals to the team who have a “can-do” attitude, who have a high level of 
training or skills and who are willing to think of “do different” solutions to problems.  
Selection of such individuals will necessitate some form of assessment of their attitude and 
skills levels.  Innovative or adaptive behaviour can be assessed using the Kirton Adaptation 
Innovation (KAI) measure (1976; 1989; 2003).  Attitude and psychological profile could be 
assessed by using Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) psychometric evaluations (Stevens 
and Burley, 2003).  Skills can be assessed by using specific skill assessment techniques or by 
past performance and delivering results by using these skills.  This intervention seeks to add 
people to the Development Team, rather than develop the ability of the existing team.  Adding 
people with higher degrees and post degree experience is likely to improve the skill levels in 
the team.  The desired artefacts from this intervention are presence of skilled individuals in 
the team.  The values being developed are a desire to question and challenge existing beliefs, 
to re-frame problems and re-use knowledge from external sources to solve those problems.  
The extant Cerulean team shows significant risk aversion, and is comprised of individuals 
with long service.  Many of them have no degree level qualification.  Adding in the “do 
different” attitudes of new team members is likely to begin to change the attitude of the team 
members to risk taking and thinking of “do different” solutions. 
2. Idea/knowledge gathering and sharing system 
This can be achieved through two different interventions.  Firstly, creating and operating a 
system that traps ideas and facilitates sharing across all team members.  This system would be 
based on a database, possibly an SQL database, and be used to log ideas and facts about new 
technologies.  This intervention is at the artefact level, in that it provides a system and process 
to use the system, thus acting as a tool to gather and share new ideas and facts.  The system on 
its own will not provide radical breakthroughs, but it can act to support the values of the team 
members in making these breakthroughs.  A hard copy print would be made at regular 
intervals for record purposes.  The ideas would be reviewed on a regular basis to identify 
those that might be worth developing.  Secondly, the creation of an ideas area for the team.  
This is a physical space where ideas can be put forward in physical form, refined, critiqued, 
where new technology can be examined, and interesting pieces of equipment can be evaluated 
and retained for future inspection.  It would act in the same way as the first intervention, the 
database, but in this case it would retain physical objects rather than ideas or knowledge.  
Having a display area for team members to add or critique ideas related to the physical objects 
would act in conjunction with the knowledge based system.  This intervention would provide 
some of the framework to support the “do different” behaviours. 
3. External input 
This intervention would encourage and facilitate input from external sources.  These are 
sources outside the company which may also be outside the tobacco or tube packing industry.  
The team members would be encouraged to visit external sources for ideas and new 
knowledge.  This information would be recorded in the system described in Intervention 2.  
The external sources would include exhibitions of technology, trade fairs, university contacts, 
Discontinuous Innovation Forum group and other companies who offer access to new 
technologies.  In addition, external speakers, “experts” in their own area, would be asked to 
present their ideas and views to the team at regular intervals to support the external input.  
The contact with universities would be a suitable initial source for these external speakers.  
This intervention is designed to develop a sense that going outside for ideas is part of the way 
things are done. 
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4. Idea gathering as a process 
The objective of this intervention is to develop the first three interventions into a process 
whereby idea gathering and development is perceived to be part of the routine of the group.  
A weekly brainstorming session to evaluate possible new products or select a solution to a 
particular problem is proposed to initiate this.  This session would be held each Wednesday at 
2pm, in order to provide regularity and embed the process into the behaviour of the group.  
This session would be facilitated by different people each week.  The output would be fed 
back into the idea gathering system described in Intervention 2.  This would also be a suitable 
venue to invite people external to the company to attend.  This external input would add new 
ideas to the group knowledge.  It is proposed that each session selects a particular focus that is 
relevant to the business, and allows the session to generate multiple ideas for resolving the 
issue.  The generation of these ideas would be enhanced by the external knowledge gained as 
part of Intervention 3.   
5. New product areas to be identified 
This intervention takes the ideas and knowledge generated from interventions 2, 3 and 4.  The 
proposal for this intervention is to ask the team to create a list of potential new product areas.  
These product areas should be described in sufficient detail to allow the team to select one 
and then develop a product that fits into the new product area.  The product areas should be 
new to the company and new to the industry, or for a different industry.  The objective of this 
intervention is to encourage the team to develop possible opportunities for product 
development that moves the team into the radical innovation area.  The specification for the 
product groups should be sufficiently clear to indicate that an iteration of an existing product 
would not be suitable, but sufficiently open-ended to allow the creativity of the team to 
provide a series of potential new areas for product development.  The task would be defined 
as identifying a new product area, potential product applications, benefits to the business, 
estimated costs and selling process along with the associated outline plan for development.  
Depending on the constitution of the team following Intervention 1, it may be more 
appropriate to allocate this task to a number of teams created from the whole Development 
Team, rather than to each Development Team member.  This intervention builds on the 
preceding interventions to produce a number of possible development routes for the company. 
6. Show and tell presentation 
This intervention takes the new product opportunities created in Intervention 5 and, with input 
from the commercial and operations areas of the business, selects one suitable for developing 
into a new product for the business.  The proposal is for a group evaluation of the product 
opportunities.  Each idea would be presented by the individual or team responsible for its 
creation.  These proposals would be evaluated at a session where other members of the 
company had the opportunity to test the thinking and feedback their view of the probability of 
the product proposal being of benefit to the company.  It may be appropriate to run such a 
session internally with the Development Team, prior to opening the ideas up to the company 
at large.  This venue would be used to discuss the relative merits and drawbacks of each of the 
product proposals.  This intervention would provide a showcase for the creative output of the 
Development Team and this would provide a degree of confidence in the team being able to 
think of “do different” solutions.  This would, in turn, strengthen the confidence of the team. 
7. “Do different” project 
This is the final stage in this series of interventions.  It builds on the preceding steps and uses 
one of the product opportunities from Intervention 6 as the basis of a radical innovation 
project.  This project would be initiated on the basis that it may, or may not, become a 
production product, but that the development of the product would still take place.  The 
selection of a “do different” project would have a degree of ownership by the team as it would 
flow from their involvement in the preceding interventions.  The project would be given to a 
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team drawn from the Development Team members with a clear overall goal, but without a 
high degree of specification being provided.  As the product opportunity will have evolved 
from the work of the team this would be a different scenario from providing a full 
specification for a new product.  This ownership of the project would be important to 
reinforce the willingness to undertake the development of such a “do different” project.  A 
segregated area should be provided if possible, to create the perception that the project is 
“different”.  Resource allocation would be provided as per other development projects, as it 
would be a legitimate product development.  A bonus for completion of project deliverables 
would be offered to the project team.  These deliverables should reflect that the project may or 
may not deliver a viable product, but nevertheless would contribute to the knowledge of the 
team.  This step would again build the confidence of the team and those outside the team, 
indicating that “do different” in product development was an acceptable, and indeed expected, 
behaviour for the Development Team. 
6.8.2 Making the change 
In the literature and case examples, there is a clear requirement to have strong top 
management support for radical innovation, through personal involvement, and recognising 
and encouraging radical innovation.  The Cerulean Development Team expressed concern 
about top management support for radical innovation during the interview stages of Project 
One.  In addition the scores on KEYS indicate poor management support for creativity.  Past 
experience of the team, in succeeding by making incremental improvements, has provided a 
degree of resistance to doing things differently.  The past behaviours that resulted in success 
are still perceived as the way things should be done.  It is not surprising then that this group of 
people would want to be guided by management, would want to take steps that improve on 
what they have currently got and would be wary of moving away from the pattern of 
behaviour that they know, and are comfortable with, to undertake a series of interventions that 
require a different way of behaving.  The suggested interventions for facilitating aspects of a 
Type II, radical innovation supporting culture in Cerulean will depend heavily on top 
management support and input.  A key part of this support is the creation of a vision for the 
Development Team.  This acts as a model of the desired position for development at the end 
of the transformation.  Based on studies of several organizations that underwent change 
programmes, from the top ten most effective components of initiative for change, the first two 
were, a common vision to guide efforts and an effective champion to continually drive the 
change (Carter et al., 2001).  French and Bell (1999) find that leadership style, mission and 
strategy are required to change in order to create enduring change.  Recent research has 
emphasized the importance of vision and mission in initiating and sustaining culture change 
as major features of interventions required to transform an organization (French, Bell Jr., and 
Zawacki, 2005).  The final step in the plan of the team managing their own radical innovation 
project would provide a focus for the Development Team in participating in these seven 
intervention steps.  This focal point would provide the guidance for the team’s efforts. 
     The use of interventions in itself is unlikely to develop a Type II radical innovation culture.  
There are many different interventions suggested from literature, case examples and the DIF 
companies.  These have common themes that indicate which aspects of innovation culture 
they would influence.  The creation of the desired culture is more likely to be achieved by 
considering an appropriate group of interventions acting to modify the behaviour of the team 
members, and then reinforcing that behaviour such that it becomes embedded in the 
underlying values of the group (Schein, 1991).  The interventions would be applied in an 
action research form of application, evaluation of the intervention, diagnosing the issues that 
are relevant and planning the next intervention based on this diagnosis (Coghlan and 
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Brannick, 2001).  This cycle would then be repeated until the values become embedded.  This 
method is shown in Figure 6-4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4  Developing culture through changing values by making interventions 
 
The cycle of taking action, evaluating outcomes, diagnosing the results and planning further 
actions facilitates participative evaluation and reflection.  This influences the behaviour of the 
team members, involves them in the planning and diagnosing process, and requires them to 
participate in the evaluation as well as the intervention. 
6.8.3 Facilitation of Type II radical innovation culture in Cerulean 
The seven interventions form a holistic approach to facilitating a radical Type II innovation 
culture.  They operate sequentially and culminate in the team managing their own radical 
innovation project.  The proposed interventions, their desired effect at the artefacts and values 
levels of Schein’s model and the desired behaviours of a Type II radical innovation culture 
associated with each intervention are summarized in Table 6-8. 
Plan 
intervention 
Implement 
intervention 
Evaluate 
effect 
Diagnose 
outcome 
Change 
Behaviour 
 
Change 
Values 
 
Develop Type II 
radical innovation culture 
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Table 6-8  Interventions and their desired effect in terms of Schein’s model 
 Intervention Artefact Value Type II behaviour 
1 Team membership Higher degree qualified 
team members. 
Team members who are 
willing to question and 
challenge. 
Confidence to think of 
untried solutions. 
Questioning from team 
members.  Willingness to 
offer untried solutions to 
problems, to seek out new 
knowledge, to experiment 
with new technologies or 
methods. 
2 Idea/knowledge 
gathering and 
sharing system 
Ideas gathering system. 
Physical area for 
interesting objects. 
Gathering and 
evaluating new ideas, 
thoughts, and physical 
objects. 
Provides the framework for 
collecting and reviewing 
ideas, technology and new 
knowledge. 
3 External input Visits to external 
sources. 
Invited external speakers. 
Looking outside the 
company is a normal 
way to gather ideas and 
information. 
Taking an external perspective 
to develop new knowledge 
and ideas for future use.  
Developing outside networks 
amongst different external 
organizations.  Seeking out 
external contacts to facilitate 
this knowledge and idea 
gathering. 
4 Idea gathering as a 
process 
Brainstorming session 
each Wednesday. 
Idea generation is a 
part of the normal 
behaviour of the group. 
Collecting, and reviewing new 
ideas technologies and 
methods.  Used in conjunction 
with the idea/knowledge 
gathering system to review 
these against current problems 
at different times.   
5 New product areas 
to be identified 
Project to develop new 
product areas for the 
business. 
Creative activity is 
encouraged, even 
though much of this 
activity may never be 
taken forward. 
Identification of potential 
product opportunities based on 
acquired knowledge and 
current problems.  Being 
creative in thinking of new 
applications of known 
knowledge and ideas. 
6 Show and tell 
presentation 
A group meeting where 
product ideas are 
presented, discussed and 
critiqued. 
Acceptance of “do 
different” solutions.  
Confidence in the team 
by others in the 
company.  Confidence 
of the team in their 
own ability to provide 
“do different” 
solutions. 
Confidence to present new 
ideas, and to discuss and 
critique those ideas.  Being 
open with other team 
members and adding 
individual viewpoints to 
further develop possible 
solutions.  Restlessness about 
wanting to seek out “do 
different” solutions. 
7 “Do different” 
project 
Undertaking a radical 
product development 
project, that may or may 
not lead to production. 
Acceptance of “do 
different” behaviour.  
Developing previously 
untried solutions is an 
acceptable behaviour 
and is to be 
encouraged. 
Speculative 
development work is 
acceptable and is 
encouraged. 
Running a radical innovation 
project with minimal 
supervision.  Allocation of 
time and resource to radical 
projects.  Radical projects are 
part of the day-to-day activity 
of the Development Team. 
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     The suggested interventions act together to develop a willingness to take risk and to 
experiment.  This will foster a “do different” approach to problem solving.  The innovation 
leadership component of the radical innovation culture is approached by having the top 
management in Cerulean participate in a radical innovation project, thus reinforcing the 
perspective that radical innovation is important to the company.  Interventions 2 and 4 act 
together to create a system for idea and knowledge gathering and sharing, and to encourage the 
Development Team to utilize the system for this purpose.  The provision of a “show and tell” 
venue for new ideas will act to encourage boundary pushing, but with a commercial focus.  The 
culmination of the interventions is the selection and development of a radical innovation project.  
The suggested intervention plan for presentation to the Development Team is shown in 
Appendix E. 
     Regardless of the outcome, risk taking, experimentation and gaining knowledge through this 
intervention should be encouraged and recognized.  Providing a bonus for team members 
reinforces this behaviour.  This will act to provide an example of the behaviour required to 
facilitate radical innovation in the organization.  This behaviour will be embedded in the values 
of the group as it is rewarded and approved of by top management.  These suggested 
interventions are mapped against the original nine themes in Table 6-9.  This is shown 
graphically in the form of a Decision Explorer map in Figure 6-5.  The interventions are 
numbered from 1 to 7 and the themes are numbered from 101 to 109 in order to differentiate 
them in the map.  The arrows in this figure indicate influence of an intervention on a theme 
rather than any precise causality. 
Table 6-9  Interventions and desired culture related to the nine themes 
 
Theme 
Suggested intervention for Cerulean 
(from Table 6-8) 
Freedom/ 
Latitude 
Implement idea gathering and experimentation as a process within the team (4) 
Team to identify product ideas that are new to the market and company (5) 
Identify a “do different” project and allow the team to manage it (7) 
Attitude to 
Risk 
Team membership strengthened to add in “do different” skills and attitude (1) 
Team to identify product ideas that are new to the market and company (5) 
Identify a “do different” project and allow the team to manage it (7) 
Growth/ 
Development 
Develop an idea/knowledge gathering and sharing system (2) 
Visit external bodies with a view to information gathering (3) 
Provide a “show and tell” session to “showcase” their new ideas (6) 
External 
confidence 
Team to identify product ideas that are new to the market and company (5) 
Provide a “show and tell” session to “showcase” their new ideas (6) 
Identify a “do different” project, allocate space, people and resources to it and 
allow the team to manage the project but with top management to champion it (7) 
Internal 
confidence 
Visit external bodies with a view to information gathering (3) 
Implement idea gathering and experimentation as a process within the team (4) 
Team to identify product ideas that are new to the market and company (5) 
Provide a “show and tell” session to “showcase” their new ideas (6) 
Identify a “do different” project and allow the team to manage it (7) 
External 
perspective 
Visit external bodies with a view to information gathering (3) 
Clear 
objectives 
Identify a “do different” project and allocate space, people and resources to it (7) 
 
Team 
Constitution 
Team membership strengthened to add in “do different” skills and attitude (1) 
Company 
infrastructure 
Develop an idea/knowledge gathering and sharing system (2) 
Implement idea gathering and experimentation as a process within the team (4) 
Provide a “show and tell” session to “showcase” their new ideas (6) 
Identify a “do different” project and support with top management champion (7) 
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     Once implementation has commenced, participation should be maintained.  Regular 
workshops to review progress, evaluate outcomes and re-plan follow-on steps would facilitate 
this.  The involvement of the Development Team in making the change is a key factor in 
developing the desired innovation culture.  The use of the assessment tools developed in Project 
Two would allow a gauging of presence and intensity of climate, culture and position against an 
“ideal” radical innovation culture at different stages during the implementation process.  The 
regular review workshops would serve to maintain participation and ownership, whilst at the 
same time act as an additional gauge of progress towards the desired culture.  To facilitate this, 
desired aspects of the artefacts and values in Schein’s model are suggested as a benchmark to 
determine success or failure at various stages during the intervention process.  These aspects are 
described in terms of the original nine themes in Table 6-10, along with typical success and 
failure indicators for each theme. 
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Co
n
st
itu
tio
n
 
 
A
rt
ef
ac
t 
Th
e 
te
am
 
ha
s 
a 
m
ix
 
o
f c
re
at
iv
e 
in
di
v
id
u
al
s 
w
ho
 
ha
v
e 
su
ffi
ci
en
t 
ex
pe
rie
n
ce
 
in
sid
e 
o
r 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
su
bje
ct
 
ar
ea
 
su
ch
 
th
at
 
th
e
y 
ca
n
 
ap
pl
y 
la
te
ra
l 
th
in
ki
n
g 
to
 
pr
o
v
id
e 
a 
ra
di
ca
l s
o
lu
tio
n
.
 
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
co
m
pr
ise
s 
di
ffe
re
n
t m
in
de
d 
in
di
v
id
u
al
s 
w
ho
 
ca
n
 
w
o
rk
 
w
ith
 
so
m
e 
de
gr
ee
 
o
f u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 
an
d 
co
n
fli
ct
 
as
 
pa
rt
 
o
f t
he
 
da
y-
to
-
da
y 
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
he
te
ro
ge
n
eo
u
s 
m
ix
 
o
f t
ea
m
 
m
em
be
rs
 
–
 
o
rig
in
al
 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
 
m
em
be
rs
 
al
o
n
gs
id
e 
n
ew
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
 
Se
v
er
al
 
o
f t
he
 
n
ew
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ha
v
e 
hi
gh
er
 
de
gr
ee
s,
 
di
ffe
re
n
t s
ki
ll-
se
ts
 
an
d 
cl
ea
rly
 
ha
v
e 
a 
“
ca
n
-
do
”
 
at
tit
u
de
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 
n
ew
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
 
A
ll 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ha
v
e 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ap
pr
o
ac
h 
to
 
pr
o
bl
em
 
so
lv
in
g 
–
 
ba
se
d 
o
n
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l 
im
pr
o
v
em
en
t. 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 
de
gr
ee
s.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
n
o
 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n
 
o
r 
ar
gu
m
en
t a
bo
u
t i
de
as
 
an
d 
so
lu
tio
n
s 
am
o
n
gs
t t
ea
m
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
Th
er
e 
re
m
ai
n
s 
a 
de
sir
e 
to
 
fo
llo
w
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
3 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
Pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
A
rt
ef
ac
t 
Ex
am
in
at
io
n
 
an
d 
ev
al
u
at
io
n
 
o
f 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
es
,
 
pr
o
ce
ss
es
,
 
m
et
ho
ds
 
an
d 
pr
o
du
ct
 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n
s 
fro
m
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y 
an
d 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
in
du
st
ry
.
 
 
N
et
w
o
rk
in
g 
o
f i
n
di
v
id
u
al
 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
co
n
ta
ct
s 
is 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d 
an
d 
su
pp
o
rt
ed
.
 
 
Th
es
e 
id
ea
s 
an
d 
kn
o
w
le
dg
e 
ar
e 
re
co
rd
ed
 
an
d 
sh
ar
ed
 
w
ith
 
th
e 
re
st
 
o
f t
he
 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
fre
qu
en
t v
isi
ts
 
to
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
so
u
rc
es
 
o
f i
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
.
 
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
sp
ea
ke
rs
 
re
gu
la
rly
 
v
isi
t a
n
d 
ta
lk
 
to
 
th
e 
te
am
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
di
sc
u
ss
io
n
 
ab
o
u
t w
ha
t h
as
 
be
en
 
se
en
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y.
 
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
m
an
y 
n
ew
 
co
n
ta
ct
s,
 
bo
th
 
at
 
a 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
le
v
el
 
an
d 
a 
gr
o
u
p 
le
v
el
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
fre
qu
en
t 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
 
w
ith
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
gr
o
u
ps
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
co
n
ta
ct
s 
an
d 
n
o
 
v
isi
ts
 
o
th
er
 
th
an
 
th
o
se
 
n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
to
 
ac
hi
ev
e 
th
e 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l d
ev
el
o
pm
en
t p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 
ex
te
rn
al
 
v
isi
to
rs
 
pr
o
v
id
in
g 
in
pu
t t
o
 
th
e 
te
am
.
 
Te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
do
 
n
o
t h
av
e 
a 
n
et
w
o
rk
 
o
f 
pe
rs
o
n
al
 
co
n
ta
ct
s 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 
in
du
st
ry
.
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3 
Ta
bl
e 
6-
10
 
 
In
di
ca
to
rs
 
o
f s
u
cc
es
s 
a
n
d 
fa
ilu
re
 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f t
he
 
n
in
e 
th
em
es
 
 
Th
em
e 
Le
v
el
 
in
 
Sc
he
in
’s
 
m
o
de
l 
A
sp
ec
ts
 
o
f a
 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 
cu
ltu
re
 
Su
cc
es
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
Fa
ilu
re
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
 
4 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
Co
n
fid
en
ce
 
V
al
u
e 
Co
n
fid
en
ce
 
an
d 
be
lie
f i
n
 
th
e 
te
am
’
s 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
tly
”
 
in
 
pu
rs
u
it 
o
f 
ra
di
ca
l s
o
lu
tio
n
s.
 
 
G
ro
u
ps
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y 
an
d 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t t
al
k 
o
pe
n
ly
 
an
d 
po
sit
iv
el
y 
ab
o
u
t t
he
 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
’
s 
ab
ili
ty
 
to
 
de
liv
er
 
ra
di
ca
l p
ro
du
ct
s.
 
Th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y 
em
pl
o
ye
es
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
 
ta
lk
 
am
o
n
gs
t 
th
em
se
lv
es
 
an
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t 
Te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ab
o
u
t r
ad
ic
al
 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
pr
o
jec
ts
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
an
 
in
te
re
st
 
an
d 
pr
id
e 
fro
m
 
pe
o
pl
e 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
te
am
 
ab
o
u
t t
he
 
te
am
’
s 
pr
o
gr
es
s 
in
 
cr
ea
tin
g 
ra
di
ca
l n
ew
 
pr
o
du
ct
s.
 
Th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
 
is 
co
n
sid
er
ed
 
to
 
re
m
ai
n
 
in
ca
pa
bl
e 
o
f r
ad
ic
al
 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
.
 
R
ad
ic
al
 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
ar
e 
in
iti
at
ed
 
by
 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n
 
w
ith
 
o
u
ts
id
e 
ag
en
ci
es
.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
n
o
 
pr
o
du
ct
 
de
v
el
o
pm
en
t p
la
n
s 
th
at
 
in
cl
u
de
 
au
da
ci
o
u
s 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
as
 
pa
rt
 
o
f 
th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
’
s 
w
o
rk
lo
ad
.
 
5 
Cl
ea
r 
O
bje
ct
iv
es
 
A
rt
ef
ac
t 
O
bje
ct
iv
es
 
th
at
 
ar
e 
n
o
t s
pe
ci
fic
 
an
d 
cl
ea
rly
 
de
fin
ed
 
ar
e 
th
e 
n
o
rm
 
fo
r 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
t”
 
pr
o
jec
ts
.
 
 
Th
es
e 
ar
e 
pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
as
 
al
lo
w
in
g 
a 
gr
ea
te
r 
de
gr
ee
 
o
f l
at
itu
de
 
in
 
de
v
el
o
pi
n
g 
so
lu
tio
n
s 
th
an
 
m
o
re
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
 
Fo
r 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
t”
 
so
lu
tio
n
s 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 
o
f a
 
le
ss
 
w
el
l 
de
fin
ed
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
is 
se
en
 
as
 
an
 
o
pp
o
rt
u
n
ity
 
to
 
de
v
el
o
p 
a 
n
ew
 
so
lu
tio
n
 
to
 
a 
pr
o
bl
em
.
 
R
ad
ic
al
 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
ar
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
riz
ed
 
by
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
s 
th
at
 
ar
e 
n
o
t c
o
m
pl
et
e 
an
d 
de
ta
ile
d.
 
 
Th
e 
pr
o
du
ct
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
o
r 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
so
m
et
im
es
 
se
em
 
im
po
ss
ib
le
 
to
 
ac
hi
ev
e.
 
 
So
m
e 
pr
o
du
ct
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
ar
e 
o
u
ts
id
e 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
u
s 
ar
ea
s 
o
f e
x
pe
rie
n
ce
 
o
f 
th
e 
co
m
pa
n
y.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
an
 
ac
ce
pt
an
ce
 
th
at
 
th
is 
in
di
ca
te
s 
th
e 
pr
o
jec
t i
s 
m
o
re
 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
 
n
at
u
re
.
 
Pr
o
du
ct
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
ar
e 
co
m
pr
eh
en
siv
e 
an
d 
le
av
e 
lit
tle
 
if 
an
y 
ro
o
m
 
fo
r 
jud
ge
m
en
t 
fro
m
 
th
e 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
.
 
 
Th
e 
pr
o
du
ct
s 
te
n
d 
to
 
be
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l v
er
si
o
n
s 
o
f w
ha
t h
as
 
go
n
e 
be
fo
re
.
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
se
ek
 
cl
ar
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
an
d 
fu
rt
he
r 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n
 
o
f a
sp
ec
ts
 
o
f t
he
 
n
ew
 
pr
o
du
ct
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
u
n
til
 
th
er
e 
is 
n
o
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
o
 
ap
pl
y 
an
y 
cr
ea
tiv
ity
 
to
 
th
e 
de
v
el
o
pm
en
t p
ro
jec
t. 
 
Th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n
 
is 
a 
v
er
y 
co
n
st
ra
in
ed
 
o
u
tli
n
e 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 
n
ew
 
pr
o
du
ct
.
 
6 
Fr
ee
do
m
/ 
La
tit
u
de
 
 
V
al
u
e 
Ex
pl
o
ra
tio
n
 
an
d 
di
sc
o
v
er
y 
ar
e 
pa
rt
 
o
f t
he
 
w
a
y 
th
in
gs
 
ar
e 
do
n
e.
 
 
Th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t 
Te
am
 
co
n
tr
o
ls 
th
e 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
t”
 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
to
 
a 
gr
ea
te
r 
ex
te
n
t t
ha
n
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
is 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d 
to
 
m
ak
e 
fu
ll 
u
se
 
o
f t
he
 
fre
ed
o
m
 
an
d 
la
tit
u
de
 
w
ith
in
 
a 
pr
o
jec
t b
y 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t.  
Th
e 
te
am
 
ta
ke
s 
re
sp
o
n
sib
ili
ty
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ra
di
ca
l p
ro
jec
ts
 
to
 
a 
gr
ea
te
r 
de
gr
ee
 
th
an
 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
cl
ea
r 
ab
se
n
ce
 
o
f t
as
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
n
d 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
o
n
tr
o
l i
n
 
ra
di
ca
l p
ro
jec
ts
.
 
 
Th
es
e 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
ar
e 
pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
to
 
be
 
“
o
w
n
ed
”
 
by
 
th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t T
ea
m
.
 
Th
e 
te
am
 
re
qu
ire
s 
pr
o
jec
t t
as
k 
m
an
ag
em
en
t t
o
 
co
m
pl
et
e 
di
sc
re
te
 
ta
sk
s 
o
n
 
th
e 
pr
o
jec
t p
la
n
.
 
 
Th
e 
ta
sk
s 
ar
e 
al
lo
ca
te
d 
as
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
be
co
m
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
af
te
r 
co
m
pl
et
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ev
io
u
s 
ta
sk
.
 
To
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
o
n
tr
o
ls 
th
e 
de
v
el
o
pm
en
t 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
an
d 
th
ei
r 
te
ch
n
o
lo
gi
ca
l d
ire
ct
io
n
.
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4 
Ta
bl
e 
6-
10
 
 
In
di
ca
to
rs
 
o
f s
u
cc
es
s 
a
n
d 
fa
ilu
re
 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
in
 
te
rm
s 
o
f t
he
 
n
in
e 
th
em
es
 
 
Th
em
e 
Le
v
el
 
in
 
Sc
he
in
’s
 
m
o
de
l 
A
sp
ec
ts
 
o
f a
 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
o
v
a
tio
n
 
cu
ltu
re
 
Su
cc
es
s 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
Fa
ilu
re
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
 
7    
A
tti
tu
de
 
to
 
R
isk
 
 
V
al
u
e 
Ta
ki
n
g 
ris
ks
 
is 
en
co
u
ra
ge
d.
 
 
U
n
ce
rt
ai
n
ty
 
is 
a 
pa
rt
 
o
f t
he
 
en
v
iro
n
m
en
t a
n
d 
di
sc
o
v
er
y 
is 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 
as
 
be
in
g 
lin
ke
d 
to
 
ta
ki
n
g 
ris
k.
 
Fa
ilu
re
 
is 
se
en
 
as
 
an
 
o
pp
o
rt
u
n
ity
 
to
 
le
ar
n
.
 
 
Fa
ilu
re
 
in
 
ra
di
ca
l i
n
n
o
v
at
io
n
 
pr
o
jec
ts
 
is 
pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
to
 
be
 
as
 
be
n
ef
ic
ia
l 
as
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l o
u
tc
o
m
es
,
 
al
th
o
u
gh
 
n
o
t 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 
de
liv
er
in
g 
a 
so
lu
tio
n
 
to
 
a 
pr
o
bl
em
.
 
 
 
Fa
ilu
re
s 
ar
e 
pe
rc
ei
v
ed
 
as
 
in
ev
ita
bl
e 
o
u
tc
o
m
es
 
pr
io
r 
to
 
a 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l r
ad
ic
al
 
pr
o
jec
t d
ev
el
o
pm
en
t a
n
d 
ar
e 
n
o
t p
u
n
ish
ed
 
bu
t u
se
d 
as
 
le
ar
n
in
g 
o
pp
o
rt
u
n
iti
es
.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
w
ill
in
gn
es
s 
to
 
tr
y 
o
u
t d
iff
er
en
t 
th
in
gs
 
an
d 
to
 
ex
pe
rim
en
t w
ith
 
pr
ev
io
u
sly
 
u
n
tr
ie
d 
so
lu
tio
n
s 
to
 
pr
o
bl
em
s.
 
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
se
v
er
al
 
“
u
n
o
ffi
ci
al
”
 
ex
pe
rim
en
ts
 
ru
n
n
in
g 
in
 
th
e 
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t a
re
a 
to
 
te
st
 
o
u
t 
id
ea
s.
 
 
B
la
m
e 
is 
n
o
t a
pp
o
rt
io
n
ed
 
w
he
n
 
a 
fa
ilu
re
 
o
cc
u
rs
.
 
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
pr
o
ce
ss
 
to
 
di
st
il 
le
ar
n
in
g 
po
in
ts
 
fro
m
 
fa
ilu
re
s.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
a 
te
n
de
n
c
y 
to
 
lo
o
k 
fo
r 
so
m
eo
n
e 
to
 
bl
am
e 
w
he
n
 
th
in
gs
 
go
 
w
ro
n
g.
 
 
A
ct
io
n
s 
ar
e 
ta
ke
n
 
to
 
re
du
ce
 
ris
k 
an
d 
en
su
re
 
o
n
ly
 
su
cc
es
sf
u
l o
u
tc
o
m
es
 
ar
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 
o
n
 
pr
o
jec
ts
,
 
to
 
th
e 
ex
te
n
t t
ha
t i
f a
 
pr
o
jec
t l
o
o
ks
 
as
 
if 
it 
m
ig
ht
 
n
o
t w
o
rk
,
 
it 
is 
ab
an
do
n
ed
.
 
Pr
o
du
ct
 
so
lu
tio
n
s 
ha
v
e 
a 
cl
ea
r 
lin
k 
to
 
pr
ev
io
u
sl
y 
tr
ie
d 
so
lu
tio
n
s.
 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
co
m
m
u
n
ic
at
io
n
s,
 
su
ch
 
as
 
em
ai
l, 
u
se
d 
to
 
pr
o
v
e 
th
at
 
th
e 
te
am
 
m
em
be
r 
w
as
 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
an
 
in
st
ru
ct
io
n
 
o
r 
co
m
pl
et
in
g 
an
 
al
lo
ca
te
d 
ta
sk
 
w
he
n
 
a 
fa
ilu
re
 
o
cc
u
rs
.
 
8 
In
te
rn
al
 
Co
n
fid
en
ce
 
V
al
u
e 
Co
n
fid
en
ce
 
am
o
n
g 
th
e 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
th
at
 
th
e
y 
ca
n
 
fin
d 
a 
ra
di
ca
l s
o
lu
tio
n
.
 
 
Ea
ch
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
r 
w
o
rk
s 
w
ith
 
o
th
er
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
an
d 
re
sp
ec
ts
 
th
e 
in
di
v
id
u
al
 
ta
le
n
ts
 
o
f o
th
er
s.
 
Qu
es
tio
n
in
g,
 
ch
al
le
n
gi
n
g 
bu
t a
lso
 
su
pp
o
rt
in
g 
an
d 
n
u
rt
u
rin
g 
o
th
er
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
is 
da
y-
to
-
da
y 
be
ha
v
io
u
r.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
co
n
fid
en
ce
 
am
o
n
gs
t t
he
 
te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
to
 
tr
y 
so
m
et
hi
n
g 
n
ew
,
 
kn
o
w
in
g 
it 
m
ay
 
n
o
t w
o
rk
.
 
Th
er
e 
is 
o
pe
n
 
de
ba
te
 
w
ith
in
 
th
e 
te
am
 
ab
o
u
t 
n
ew
 
id
ea
s 
an
d 
co
n
ce
pt
s.
 
 
Te
am
 
m
em
be
rs
 
ha
v
e 
co
n
fid
en
ce
 
to
 
pu
t f
o
rw
ar
d 
th
ei
r 
“
do
 
di
ffe
re
n
t”
 
id
ea
s.
 
 
O
th
er
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     Top management ownership and involvement is critical to the success of the 
proposed interventions.  This must be visibly demonstrated to the Development Team 
throughout the intervention process.  Provision of adequate resources, provision of 
space and time to enact the interventions, and demonstration of an interest in progress of 
the interventions and resulting successes and failures will support this.  Top 
management must take care not to assume control of the interventions.  The 
responsibility for implementing interventions 2 to 7 lies with the Development Team.  
Top management must facilitate, encourage, take an interest, but at all stages it must 
allow the Development Team to retain control and ownership of these interventions.  
This sets the vision for radical product development in Cerulean, the perception that 
experimentation, learning and discovery are valued and are part of the “way things are 
done now” in the Cerulean Development Team. 
6.9 Key points from Project Three 
The key points arising from Project Three can be summarized as:- 
• Interventions to facilitate a radical innovation culture focus on encouraging team 
members to experiment and seek out new knowledge. 
• Copying interventions is unlikely to be effective.  They need to be implemented 
with participation from team members and recognise the history and extant 
position of the team. 
• The use of the ideal Type II radical innovation culture provides a goal for the 
interventions and provides a tangible focus for team members. 
• Transition between the two archetypes can be facilitated by adopting Schein’s 
model of organizational culture.  This provides a framework for interventions 
focused on changing values and underlying beliefs by encouraging adoption of 
the desired behaviours. 
• Leadership is a key component of developing a radical innovation culture.  The 
leadership to facilitate this requires balancing of good business practices with 
the practices to facilitate radical innovation. 
• Support from top management is a key aspect to developing a radical innovation 
culture.  This gives legitimacy to what could otherwise be considered as 
practices that are counter-productive to good business operations. 
• A radical innovation culture embraces risk.  Management’s task is to manage 
this risk-taking and balance the risk against the potential benefit. 
• Top management must work continuously at maintaining the perception that 
failure is not necessarily to be avoided.  Failure should be “fast and often” to 
provide learning for the team. 
• Interventions to develop a radical innovation culture encourage learning through 
exploration. 
• A radical innovation culture embedded in a normal business environment is not 
easily achieved. 
• A planned set of linked interventions to facilitate a radical innovation culture 
specifically for the Cerulean Development Team was developed. 
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7 Discussion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1  Research overview – Discussion 
The extant literature discusses the diagnosis of innovation cultures and makes 
observations on what interventions may be beneficial to facilitate radical innovation.  
Eisenhardt, in Hargadon’s book “How Breakthroughs Happen” (2003), suggests that in 
developing an innovative organization, there is a tendency to focus on the “where to 
go”, ie, a particular position or strategy, and pay scant attention to the “how to get 
there”.  The landscape of a radical innovation culture is not well understood and so the 
steps to get there are not clearly visible.  This research addresses the planning activities 
associated with this journey. 
7.1 Developing the interventions 
Radical innovation is rooted in risk (Utterback, 1994; Song and Montoya-Weiss, 1998) 
and a firm that embraces radical innovation must also be prepared to embrace risk.  The 
Cerulean Development Team show an aversion to risk taking.  An organizational 
culture that encourages risk taking is counter-productive to good business practice- 
where risks are avoided or minimized.  In this environment failure is to be avoided.  The 
routines and systems that work well for normal business operation become inhibitors 
when applied to radical innovation development (Christensen, 1997; Sutton, 2001; 
Farson and Keyes, 2002).  Established players have a learned behaviour which they 
have developed that includes those ideas, techniques and habits which are passed on by 
one generation to another.  The routines become institutionalized.  The culture that 
facilitated past success based on “doing better” can become the culture that inhibits 
frame breaking behaviour needed for radical innovation.  Maintaining this “do 
different” capability requires top management support and leadership that allows these 
practices to co-exist with the normal good business processes.  Developing and 
sustaining this kind of ambidexterity requires continuing management support.  In a 
radical innovation culture, failure is a learning step and the objective is to fail quickly 
and move on, learning from the failure.  The radical innovation culture is one that 
encourages learning, from these failures but also from external sources.  The “do 
different” step forward very often comes from linking two previously unlinked ideas to 
produce a radical innovation.  Therefore a radical innovation culture encourages 
boundary crossing in the pursuit of new knowledge.  Successful organizations manage 
this new knowledge using a process, and in some cases review it at regular intervals, to 
ensure that it is not forgotten.  The radical innovation culture encourages learning, from 
both experimentation and exploration.  It is a culture that has a hunger for new concepts, 
new technologies and new ideas.  These are fuel for the flow of radical innovations. 
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     Using Greenwood and Hinings (1993) archetypes as a basis for representing the 
innovation supporting culture allows the development of two archetypes.  Type I 
represents an incremental innovation supporting culture.  Type II represents an 
innovation culture that supports radical innovation.  The holistic approach that the use 
of archetypes facilitates allows the comparison and contrast of the two types.  There is 
some commonality, but there are also clear differences in the culture aspects that 
operate to facilitate each type of innovation.  The archetypes are considered to be ideal 
types.  It is unlikely that any organization would exhibit the characteristics of one type 
exclusively.  However the use of the ideal facilitates the “end point” towards which any 
change process or activities should be directed in order to enable the desired 
characteristics for radical (or incremental) innovation.  The assessments made of the 
Development Team culture provide a datum point for gauging progress towards a 
radical innovation culture and also indicate the areas where interventions are required to 
develop this radical innovation culture.  The results show that freedom of operation and 
willingness to take risk are perceived as being low.  The Development Team also feel 
that management support for “do different” activities is low.  In evaluating interventions 
to develop a radical innovation culture, the interventions pooled from the empirical 
examples indicated a need to provide strong support and leadership to facilitate a radical 
innovation culture.  This provides a legitimacy for what could be considered as counter-
productive practices like experimentation and seeking out different ideas in the business 
context.  Idea gathering and management of the amassed knowledge is another aspect in 
these examples.  The plan developed for the Cerulean Development Team takes these 
examples and develops a series of inter-linked interventions designed to develop a 
radical innovation culture.  The plan builds on the previous participation of the 
Development Team and the planned interventions are intended to be highly 
participative.  The focus is on developing some “do different” aspects of a radical 
innovation culture that have legitimacy within the company, and then selecting and 
running a “do different” project.  This would have high visibility within the company 
and encourage the Development Team members in behaviours that are new to them and 
which facilitate a radical innovation culture. 
7.2 Making the change 
Interventions adopted by other organizations that attempted to generate a “do different” 
capability show what has worked and what has not.  It is not beneficial to simply copy 
these interventions in order to generate a Type II innovation culture.  Adoption of Type 
II innovation culture ways of working can be encouraged through Organization 
Development (French, Bell Jr., and Zawacki, 1989) types of interventions.  Using 
Schein’s model of culture as a guide, interventions that influence the behaviours and can 
lead to adoption of values and underlying beliefs, the “way things are done” can be 
changed to behaviours that are in line with a Type II innovation culture. 
     The use of an archetype facilitates the “end point” towards which activities should be 
directed in order to enable the desired characteristics for radical (or incremental) 
innovation.  Transition between archetypes is facilitated by using Schein’s model.  
Change can be distinguished between incremental change, frame breaking change and 
quantum change.  The dynamics of the process are different from incremental to large 
scale change, which involves movement from one archetype to another (Greenwood and 
Hinings, 1993).  A series of interventions to facilitate change rather than a diffusion 
from one archetype to another is suggested as a method of moving towards a radical 
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intervention culture.  If these interventions are perceived as actions taken at the artefact 
and value level in Schein’s model of culture, then transition between archetypes is 
possible by embedding new values and underlying assumptions through implementation 
of artefact examples for the group.  As the value relating to the artefact created by the 
intervention is developed, it in turn leads to a behaviour and as that behaviour begins to 
solve the problem which prompted it, the value is gradually transformed into an 
underlying assumption about how things really are.  As the assumption is increasingly 
taken for granted, it drops out of awareness, thus creating a shift in the organizational 
culture.  This shift facilitates the transition towards Type II radical innovation culture. 
     Throughout the cases examined, there is a clear thread of top management support, 
either through initiation of changes to support a radical project, creation of a project 
team to develop a radical product or through active participation in the development of 
radical projects.  This sends a clear message that radical is important to the company, 
and reinforced when this is aligned with business strategy, indicating that the 
development of radical products is part of the overall business the “way we do things 
round here” rather than a “bolt-on” that resolves an immediate problem for the 
organization.  Having the “do different” innovation aspect of product development 
aligned with or even integral to the business strategy reinforces company commitment 
to radical innovation and provides a clear message that it is essential for the business.  A 
focus on fewer rather than more projects, with support from top management, adds 
legitimacy to the projects in the eyes of the organization.  To create the belief that 
failure is a learning opportunity rather than something to be avoided at all costs, means 
appearing to accept a different standard for this group to the other areas of the business.  
This ambiguity, that contributes to the organization’s ambidexterity, can be seen in 
many of the “ways of doing things” – the culture of a radical innovation organization.  
The support, encouragement and involvement of top managers in the radical innovation 
process and activities sends a clear signal that radical innovation is part of the “way we 
do things round here”.  Top management can interweave radical innovation into the 
business strategy such that it becomes an integral part of the day-to-day activities of the 
business.  This can only be achieved if there is visible support and encouragement for 
the Type II behaviours that in many cases are counter-productive to normal day-to-day 
business activities.  These counter-culture behaviours can be given legitimacy and 
credibility by the actions and behaviour of the top management team.  By reinforcing 
Type II behaviours at the highest level, by acknowledging that the two behaviours, Type 
I and Type II, co-exist within the single organization, albeit perhaps physically 
segregated in some cases, the development of a radical innovation culture can be 
facilitated.  Creation of a Type II innovation culture capability in the Cerulean 
Development Team could be perceived as developing a separate, but integrated, 
innovation culture within the existing Cerulean organizational culture.  This radical 
innovation culture would be counter-intuitive to good business practice, yet be 
encouraged to co-exist with the existing culture.  It cannot exist on its own as it needs 
links to the rest of the organization for its continued existence, yet it cannot be 
completely integrated into the existing culture as it acts to challenge and de-stabilize the 
“do better” approach of the organization.  It is a symbiotic relationship where two 
separate organizational cultures, one embedded in the other, co-exist to their mutual 
benefit. 
     Moving to a radical innovation culture requires entering into a psychological space 
with unknowns and uncertainties.  In this situation, providing psychological security is 
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extremely difficult (Francis et al., 2003).  It is in this environment that passion and an 
unfettered desire to achieve a desired position can be supported by adding people with 
this attitude and with the experience to know what this position is like (Kirton, 1984).  
The characteristics sought for new recruits include being able to think tangentially and 
to approach tasks from unsuspected angles.  This is described by Kirton as discovering 
problems and discovering the avenues of solution.  These new recruits act as a catalyst 
to the established group and provide the dynamics to bring about change within the 
group.  Characteristics such as irreverence of consensual views, creating dissonance, 
challenging rules, having little respect for past custom and not needing consensus to 
maintain certitude in face of opposition are all beneficial in facilitating the culture 
change.  This type of recruitment corresponds to the first intervention, whereby the team 
skills and attitudes are developed to embrace this step into new territory.  Taking time to 
communicate the changes, why they are happening and involving the employees in a 
participative style of making the change provides a degree of psychological security for 
these employees during the change process (West, 2002).  Innovation is given a high 
priority as part of the strategy and radical innovation is held up as an equally important 
part of this. 
7.3 Structural arrangements for a radical innovation culture 
A radical innovation culture is a collection of underlying beliefs, values and visible 
artefacts (Schein, 1984).  To develop and sustain such a culture there must be processes 
and frameworks that allow the appropriate behaviours to take place and encourage their 
use.  The structural arrangements suitable for this type of “do different” innovation are 
not clear and easily replicable.  They interweave with the behaviours, and as the 
behaviours to facilitate radical innovation are not clear and consistent, ie, constantly 
evolving to respond to continuous learning and experimentation, the structural 
framework must also constantly evolve.  A structure to support radical innovation must 
allow flexibility for the team members.  Allocation of tasks, formal roles and 
responsibilities are anathema to this type of innovation.  Rather, a flexible structure that 
shifts itself to suit the situation is required.  This is clearly seen in the example of IDEO 
(Kelley and Littman, 2001).  Here, the structure is loose, the working arrangements are 
temporary and constantly change, reporting lines are blurred and the focus is on 
delivering a solution for the customer.  Any such structures should develop and evolve 
as the needs of the group change.  Where processes are of benefit is in development of 
creative thinking.  Processes that encourage experimentation, that facilitate learning are 
appropriate.  Processes are designed to provide control over employees’ actions and 
behaviours.  With a radical innovation culture, control can be damaging.  The words of 
Lockheed’s Kelly Johnson are relevant here; ‘if a Skunk Works really operates right, 
control is exactly what they don’t get’ (Rich and Janos, 1994:  288). 
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8 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1  Research overview – Conclusions 
8.1 Summary of key findings 
Project One developed a model of innovation culture as two ideal types at opposite ends 
of a continuum.  This was based on nine themes which represented aspects of 
innovation culture that related to radical innovation.  The model of the radical 
innovation culture defines what this is like, in artefact and value terms (Schein, 1984).  
Project Two provided triangulation of the grounded research findings from Project One, 
and in addition, provided an assessment of the extant position of the Development 
Team’s innovation culture in facilitating radical innovation.  This provided a starting 
point for developing a plan of interventions suitable for moving the organizational 
culture to be more supportive of radical innovation.  Project Three suggested a series of 
interventions that were suitable for Cerulean, in that they related to previous 
participative work with the team members and in that they had a precedent in other 
organizations in terms of developing aspects of a radical innovation culture.  A key 
aspect of the interventions is the role of senior management.  This leadership from the 
top of the company is essential to ensure resources and support for radical innovation 
are made available, but more importantly, it legitimizes a way of working and style of 
management that is in dissonance with good-practice methods.  This is because the 
culture that facilitates radical innovation in itself must be open, questioning, challenging 
and unaccepting of the status quo and past successful methods and processes.  
Loosening control and encouraging learning through experimentation are necessary for 
facilitating this type of innovation culture. 
8.2 Radical innovation culture 
The nine themes represent aspects of Cerulean’s innovation culture that enable or inhibit 
radical innovation.  Using archetypes as a basis for representing the holistic perspective 
of an innovation supporting culture allows the development of two ideal types.  The use 
of an ideal type facilitates the “end point” towards which any change process or 
activities should be directed in order to enable the desired characteristics for radical 
innovation.  The framework based on Greenwood and Hinings’ archetypes and Schein’s 
model acts as a guide for managing and monitoring the transition between innovation 
cultures at various levels of analysis.  Through planned interventions enacted in a 
participatory manner changing the underlying assumptions and values, behaviour 
changes can be embedded in the organization as “the new way we do things around 
here”, thus leading to the desired radical innovation culture.  Examination of empirical 
examples indicated several appropriate interventions that could facilitate radical 
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innovation.  Throughout the cases examined, there is a clear thread of top management 
support, either through the initiation of changes to support a radical project, creation of 
a project team to develop a radical product or through active participation in the 
development of radical projects.  This sends a clear message that radical is important to 
the company, and is reinforced when this is aligned with business strategy, indicating 
that the development of radical products is part of the overall business, the “way we do 
things round here” rather than an instant solution that resolves an immediate problem 
for the organization.  Having the “do different” innovation aspect of product 
development aligned with or even integral to the business strategy reinforces the 
company commitment to radical innovation and provides a clear message that it is 
essential for the business.  This will mean appearing to accept a different standard to the 
other areas of the business.  This ambiguity, that contributes to the organization’s 
ambidexterity, can be seen in many of the “ways of doing things” – the culture of a 
radical innovation organization. 
8.3 Interventions to develop radical innovation culture 
The OCAI (Cameron and Quinn, 1999) and KEYS (Amabile et al., 1996; Amabile, 
1998; Amabile and Gryskiewicz, 1989) assessments along with the innovation 
assessment instrument based on the nine themes provided an estimate of the team’s 
perception of the innovation culture in comparison to an ideal position- the Type II 
archetype.  The results showed that freedom of operation and willingness to take risk is 
perceived as being low.  The use of an archetype facilitates the “end point” towards 
which any change process or activities should be directed in order to enable the desired 
characteristics for radical (or incremental) innovation. 
     The sequence of interventions suggested is designed to facilitate aspects of a Type II 
radical innovation culture.  The ideal type as defined in the innovation model provides 
the desired position – the aspects of a radical innovation culture the interventions are 
designed to facilitate.  The interventions themselves are less important than the 
underlying beliefs and values being developed and embedded.  It is these underlying 
beliefs and values that propagate the desired behaviours associated with a radical 
innovation culture. 
     The interventions require a significant input from top management, in providing 
resources, time and the infrastructure for the team.  The involvement of top 
management is an important intervention in its own right, as evident in the literature, 
empirical and DIF company examples.  The leadership shown by managers at the top of 
the organization have a major effect on the development of a radical innovation culture 
(Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan, Murray and Henderson, 2003).  This is not 
surprising as leadership is a significant influence in changing organizational culture 
(Carter et al., 2001; Ekvall, 1996; Schneider et al., 1996). 
     Transition between archetypes is facilitated by using Schein’s model.  Change can be 
distinguished between incremental change, frame breaking change and quantum change.  
The dynamics of the process are different from incremental to large scale change, which 
involves movement from one archetype to another (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993).  A 
series of interventions to facilitate change rather than a diffusion from one archetype to 
another is suggested as a method of moving towards a radical intervention culture. 
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8.4 Contribution 
The literature is vocal on the issue of radical innovation and on diagnosing enablers and 
inhibitors.  However, it remains largely silent on management actions to develop a 
radical innovation culture.  There is a tension between exploitation – incremental 
innovation, and exploration – radical innovation, in terms of the management of the 
innovation activity.  There is less known about what the cultural conditions for 
facilitating radical innovation are and about how to develop this type of culture.  This 
research examines aspects of innovation culture that facilitate radical innovation, and 
suggests interventions suitable for developing such an innovation culture.  Literature 
tends to focus on innovation in general or on incremental innovation and where radical 
innovation is the subject of the research this tends to be in larger firms.  This research 
makes a contribution to designing a change programme to facilitate aspects of a radical 
innovation culture for a mature SME. 
8.4.1 Practitioner contribution 
For practitioners, the research findings can be used to help understand aspects of 
organizational culture that facilitate radical innovation.  The nine themes influencing 
radical innovation have a degree of generalizability outside the specific context of 
Cerulean.  These themes represent aspects of organizational culture that influence 
radical product development.  The framework of ideal types forms a starting template 
for evaluating other organizations’ radical innovation cultures.  The composite 
instrument developed indicates the propensity for radical innovation in a small mature 
company, and may find application in other organizations where radical innovation is 
no longer prevalent.  Although the research will be contextual to Cerulean, there are 
features that may be relevant to other SMEs struggling with a lack of innovative 
capability.  As Parker states (2000:  222), ‘all organizational cultures are unique, yet at 
the same time they share similar features’.  Developing a radical innovation capability is 
of interest to a growing number of firms.  The interventions suggested as part of the 
research are designed to develop a radical innovation culture.  These interventions are 
based on empirical examples and address the reduction of the gap between the extant 
and ideal position of the innovation culture.  For practitioners the contribution is 
therefore in what a radical innovation culture “looks like” and “how to get there” 
(Hargadon, 2003).  Ambidexterity is a concept that is often used in describing the 
operation of radical innovation concurrently with incremental innovation (O’Reilly III 
and Tushman, 2004; Stringer, 2000; Tushman and O’Reilly III, 1996; Tushman and 
O’Reilly III, 1999).  The two innovation types sometimes require different conditions 
and management (Markides, 2004).  On occasions, what facilitates one may inhibit the 
other.  This research makes a contribution to the area of innovation management, in 
designing a plan of interventions to create a radical innovation culture within a larger 
incremental culture. 
     Finally in the field of innovation management, the research suggests that as the 
innovation process is contingent, innovation in the innovation process ensures it 
remains effective as the internal and external factors change. 
8.4.2 Academic contribution 
For academics, the research contributes to knowledge concerning aspects of 
organizational culture that facilitate radical innovation.  This knowledge is trans-
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disciplinary and adds to the domains of innovation management, organizational culture 
and organizational creativity. 
     This research adopts an experimental, “probe and learn” approach to organizational 
development to stimulate an innovation culture for radical product development in a 
medium sized mature engineering firm, which is part of a larger multi-national 
corporation.  The researcher has deployed a grounded participative methodology, within 
a “live” new product development (NPD) team to surface key aspects of a radical 
innovation culture.  The research can be considered to be a live experimental approach 
to organizational development.  This “probe and learn” approach adds to the theoretical 
knowledge of organizational development for transformational change.  The stage of the 
work discussed in this thesis represents the diagnostic phase.  The next stage would be 
to undertake the interventions in the same experimental “probe and learn” manner. 
     As the research is participative, it is well placed in its potential for developing theory 
that will be relevant to practice (Huxham and Vangen, 2003).  This participative 
approach to developing knowledge of the members’ perceptions of a radical innovation 
culture and on creating a radical innovation capability from an insider perspective 
contributes to mode 2 knowledge production (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, 
Schwartzman, Scott, and Trow, 1994; Tranfield and Starkey, 1998; MacLean, 
MacIntosh and Grant, 2002; Tranfield, 2002) in the domains of Innovation Management 
and Organizational Culture. 
8.4.3 Researcher as a practitioner 
This research includes an insider action research content.  This inevitably had an 
influence on the response of participants to interviews, workshop sessions and 
discussions about the research activities.  The methodology adopted used triangulation 
in the form of established assessment tools and a journal kept by the researcher as a 
method of validating what had been developed in the participative work with the team.  
This brand of insider participative action research is less usual.  The methodological 
approach to this research required the experiential involvement of the researcher, the 
absence of a priori analytical categories and an intent to understand a particular 
situation (Evered and Louis, 1981).  The researcher was also a senior manager and the 
inquiry was not “seen from the outside”, but rather “seen from within”.  The 
triangulation of the findings developed from a grounded methodology through 
observations and assessments adds to the validity of the innovation model developed.  
The approach adopted would have applicability in other situations in which the 
researcher in the role of practitioner has similar opportunity to influence the responses 
from the research subjects.  There is therefore a contribution to methodology for this 
form of action research.  The areas of contribution are summarized in 
 154 
Table 8-1. 
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Table 8-1  Domains of contribution and extent of contribution of the research 
 What has been 
confirmed? 
What has been 
developed? 
What has been 
found which is 
brand new? 
Theoretical 
Knowledge 
Culture and climate 
for creativity. 
 
Top management 
influence on 
developing a radical 
innovation culture. 
 
 
Framework to 
understand radical 
innovation culture. 
 
Interventions suitable 
to develop a radical 
innovation culture in 
one small mature 
company. 
A probe and learn 
approach to 
organizational 
development for 
transformational 
change. 
Empirical 
evidence 
Aspects of 
organizational 
culture that 
influence radical 
product 
development. 
 
Themes developed 
through participative 
inquiry. 
 
Themes that 
influence radical 
innovation. 
Development of an 
instrument to allow 
self assessment to 
gauge a team’s 
position against an 
ideal Type II radical 
innovation culture. 
Methodological 
approaches 
Content analysis. 
 
Action research. 
 
Participative 
research. 
 
Use of KEYS and 
OCAI. 
 
Triangulation using 
different methods. 
Gauge for presence 
and intensity of a 
radical innovation 
culture. 
 
Combined use of 
KEYS and OCAI to 
gauge aspects of 
innovation culture. 
 
Unusual participative 
research by a senior 
manager in the 
business.  This is a 
one company, high 
influence situation 
where the researcher 
is also a practitioner. 
Knowledge of 
practice 
Interventions 
suitable for 
facilitating a radical 
product 
development. 
Strategic plan to 
develop a radical 
innovation culture in 
a small mature 
company. 
The innovation 
process is contingent. 
Innovation in the 
innovation process 
ensures effectiveness 
of change. 
8.5 Review of the research questions 
Section 1.3 outlines the research questions associated with this exploratory study.  In 
this section the questions will be reviewed in the context of the investigation that has 
been conducted.  The main research question was supplemented by four sub-questions 
that comprise the different stages of the research activity.  A summary response to the 
research question is outlined in Table 8-2 and to the sub-questions in Table 8-3. 
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Table 8-2  Research questions and review informed from the research 
Research question Review 
“What aspects of organizational 
culture facilitate radical product 
innovation and how can change 
be planned to leverage potential 
improvement?” 
 
The aspects identified are in the form of the nine 
themes.  Modelling these as archetypes of 
innovation culture provides a clear indication of 
the aspects of organizational culture that influence 
radical innovation. 
The development of a plan of interventions for 
Cerulean informs the second part of the question.  
These interventions are developed by reference to 
empirical examples with the ideal position for a 
radical innovation culture as the desired end-point. 
 
Table 8-3  Sub-questions and review informed from the research 
Sub question Review 
What are the known 
organizational culture enablers 
and inhibitors to radical 
innovation in mature small to 
medium sized design and 
manufacturing firms? 
The enablers and inhibitors for a radical innovation 
culture are informed through the literature review.  
This examines the enablers and inhibitors of a 
radical innovation culture from both theoretical 
and empirical perspectives.  These enablers and 
inhibitors form the basis of the aspects of an ideal 
radical innovation culture developed for the 
archetypes model. 
What are the perceptions of 
Cerulean employees and their 
extant position on the company’s 
culture for encouraging radical 
innovation? 
 
The employees’ perceptions are informed by the 
nine themes influencing radical innovation.  These 
themes were developed in a participative method 
with the team.  They represent their perceptions, 
not as a first snapshot, but as a refined and 
considered position of the aspects of organizational 
culture influencing radical innovation. 
What is the gap between the 
Cerulean current organizational 
culture and the desired future 
state for radical innovation? 
The use of the archetypes model provides the 
desired ideal position.  The gauging of the team’s 
perception of the current position against this ideal 
is informed by the use of the innovation culture 
assessment. 
What change be effectively 
planned to encourage a culture 
that will develop a radical 
innovation capability at 
Cerulean? 
A change programme in the form of a series of 
interventions is proposed.  These interventions are 
based on literature, empirical examples and DIF 
companies’ experiences.  The interventions are 
developed with the ideal position for a radical 
innovation culture as an objective.  This ideal 
position outlines aspects of such a culture.  The 
interventions are designed to shift the underlying 
values and beliefs, closer to a desired position, 
through the application of suitable artefacts. 
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8.6 Limitations of the study and further research 
8.6.1 Limitations in Project One 
The themes that have emerged from this stage of the research refer to that part of the 
organizational culture that relates to radical innovation.  They do not and are not 
intended to represent a complete picture of the organizational culture of the Cerulean 
company.  The themes do not exist as stand alone entities, but co-exist as 
representations of the innovation enabling or inhibiting culture in the Cerulean 
Development Team.  The data gathered relate to radical innovation, rather than 
innovation in general, and cannot be considered exhaustive.  A decision was taken to 
stop any further refining of the themes after four workshops.  Whilst there may have 
been the opportunity to further refine the themes, the dynamic perspective of the 
organizational culture suggests that dwelling on refining data developed through a 
grounded methodology is less useful the later it is done.  The organizational culture is 
continuously evolving, as the artefacts, values and underlying beliefs influence each 
other.  The nature of this research was very participative and the very fact of beginning 
to talk about radical innovation and engage the Development Team in a process of 
discussing and refining its perspective of this culture means that its initial views had 
developed from the early stages of the research.  As time progressed this involvement 
itself had an influence on its values and underlying beliefs, thus changing the innovation 
culture.  Too much time spent on introspection was likely to yield a view that is 
significantly outdated and therefore less valid.  The opportunity in this research was 
therefore to develop a reflection and refining process that retained an up-to-date 
perspective of the team’s innovation culture.  The objective of this was making sense 
from the data (Langley, 1999), and this was achieved to allow the research to progress 
to the next stage.  Further refining after a period of reflection may have added more 
insights. 
     The innovation culture archetypes were constructed in the light of existing theory 
and literature.  They also reflected the perceptions of the Development Team.  Although 
their results are not clear cut, Greenwood and Hinings (1993) are confident that 
organizations do tend to operate with structures and systems that approximate 
archetypes.  There is also evidence that organizations tend to move towards archetype 
coherence.  Passage between archetypes (organizational change) is less common than 
archetype stability (organizational inertia), and they argue that ‘archetypes are probably 
institutionally specific’ (1993:  1057).  Therefore generalizability beyond Cerulean of 
these forms of archetype may be limited.  Development of organization specific 
archetypes would however be facilitated by following the same participative approach 
as in this research. 
8.6.2 Limitations in Project Two 
The assessments provide a perspective of the Development Team at three levels.  
However, although the OCAI and KEYS have external validity, the radical innovation 
culture self-assessment based on the nine themes has internal validity.  This assessment 
instrument was not intended to provide a rigorously reliable and externally valid 
measure of the innovation culture.  The objective was to obtain an estimate of the 
team’s perception of the innovation culture in comparison to an ideal position – the 
Type II archetype.  This was an attempt to gauge more directly than was possible with 
KEYS and OCAI, the presence and intensity of the themes relating to radical innovation 
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culture.  However, there is no direct link from the OCAI and KEYS to the innovation 
culture assessment.  This assessment tool was derived by participative development 
based on the themes surfaced in Project One.  As this assessment tool is designed 
specifically for the research within Cerulean, it is considered adequate for repeated use 
on the same organization group as an assessment for the effectiveness of the planned 
interventions.  Further work would be required if this assessment tool were to be used 
outside the confines of this Executive Doctorate research.   
     For culture and climate assessment, it was considered impractical to evaluate all 
available instruments and then develop a suitable assessment tool.  Therefore, only 
more common assessment tools were considered.  The tools considered were required to 
be widely used, academically robust, validated and reliable.  In addition, it was 
considered preferable if the tool did not require specialist training or assessors in order 
to be utilized.  This, therefore, restricted the pool of assessments evaluated.  The nature 
of action research, involving the members of the team in making the change, was also 
considered when selecting instruments.  The assessment tool developed as part of this 
research was required to be suitable for use and understanding by the members of the 
Development Team.  This was considered necessary in order to preserve the ownership 
and participation that had been developed during the course of Project One.  Further 
research may indicate a broader pool from which a suitable composite instrument could 
be developed.  Recent literature suggests another instrument, part of an innovation 
audit, that may be relevant to gauging the radical propensity of the innovation culture 
(Goffin and Mitchell, 2005). 
8.6.3 Limitations in Project Three 
The interventions identified from literature and empirical examples were evaluated from 
the perspective of being relevant to changing the Cerulean Development Team 
innovation culture.  The interventions suggested are contingent to this research, 
although their foundation is in innovation management in general. 
     The interventions examined cannot be considered as exhaustive.  Those identified 
potentially create aspects of the desired radical innovation culture.  They act together to 
have an effect on the innovation culture of the group, but cannot be considered to act 
independently of each other.  Leonard-Barton suggests that when an organization is 
examined to identify the reason for its innovation capability, if a part is ‘pulled out to be 
examined, it comes out vinelike, trailing roots back to deeply held values and widely 
observed management practices’ (1992b:  25).  It is the interconnectedness that makes 
such systems difficult to imitate and fragile but effective.  There are likely to be other 
interventions that also act to develop the desired culture.  The outcome of applying the 
Cerulean set of interventions to another organization would be dependent upon the 
existing position of the innovation culture.  The suggested interventions may have some 
applicability in other mature SME organizations, but it would be pertinent to gauge the 
issues that are inhibiting radical innovation culture in these organizations before 
suggesting suitable remedies.  However, some of the research described in this report 
may be of benefit to similar organizations struggling with a lack of radical innovation 
capability.  Where there are clear similarities, similar interventions applied in a 
participatory manner may result in closer proximity to a Type II innovation culture.  
Further research would be required to test the extent to which the proposed 
interventions have widespread applicability. 
 159 
     The interventions identified from literature and case examples were evaluated from 
the perspective of being relevant to changing the Cerulean Development Team 
innovation culture.  The interventions suggested are therefore contingent to this 
example, although their foundation is in the innovation management in general.. 
8.6.4 Further research 
The main opportunity for further research is in observing the impact of the planned 
interventions implemented over time on the development of a radical innovation 
culture.  This would provide an opportunity for participative research in which the 
researcher as practitioner plays a central role in developing a radical innovation culture. 
     The composite instrument has potential to be further developed as an instrument to 
assess radical innovation culture.  KEYS and OCAI are creative climate and 
organizational culture assessments, and OCAI refers to a specific culture type 
(Adhocracy) that closely matches many aspects of a radical innovation culture. 
     Two opportunities for further research are in evaluating interventions suitable for a 
broader range of organizations and in developing interventions specifically focused on 
creating a particular type of belief.  This form of research is likely to be more academic 
in nature and the practitioner setting of this research precluded taking such an approach.  
The ultimate outcome for Cerulean is not the suggested list of interventions from the 
Executive Doctorate research, but in the creation of a radical innovation culture that 
facilitates a stream of radically new products. 
     Although the research is based on a single organization, this allows a deeper 
evaluation of the aspects influencing radical innovation.  The research strategy focuses 
on understanding the dynamics present within a single setting.  To build theory from 
case studies it is necessary to overlap the data analysis with data collection.  A study of 
this type produces large volumes of rich data.  The forced comparisons create new 
categories and concepts (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Overlapping this study with similar studies 
in other mature small organizations would add a broader range of data and allow more 
comparisons to be drawn. 
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8.7 Personal reflection on the research 
This research has been a fascinating journey; extremely demanding yet also satisfying.  
It has awakened an interest in management research which is likely to evolve through 
my future career aspirations.  Whilst in the beginning, embarking on the Executive 
Doctorate was a well considered course of action, my research developed in many 
unexpected ways.  The academic learning is woven throughout this thesis.  I will reflect 
here on my personal and professional development. 
 
     I have undoubtedly changed during the course of this research.  The ability to think 
critically, to evaluate and to write crisp incisive papers is considered to be a 
developmental aspect for an individual undertaking doctoral research!  I may have 
developed a little skill in this aspect, yet it is in being more critical of myself, of my 
assumptions and of my conclusions, that I have become more aware.  I find myself 
reflecting more about events around me, whether professional or social, and rather than 
accepting the proffered explanation for an event, I now consider the validity of any 
explanation and its robustness.  I have become more receptive to alternative 
perspectives to any given situation and alert to contradictory explanations.  I have 
learned that each perspective can have validity and yet can also be related to other 
perspectives.  The co-existence of multiple viewpoints, plurality and paradoxes are all a 
natural and necessary part of organizational life and survival. 
 
     I have also ventured into many different domains of research during the Executive 
Doctorate programme.  Some of these ventures overlapped with my own research, and 
some were driven by curiosity about a particular issue.  At times, it was difficult to 
resist the temptation to pursue a new area of interest and remain focused on the doctoral 
research area.  Some of these areas will undoubtedly be revisited in the future. 
 
     My company has also benefited from my doctoral research through my own personal 
and professional development.  Some of the actions taken to improve company 
performance in my role as Managing Director are based on ideas discovered or 
developed during this Executive Doctorate research process.  This is, in one way, 
recompense for the lack of total focus on my “day” job whilst undertaking the research. 
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Appendix C  OCAI Assessment Questionnaire 
Radical Innovation Project 
As part of the project to develop a radical innovation capability within Cerulean, an 
assessment of the organizational culture is being undertaken.  The assessment will take 
place at several points during the next twelve months as part of gauging how the innovation 
culture within this group is changing.  This assessment will be restricted to the Development 
Team and feedback will be to the Development Team only.  The individual information 
provided is confidential and will not be shared with any other person in Cerulean.  The 
feedback on the results will be at a group level only. 
The OCAI (Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument) is an established tool for gauging 
organizational culture.  It is one of a number of tools available and is considered to be the 
most suitable for this project.  It will be run alongside the KEYS assessment tool to assess 
creative climate.  
The purpose of the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) is to assess six 
key dimensions of organizational culture.  In completing the assessment, you will be 
providing a picture of how the Development Team operates and the values that characterize 
it.  No right or wrong answers exist for these questions just as there is no right or wrong 
culture.  Therefore be as accurate as you can in responding to the questions so that your 
resulting cultural diagnosis will be as precise as possible. 
You are asked to rate your “organization” in the questions.  Consider the “organization” to be 
the Development Team within Cerulean.  You are asked to assess the Development Team 
as it exists now, and as you would prefer it to be in the future.  The preference relates to a 
Development Team that has an innovation culture that supports and facilitates radical as well 
as incremental innovation. 
The OCAI consists of six questions.  Each question has four alternatives.  Divide 100 points 
among these four alternatives depending on the extent to which each alternative is similar to 
your own organization.  Give a higher number of points to the alternative that is most similar 
to your organization.  For example, in question 1, if you think alternative A is very similar to 
the Development Team, alternatives B and C are somewhat similar, and alternative D is 
hardly similar at all, you might give 55 points to A 20 points each to B and C and 5 points to 
D.  Just be sure your total equals 100 for each question. 
Note that in pages 1 and 2, the response column for the assessment is labelled “Now”.  
These responses mean that you are rating the Development Team as it is currently.  The 
assessment in pages 3 and 4 has a response column labelled “Preferred”.  In this part of the 
assessment you rate the Development Team as you think it should be in the future in order 
to be capable of delivering both incremental and radical innovation in product developments.  
You will note that the two assessments are identical except for the response column. 
If you have any questions about completion of the assessment please do not hesitate to ask.  
The results of the assessment will be fed back to the Development Team, and the intention is 
to use these results as a starting point for making changes within and around the 
Development Team.  These changes are intended to move the innovation culture in the 
direction of being more able to facilitate radical innovation. It is important therefore that you 
are as honest as possible in your responses, as these will form the basis for a series of 
actions to be undertaken by the team members.  Please return your completed assessments 
to Patrick McLaughlin.
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Name:____________________________________________     Date: ________________ 
 
The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Current 
 
1.  Dominant Characteristics Now  
A The organization is a very personal place.  It is like an extended 
family.  People seem to share a lot of themselves. 
  
B The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place.  
People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
  
C The organization is very results oriented.  A major concern is 
with getting the job done.  People are very competitive and 
achievement oriented. 
  
D The organization is a very controlled and structured place.  
Formal procedures generally govern what people do. 
  
 Total 100  
2.  Organizational Leadership Now  
A The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. 
  
B The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating or risk taking. 
  
C The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive results-orientated focus. 
  
D The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify co-ordinating, organising or smooth-running efficiency. 
  
 Total 100  
3.  Management of Employees Now  
A The management style in the organization is characterised by 
teamwork, consensus and participation. 
  
B The management style in the organization is characterised by 
individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom and uniqueness. 
  
C The management style in the organization is characterised by  
hard-driving competitiveness, high demands and achievement. 
  
D The management style in the organization is characterised by 
security of employment, conformity, predictability and stability in 
relationships. 
  
 Total 100  
4.  Organizational Glue Now  
A The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and 
mutual trust.  Commitment to this organization runs high. 
  
B The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to 
innovation and development.  There is an emphasis on being on 
the cutting edge. 
  
C The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on 
achievement and goal accomplishment.  Aggressiveness and 
winning are common themes. 
  
D The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and 
policies.  Maintaining a smooth-running organization is 
important. 
  
 Total 100  
                                                       Page 1 of 4 
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The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Current 
 
5.  Strategic Emphases Now  
A The organization emphasises human development.  High trust, 
openness and participation persist. 
  
B The organization emphasises acquiring new resources and 
creating new challenges.  Trying new things and prospecting for 
opportunities are valued. 
  
C The organization emphasises competitive actions and 
achievement.  Hitting stretch targets and winning in the 
marketplace are dominant. 
  
D The organization emphasises permanence and stability.  
Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important. 
  
 TOTAL 100  
6.  Criteria of Success Now  
A The organization defines success on the basis of the 
development of human resources, teamwork, employee 
commitment and concern for people. 
  
B The organization defines success on the basis of having the 
most unique or newest products.  It is a product leader and 
innovator. 
  
C The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the 
marketplace and outpacing the competition.  Competitive market 
leadership is key. 
  
D The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency.  
Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low-cost 
production are critical. 
  
 TOTAL 100  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Page 2 of 4 
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The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Preferred 
 
1.  Dominant Characteristics  Preferred 
A The organization is a very personal place.  It is like an extended 
family.  People seem to share a lot of themselves. 
  
B The organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place.  
People are willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
  
C The organization is very results oriented.  A major concern is 
with getting the job done.  People are very competitive and 
achievement oriented. 
  
D The organization is a very controlled and structured place.  
Formal procedures generally govern what people do. 
  
 Total 100  
2.  Organizational Leadership  Preferred 
A The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify mentoring, facilitating, or nurturing. 
  
B The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify entrepreneurship, innovating or risk taking. 
  
C The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify a no-nonsense, aggressive results-orientated focus. 
  
D The leadership in the organization is generally considered to 
exemplify co-ordinating, organising or smooth-running efficiency. 
  
 Total 100  
3.  Management of Employees  Preferred 
A The management style in the organization is characterised by 
teamwork, consensus and participation. 
  
B The management style in the organization is characterised by 
individual risk-taking, innovation, freedom and uniqueness. 
  
C The management style in the organization is characterised by  
hard-driving competitiveness, high demands and achievement. 
  
D The management style in the organization is characterised by 
security of employment, conformity, predictability and stability in 
relationships. 
  
 Total 100  
4.  Organizational Glue  Preferred 
A The glue that holds the organization together is loyalty and 
mutual trust.  Commitment to this organization runs high. 
  
B The glue that holds the organization together is commitment to 
innovation and development.  There is an emphasis on being on 
the cutting edge. 
  
C The glue that holds the organization together is the emphasis on 
achievement and goal accomplishment.  Aggressiveness and 
winning are common themes. 
  
D The glue that holds the organization together is formal rules and 
policies.  Maintaining a smooth-running organization is 
important. 
  
 Total 100  
                                                       Page 3 of 4 
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The Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument – Preferred 
 
5.  Strategic Emphases  Preferred 
A The organization emphasises human development.  High trust, 
openness and participation persist. 
  
B The organization emphasises acquiring new resources and 
creating new challenges.  Trying new things and prospecting for 
opportunities are valued. 
  
C The organization emphasises competitive actions and 
achievement.  Hitting stretch targets and winning in the 
marketplace are dominant. 
  
D The organization emphasises permanence and stability.  
Efficiency, control and smooth operations are important. 
  
 TOTAL 100  
6.  Criteria of Success  Preferred 
A The organization defines success on the basis of the 
development of human resources, teamwork, employee 
commitment and concern for people. 
  
B The organization defines success on the basis of having the 
most unique or newest products.  It is a product leader and 
innovator. 
  
C The organization defines success on the basis of winning in the 
marketplace and outpacing the competition.  Competitive market 
leadership is key. 
  
D The organization defines success on the basis of efficiency.  
Dependable delivery, smooth scheduling, and low-cost 
production are critical. 
  
 TOTAL 100  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                       Page 4 of 4
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Appendix D  Innovation culture assessment scoring sheet 
 
 
 
Type II innovation culture 
Radical 
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Exploration and discovery are part of the way things are 
done.  Opportunity is provided to try new ideas.  The 
team have a high degree of control over what steps they 
take to achieve the objective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
Taking risks is encouraged.  Uncertainty is a part of the 
environment and discovery is accepted as being linked 
to taking risk. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
There is a desire to grow and develop the ability and 
knowledge of the group.  A hunger to know more and 
know why.  The team are encouraged to gain new skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
People outside the team expect a “do differently” 
approach to new product development.  People outside 
the team have confidence that the team will develop a 
radically different solution that will resolve the problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
The team are confident that they can find a radically 
new solution.  Working with and respecting the 
individual talents of the other team members is a normal 
way of working.  The team is comfortable with a 
questioning, and challenging of new ideas, and this is 
usually built upon to develop useable new ideas. 
The team is an autonomous unit that believes it can “do 
differently” to provide the radical solutions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
Alternative perspectives and awareness of new 
technologies are constantly being sought by the team.  
These provide an array of possibilities that the team can 
call upon to resolve internal problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
Overall objectives are not specific but outline targets.  
These allow the team to make decisions about how to 
achieve these objectives.  A degree of latitude in the set 
objectives is provided to the team. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
There is a mix of creative individuals in the team who 
have sufficient experience inside or outside the subject 
area such that they can apply lateral thinking to provide 
a radical solution.  The team comprises different minded 
individuals who can work with some degree of 
uncertainty and conflict as part of the day-to-day 
activities.  If disagreement happens because of this, then 
that is accepted. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
A management style that encourages risk taking is 
prevalent.  Rule following and conformance to 
procedures is not enforced and not considered to be 
necessary.  Resources are neither abundant nor too 
tightly restricted.  A “Champion” provides support for 
new product projects at a high level in the company. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0 
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Appendix E  Proposed intervention plan for Cerulean 
 
Proposal for developing a radical innovation culture in Cerulean: 
Introduction 
During 2005 the Cerulean Development Team suggested six interventions to help create 
an innovation culture which facilitated radical innovation.  These interventions were:- 
 
 
1 Better time management, to allow slack, to allow some personal (radical) 
development projects to take place. 
2 Development Team members to be permitted and supported to undertake 
personal development projects that would be available for an “Ideas Market” 
session.  This venue to be used as a forum to allow decisions to be made on what 
should be allowed to continue and what should be dropped amongst the personal 
(radical) development projects. 
3 Resource allocation to be made available to support these personal (radical) 
development projects. 
4 Visits to external sources for ideas.  Other companies, suppliers, customers, 
universities would provide sources of ideas for what is possible. 
5 Exposure to the Sales team members and customers to better understand the 
potential issues facing customers, the industry and the company. 
6 Management to work with the Development Team to facilitate these actions and 
to demonstrate trust in the team. 
 
Since that time, other interventions from companies that wished to develop a similar 
innovation culture have been evaluated.  These companies included 3M, BMW, Hewlett 
Packard and Mattell.  The actions taken by these companies have been examined in 
relation to the nine themes originally derived by the team and against the six proposed 
interventions.  From this list of actions, an implementation plan consisting of a series of 
seven interventions is proposed for Cerulean.   
 
Proposed interventions for Cerulean 
The interventions form a holistic approach to developing a radical innovation culture.  
They take place sequentially and culminate in the team selecting and developing a “do 
different” product for the company.  Each intervention on its own is unlikely to develop 
the desired culture, but taken together they form a series of interventions that inter-relate 
and lead to the team undertaking a project of their own. 
1. Team membership 
Team membership strengthened to add in “do different” skills and attitude. 
This intervention seeks to add individuals to the team who have a “can-do” attitude, 
who have a high level of training or skills and who are willing to think of “do different” 
solutions to problems.  Selection of such individuals will necessitate some form of 
assessment of their attitude and skills levels.  Innovative or adaptive behaviour can be 
assessed using the Kirton Adaptation Innovation (KAI) measure.  Attitude and 
psychological profile could be assessed by using Myers Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
psychometric evaluations.  Skills can be assessed by using specific skill assessment 
techniques or by past performance and delivering results by using those skills. 
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This intervention seeks to add people to the Development Team, rather than develop the 
ability of the existing team.  This is suggested on the basis that the skills level and 
psychological profile that the current team has is unlikely to be significantly changed in 
the short-term by retraining the team members.  Adding people with higher degrees and 
post degree experience is likely to improve the skill levels in the team.  The desired 
artefacts from this intervention are presence of skilled individuals in the team.  The 
values being developed are a desire to question and challenge existing beliefs, to re-
frame problems and re-use knowledge from external sources to solve those problems.  
The extant Cerulean team shows significant risk aversion, and is comprised of 
individuals with long service.  Many of them have no degree level qualification.  
Adding in the “do different” attitudes of new team members is likely to begin to change 
the attitude of the team members to risk taking and thinking of “do different” solutions. 
2. Idea knowledge gathering and sharing system 
This system can be achieved through two different interventions.  Firstly, creating and 
operating a system that traps ideas and facilitates sharing across all team members.  This 
system would be based on a database, possibly an SQL database, and be used to log 
ideas and facts about new technologies.  This intervention is at the artefact level, in that 
it provides a system and process to use the system, thus acting as a tool to gather and 
share new ideas and facts.  The system on its own will not provide radical 
breakthroughs, but it can act to support the values of the team members in making these 
breakthroughs.  A hard copy print would be made at regular intervals for record 
purposes.  The ideas would be reviewed on a regular basis to identify those that might 
be worth developing.  Secondly, the creation of an ideas area for the team.  This is a 
physical space where ideas can be put forward in physical form, refined, critiqued, 
where new technology can be examined, interesting pieces of equipment can be 
evaluated and retained for future inspection.  It would act in the same way as the first 
intervention, the database, but in this case it would retain physical objects rather than 
ideas or knowledge.  Having a display area for team members to add or critique ideas 
related to the physical objects would act in conjunction with the knowledge based 
system.  This intervention would provide some of the framework to support the “do 
different” behaviours. 
3. External input 
This intervention would elicit input from external sources.  These are sources outside 
the company which may also be outside the tobacco or tube packing industry.  The team 
members would be encouraged to visit external sources for ideas and new knowledge.  
This information would be recorded in the system described in Intervention 2.  The 
external sources would include exhibitions of technology, trade fairs, university 
contacts,  Discontinuous Innovation Forum and other companies who offer access to 
new technologies.  In addition, external speakers, “experts” in their own area would be 
asked to present their ideas and views to the team at regular intervals to support the 
external input.  The contact with universities would be a suitable initial source for these 
external speakers.  This intervention is designed to develop a sense that going outside 
for ideas is part of the way things are done. 
4. Idea gathering as a process 
The objective of this intervention is to develop the first three interventions into a 
process whereby idea gathering is perceived to be part of the routine of the group.  A 
weekly brainstorming session is proposed to initiate this.  This session would be held 
each Wednesday at 2pm, in order to provide regularity and embed the process into the 
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behaviour of the group.  This session would be facilitated by different people each 
week.  The output would be input into the idea gathering system described in 
Intervention 2.  This would also be a suitable venue to have people external to the 
company to attend. 
This external input would add new ideas to the group knowledge.  It is proposed that 
each session selects a particular focus that is relevant to the business, and allows the 
session to generate multiple ideas for resolving the issue.  The generation of these ideas 
would be enhanced by the external knowledge gained as part of Intervention 3.   
5. New product areas to be identified 
This intervention takes the ideas and knowledge generated from interventions 2, 3 and 
4.  The proposal for this intervention is to ask the team to create a list of potential new 
product areas.  These product areas should be described in sufficient detail to allow the 
team to select one and develop a product that fits into the new product area.  The 
product areas should be new to the company and new to the industry, or for a different 
industry.  The objective of this intervention is to encourage the team to develop possible 
opportunities for product development that moves the team into the radical innovation 
area.  The specification for the product groups should be sufficiently clear to indicate 
that an iteration of an existing product would not be suitable, but sufficiently open-
ended to allow the creativity of the team to provide a series of potential new areas for 
product development.  The task would be defined as identifying a new product area, 
potential product applications, benefits to the business, estimated costs and selling 
process along with the associated outline plan for development.  Depending on the 
constitution of the team following Intervention 1, it may be more appropriate to allocate 
this task to a number of teams created from the whole Development Team, rather than 
each Development Team member.  This intervention builds on the preceding 
interventions to produce a number of possible development routes for the company. 
6. Show and tell presentation 
This intervention takes the new product opportunities created in Intervention 5 and with 
input from the commercial and operations areas of the business selects one suitable for 
developing into a new product for the business.  The proposal is for a group evaluation 
of the product opportunities.  Each idea would be presented by the individual or team 
responsible for its creation.  These proposals would be evaluated at a session where 
other members of the company had the opportunity to test the thinking and feedback 
their view of the probability of the product proposal being of benefit to the company.  It 
may be suitable to run such a session internally with the Development Team, prior to 
opening the ideas up to the company at large.  This venue would be used to discuss the 
relative merits and drawbacks of each of the product proposals.  This intervention 
would provide a showcase for the creative output of the Development Team.  This 
would provide a degree of confidence in the team being able to think of “do different” 
solutions.  This would in turn, strengthen the confidence of the team. 
7. “Do different” project 
This is the final stage in this series of interventions.  This builds on the preceding steps 
and uses one of the product opportunities from Intervention 6 as the basis of a radical 
innovation project.  This project would be initiated on the basis that it may, or may not, 
become a production product, but that the development of the product would still take 
place.  The selection of a “do different” project would have a degree of ownership by 
the team as it would flow from their involvement in the preceding interventions.  The 
project would be given to a team drawn from the Development Team members with a 
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clear overall goal, but without a high degree of specification being provided.  As the 
product opportunity will have evolved from the work of the team this would be a 
different scenario from providing a full specification for a new product.   
This ownership of the project would be important to reinforce the willingness to 
undertake the development of such a “do different” project.  A segregated area should 
be provided if possible, to create the perception that the project is “different”.  Resource 
allocation would be provided as per other development projects, as it would be a 
legitimate product development.  A bonus for completion of project deliverables would 
be offered to the project team.  These deliverables should reflect that the project may or 
may not deliver a viable product, but nevertheless would contribute to the knowledge of 
the team.  This step would again build the confidence of the team and those outside the 
team that “doing-different” in product development was an acceptable, and indeed 
expected, behaviour for the Development Team. 
 
Carrying out the proposed interventions 
This plan focuses specifically on the Development Team and senior management in 
Cerulean.  The interventions are not a set of stand alone actions.  They operate as a 
sequence of interventions that build on the preceding activity to develop a culture that 
facilitates radical innovation within the company.  The interventions themselves should 
not be adopted as a prescriptive set of instructions.  Implementation should be in the 
same participative manner as the early stages of the innovation project research, where 
there was regular feedback to the team and validation of what was being developed.  
This allowed understanding by all members of the team and facilitated input from those 
who wished to influence the outcome.  The same approach is suggested for the 
implementation of this set of interventions. 
 
Measuring progress 
It is proposed that regular reviews are carried out to gauge the progress with developing 
the innovation culture.  The climate and culture assessments carried out previously 
should be used to provide a starting point and progress guide for the duration of the 
interventions.  However, it is suggested that this gauging be undertaken no more 
frequently than every three months in order to allow sufficient time for the interventions 
to have an influence on the behaviour of the team.  The assessments should also not be 
the sole method for gauging progress.  The regular reviews, through workshop sessions 
would provide good feedback as to the effect of the interventions. 
 
Conclusion 
The interventions have been developed by examination of examples from several 
companies.  The format of the interventions is designed to suit Cerulean, but the 
implementation will need to recognize that adaptation will be required as the 
interventions progress, depending on the response of the Development Team and their 
attitude to the change.  The active involvement of the team and senior management is 
essential to allow the interventions to influence the behaviour of the team.  A 
prescriptive following of interventions 1 to 7 without recognizing the progress at each 
stage and reviewing with the team is unlikely to produce the desired culture.  Culture is 
“the way we do things round here”.  It is a series of learned responses that provide an 
acceptable outcome.  The desired outcome is an innovation culture that facilitates 
radical innovation, and since this is a “do different” activity, there is no “one right way” 
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of achieving this.  In addition culture is created and maintained by the people in the 
organization.  The involvement of the team and senior management, (the group of 
people who have the most influence on the Development Team culture), is an essential 
part of making the change. 
